Utilizing lateral organizational patterns in a research and development function - Mission planning for manned spaceflight by Sullivan, L. J.
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19700023572 2020-03-11T23:19:41+00:00Z
.... ,.. 
' .. -
." . ~ , 
. '. >'", ~ 
•• .. ' ~ .~ . 
. '. ~. . ""., 
... 
NGL-32-004-o42 - Univ. of New Mexico 
This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's com-
mittee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of The 
University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of 
~1aster of' Art s in Public Administration 
UTILIZING LATERAL ORGANIZA'I1IONAL PAT'I1ERNS 
n.IN A RESEARCH AND DEv~LO~M~~T FuNCTIoN: 
I~ISSION PLANNING POR HANNED SPACEFLIGHT 
Leslie James Sullivan 
Candidate 
Division of' Public Administration 
Department 
Dean 
"'V)I2 ec...., ~', I ~ 2 II 
Date 
Committel1 
(CATEGORYI 
, 
1 
\ 
./ 
.~ 
I 
} 
~I~~' .. ~.-
, ' 
I; 
, .... i 
:~ 
:;~ 
, ) 
:' . <:, 
:c'" 
... 
, " 
. \ 
, I ., [" 
I'. , 
_, _.' • '!"~ " : ~ .•• ~. :, •• ':;":'.~_:~ "" •• ~. _'. '. ":' ~.".~~ -o~- .,.-~ 
". " ...... .,' :', 
. :. " ~ 
.. '
• ,.. _. " A' ,. .~' 
: .. 
; ",~ 
UTILIZING LATERAL ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS 
IN A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPHENT Fu1~CTION: 
. 
MISSION PLANNING FOR HANNED SPACEFLIGHT 
BY 
LESLIE J~rES SULLIVAN 
B"S., Marquette University, 1952 
THESIS 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Master 0:£ Arts in Public Acll11inistration 
·1 
in the Graduate School of 
'TheUniversity of New Mexico 
Alhuque1"que, New Mexico 
June, 1970 
'" ~. 
! 
f 
~ 
1 
i 
I 
I 
1./ 
f·, ' 
'r'" 
,', 
'," '". ," . ~ 
t . • .' ~.;:.-
" , 
',' " 
" 
. ~ ... ' " 
••... "! 
"" .~ 
, , 
" ... 
'" ,. 
.~ .. 
,.: .... :!;' 
, .... 
, -
, , 
. -'..-.. , 
, " .~ '. : ~... ~ 
, 
",': 
" I' i 
," 
. '. 
r '" .... ,.,-
. .. :', 
. , 
; ~. 
'" 
!,' ~.~ 
i 
'. ~ 
, " 
'. , 
,', 
',' -,-., ".',.'.'--".~; ~ ,. , .:~: .. ~.;-
9'" ".r 
.~- - __ C'H 
..... 
~. " 
' ... ' .. 
. .. ~:"". :~:", '.' .. 
, . " 
. ' .. " 
~ ..." 0., .. 
.. ' 
' .. '. 
i 
~ -."' ',:" '''1 
';" -". 
,;; ......... <, ...... -.;; 
'.. . ",. 
. ' 
. :".: ',' 
....... . .... 
':- . \ ~ ~ 
" , 
. . : .. 
, ' 
.... '.': 
~ •• ,:,,~.:~.4· ,' .. ' .... ~ ~"'_ 
.: ... ' .. ,: .. ' .'., 
" 
. . ~. . 
~. ". '.. 
': ,.:.- ',1.1; .... 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This thesis was prepared by the writer as an In-service 
Fellow in the Program for Advanced Study in Public Science Policy 
and Administration, University of New Mexico. 
My thanks and appreciation are extended to the follow-
ing individuals for their support. 
1. To the personnel of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the University of New Me~ico, whose leader-
ship was instrumental in establishing this Program, 
2. To my superiors at Manned Spacecraft Ce.nter ~vho provided me 
this opportunity for advanced study. 
3. To Albert H. Rosenthal, Director, Program for Advanced Study 
in Public Science Policy and Administration, who not only 
implemented the Program, but who through seminar, consistently 
stressed not only the requirement for high standards and goals, 
but also the administrative nece:-ssity of "getting on" with the 
task at hand, 
4. To the faculty and Fellows in the Program who provided a 
stimulating and meaningful environment, 
i 5. To the personnel at Manned Spacecraft Center who assisted me 
in developing the data necessary for this study, 
6. And, especially, to my wife, Helen, who typed and otherwise 
helped me in the preparation of this thesis--not out of 
iii 
-
, 
\ 
1 
I 
, t, 
t 
f 
! 
f 
I, 
! I 
I I' 
i 
\1 
\, 
1 
.. ~, 
. ' 
" 
", 
" 
, ' 
. : . 
~ .... ,' .. -.-;:; ... ::-. ~7;'··"7"~<·--·" ,........,...,-~ 
- '.;- - ;~:"; ....... ~.' ... :~-.. " 
t; •• ·.<; _ 
-
.... ' ',. . .... 
: .'. ~ 
., .. 
, ", 
. :, ~ .. 
. '": .' ,; 
',.,'. 
. '.' .'. 
: ..... ' 
. ~ . : ...... 
....... ,'. , 
'" 
' ... ' ' ••• ,0' 
.. 
" ' 
.•.. ' ",: " 
necessity, but rather in the spirit of working together. Also to my 
children, Claire, Chris, and Timmy, who had to bear with a father who 
was "getting on" with a thesis. 
" / 
-
\ 
'0" .; 
" ! 
'i, ' 
:' ' 
: . '. ~ '. 
f::·, i: :: 
.. , 
r" ,. 
~",; ", 
:;. . , 
,(' "'" 
'. ' !', 
I, " 
J 
i 
iv 
\ w' 
j 
t 
i 
i 
I 
1 
,. 
f 
I 
1 
\ 
, 
, ' . 
, 
.'" 
" 
,'. 
' .... , 
. :.': 
, ' 
,! '.~ 
. , 
, i-
.. ''', 
I 
'l 
f , 
I 
I 
r 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
.. 
, 
f 
f 
I 
. ~'.' ""~'. - .... ~:. 
, , 
, , 
:' .. " 
" 
. ' . 
'. -.-' .... ; .. '";.:.:~ .. ~:.<.~ .. ::-,": .. ::::.- :. - .. ' ,. ~ ,,; 
. ''-~ .' 
.... 
.. ;., " 
"., 
'l ." .... »,..~:, ... : .. ' 
,_., '. , 
: '"; '~'>.>'~: ";" '.. '~~.'-' ':.,.. ~:' . ' 
. ' .. : ..... 
-
. . 
. '. ~ .\:. :.: .. . . ~ .' " . 
.' .,". 
,',.1 
. .... \ 
... ; , 
,.' .' ·,9 •••• 
" . 
. ~.'. 
" .. " 
" 
...... -..... 
UTILIZING LATERAL ORGAJ:-TIZATIONAL PAT'TEHNS 
IN A RESEARCH AHD DEVELOFHENT FUrJCTION: 
MISSION PLANNING FOR MANNED SFACEFLIGHT 
" 
BY 
Leslie James Sullivan 
ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts in Publi.c Administration 
, in the Graduate School of 
The University of New Mexico 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 
JUne, 1970 
,I. 10; 
I 
I _____________________________ • ____________ ~~~.~~,------------------------~ 
v 
, 
\ 
I 
. \. 
1 
.: ' . 
.... ". 
, " . 
b 
1[ 
. "I 1t 
. ~.: 
,:-- ;' .:', 
, -. -. - ";+ .... '7' ... - . .-.-.r-;-,,'.'~; .• ,~.,~ .--:;;;-- ,L .,,4_. ~ 
.. ,' .. : 
... ' . 
.... 
".' '. ". 
, ~ _ •• f ~ • 
, '". 
" ... ",-.' 
:'1. .','".',: 
i-', 
': ': . 
. ' . ,: .. 
~:. " :~ . 
,:" 
", .. {, . -i • ' • 
. . 
" ~,; , 
, .. 's· 
UTILIZING LATERAL ORGANIZALIONAL PATTERNS 
IN A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPHEt-!T FUNCTION: 
MISSION PLANNING FOR t-1ANNED SPACEFLIGHT 
Leslie James Sullivan, M.A. 
Division of Public Administration 
The University of Ne\v Mexico, 1970 
Innovative management techniques developed for the Apollo 
Program may constitute as significant a contribution to our country's 
capabilities as the technical achievements--this concept is advanced 
by certain authorities, including James E. Webb, former NASA Admin-
istrator. This study focuses on a key organizational structure 
within the Apollo Program- -·spacefl ight miss ion planning, an organi-
zational structure exhibiting singular lateral patterns of organi-
•• 
zation. 
Three w';;)rking hypotheses comprise the thesis of this study. 
First, the mission planning structure ~s a reprrsentative example of 
Likert's multiple, overlapping group concept. Second, line super-
visors are the major factor integrating the activities of the cross-
. funttional groups into overall organization. Third, the use of 
multiple, overlapping groups is an extremely valuable tool in 
[ 
i 
achieving coordination. Three techniques are utilized in collecting 
data necessary for determining whether or not twelV~'evaluation 
criteria are met: (1) a survey of organizational lit:erai:!J.re is made 
\ 
to identify relevant concepts, (2) an analysis of the mission planning 
structure is made based on agency sources, and (3) information is 
utilized from a questionnaire submitted to members of the cross-
function groups. 
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The survey reveals that lateral coordination is treated in 
the literature, until recently, only in a most limited manner. 
o Authorities through the 1930's are concerned primarily with hier-
archical relationships. Traditional aut~orities develop concepts 
of specialization, departmentalization, and vertical coordination; 
for them, lateral coordination indicates deficiencies in organi-
zational design. M. P. Follett's concept of lateral coordination, 
however, is the exception; for her, effective coordination is 
necessarily early, direct, self-adjusting, and continuous. Com-
o .. 
mencing with C. 1. Barnard and H. A. Simon, and as fu,rther developed 
by contributions from the newer disciplines, concepts of lateral 
coordination take on increasing importance. By the 1960's 
authorities such as McGregor, Likert, Burns and Stalker, and Pelz 
and Andrews advance concepts involving definite patterns of lateral 
coordination~ Further, many of these authorities concurw'ith 
Likert's conce~t of mUltiple, overlapping groups as a basic building 
block for developing these lateral organizational patterns. 
The Apollo mission planning structure is composed of six line 
organizations which are coordinated in their mission planning 
activities by an overlay of twelve boards, panels, and working group~. 
Analysis shows that of the 121 members of these cross-function working 
groups, 53 percent are supervisors from the six line organizations; 
the remainder are non-supervisory members from the same organizations. 
Further, e1 ieven of twelve chai~mEmare supervisors; the majority 
being from one hierarchical level higher than the remaining members. 
Respondents to the questionnaire state: (1) Apollo mission planning 
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could not have been accomplished ~vithout this cross-function group 
structure, (2) utilization of this structure increases the overall 
quality of mission planning by 50-100 percent, and (3) membership 
by line supervisors is the most important factor contributing to 
effective cross-function group utilization. Respondents further 
state: (1) their time is more effectively utilized in these cross-
functional activities than in line organization activities, and 
(2) these cross-functional groups contribute substantially to 
creative results. 
In summary, it is concluded that the three hypotheses are 
verified. It is also suggested that the concept of cross-functional 
groups utilized in this structure may have an important implication 
for effective committee usage. It is recommended that managers 
systematically consider lateral coordination patterns in designing 
and updating their organizations; the Linear Responsibility Chart 
is suggested as one tool that can be productively utilized in lateral 
organizational analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The success of Apollo 11, man's first lunar landing mission, 
has been acknowledged worldwide to be a managerial, as ,,,elf as 
1 technological accomplishment of the highest order. The organiza-
tional structure ,"hich was developed at the Manned Spacecraft Center, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Houston, Texas, 
to plan the Apollo spaceflight missions performed a central, major 
function in the realization of this national objective. The purpose 
of this study is to describe, to analyze, and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Apollo mission planning organizational structure, 
especially its unusual pattern of lateral coordination~ In addition, 
dependent on the findings made and the conclusions reached, recom-
mendations are made, both tor practical use of the concepts developed 
as well as for suggested areas requiring further study. 
The methodology employed is essentially descriptive research, 
utilizing both primary and secondary data sources. A comparative 
analysis of the mission planning organizational structure is made in 
terms of relevant organizational concepts, based on a survey of the 
, 
literature. Furthermore, as preliminary data suggests especial 
2 
relevance to Rensis Likert's concept of multiple, overlapping groups, 
a major thrust of the comparative analysis is in terms of Dr. Likert's 
model. 
The study is divided into nine parts or chapters. Chapters I 
through III delineate the scope of the study. Specifically, Chapter I 
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establishes the significance of the study. Chapter II develops the 
working hypotheses, sets forth the assumptions made, and defines the 
boundaries of the study. Chapter III describes the research design, 
specifying the ways by which the hypotheses are tested and methods 
are used to accomplish the design. 
Chapters IV through VII develop the data in accordance with 
the research design. Chapter IV surveys the literature, outlining 
the major relevant concepts utilized in evaluating the Apollo mission 
planning organizational structure. Chapter V highlights the environ-
ment of the Apollo mission planning structure to aid in the inter-
pretation of the findings of the study. Chapter VI presents an an-
nalysis of the mission planning structure based on historical data 
sources. Chapter VII sets forth and interprets the results of the 
questionnaire concerning the lateral coordination mechanism sub-
mitted to personnel who participated in this aspect of the Apollo 
mission planning structure. 
Chapter VIII summarizes the findings of the study and 
presents the conclusions reached • 
Chapter IX concludes the study by making recommendations, 
both for practical application in ongoing organizations as well as 
others which indicate areas of potential research. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Representative comments are: 
(a) in an Editorial, ~dministrativ~ Management, September, 1969, 
p. 19. 
The giant leap by mankind \'7hich put human 
footprints on the moon was also a giant 
expression of the management process. 
(b) in an Editorial, Time, August 1, 1969, p. 24. 
• . many scientists are convinced that 
the fresh technical ideas that helped send man 
to the moon will ultimately make his material 
life far better on earth. Perhaps the most 
exciting promise, they say, is not in the 
technical achievements themselves, but in the 
mastery and management of the multiple skills 
that produced them. Teams of specialists had 
to harness their disparate talents in order 
to make so vast an enterprise as the Apollo 
program succeed. A similar cooperative effort, 
they contend, could be equally effective in 
tackling more earthy problems . • . • 
2. Rensis Likert, The Human Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1967), pp. lS6~l88. 
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CHAPTER I 
SIGNIFICANCE OF SlDDY 
' ... 
1 The Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) has been responsible 
for the design of all manned spacecraft and for the associated 
mission planning for all spaceflights flown by the United States 
2 In the short span of eleven years, MSC, a new organization, has 
oc: 
successfully accomplished three major manned spaceflight programs--
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. During the majority of this period, 
two or more of these programs were managed concurrently, in addition 
to other manned spaceflight programs currently in the planning or 
early developmental phases. Significant factors indicate it is 
warranted that attention should be focused on the MSC Apollo mission 
planning structure--a major organizational element, contributing 
materially to these program successes. The aim ofth'is chapter is 
to treat comprehensively the jU$tifications for selecting this area 
for study and to indi.cate possible study implications. 
Basically, three fa?tors, two primary and one secondary, 
shape the dIrection of t.h.e study~ First, as indicated briefly in 
the Introduction, the MSC Apollo mission planning organization per-
formed a key technical and managerial role in an endeavor which 
successfully achieved a national goal and 1;vhich, as President Kennedy 
predicted, would ". . . serve to organize and measure the best of 
oUr energies and skills ,,3 Many of ~he management practices and 
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concepts employed in this functional area are representative of 
techniques utilized, to a varying degree, throughout NASA in co-
ordinating the activities of the various organizations engaged 
nation-wide in support of the Apollo Program. As such it merits 
special study and consideration • 
Consider for instance, the comment of Torn Alexander, an 
Associate Editor of Fortune magazine, a few weeks before the lunar 
landing mission in an article entitled "The Unexpected Payoff of 
Project Apollo!" 
The really significant fallout from the strains, 
triaumas, and endless experimentation of Project 
Apollo has been of a sociological rather than a 
technological nature: techniques for directing 
the massed endeavors of scores of thousands of 
minds in a close-knit, mutually enhancive com-
bination of government, university, and private 
industry.4, 
Or consider the st,atement of Sir Charles P. Snow, noted British 
scientist and manager, who suggested that oni of the principal 
benefits of Apollo 11 was the new hope that the ". . technological 
and organizational skills of the whole NASA team •.• tlS were in-
dicative of th~ managerial resource~ available to the world for 
solving many of man's age-old problems. 
These statements embo!1y much of what James E. Webb, former 
Administrator of NASA has emphasized in recent years. For example., 
in September, 1968, in an address at Harvard University he stated: 
There is, as suggested earlier, the matter of 
how as well as what. The way in which we have 
built up . ~ . and what we, have learned in the 
process ••• and how well we adapt . . • may 
c6nstitute as important a contribution to bur 
Nation--to its ability to move forward into the 
future--as the space capabilities themselves. 
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and, further in the same speech, 
The essence of the job NASA has don~ is not 
that a new body of knowledge and technology 
was already at hand. The essence of our job 
has been that of organizing and managing the 
use of available kno'ivledge and technology in 
a purposeful and effective way~ This, funda-
mentally, has been a job of organizing and 
managing }?eople and simulataneously making 
sure citizen and their legislative represent-
atives were in a position to understand, to 
accept, and to sup ort what was being done 
and the purposes for which it was being done. 
Here, I believe, also lies the essence of the 
other great undertakings that our society will 
have to face up to. 6 
Another primary factor in selecting the MSG Apollo mission 
planning structure for study is the interest in the singular lateral 
organizational pattern tha~ has been developed to ensure effective 
coordination in the extremely complex mission planning process. 
This second factor may prove t.o be even more important from a 
fundamental research standpoint. The following paragraphs briefly 
outline the mission planning process and the associated lateral organ-
izational pattern that has been developed. 
I 
The function, mission planning, is concerned with the tra-
jectory,and flight Ptanning associated with the various spaceflights. 
However; the functional area encompassed is very broad. In the early 
design phases ofl a spaceflight program, mission planning designs 
strongly influence the configuration of the proposed spac,ecraft; in 
the latter developmental and operational phases of the program it is 
concerned with optimizing spacecraft performance and achieving 
specific mission objectives. Its considerations range from the place-
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ment of tracking stations around the world to the 'specification of 
specific actions that an astronaut will take at specific times in a 
mission. It is concerned not only with normal operations but also 
with planning for contingency events. It is characterized by a 
highly iterative work process essential to achievi.ng the compre-
hensive integration of the extremely numerous and interdependent 
elements of the final operations plans . 
In accomplishing the Apollo mission planning effort, a 
hierarchical system of boards, panels and working groups, official 
and semi-official in nature, has been developed to achieve the close 
lateral coordination required among the organizations having mission 
I ° °bOIOtO 7 p ann1ng respons1 1 1 1es. What evolved, in effect, is an organi-
zational matrix; an overlay of program-oriented organizational 
elements superimposed on the functional organization. Key member~ 
of the functional organization are given additional duties--on panels, 
committees, or boards with responsibility for effecting lateral 
coordination. These panels, boa.rds and committees are arrang·ed in a 
hierarchical system with member representation from corresponding 
levels of the fun'ct ional hierarchy. 
The implic~tibns associated with the development of this 
lateral organizational structure in the Apollo mission plannip.g 
area can be very significant. The organizational pattern that has 
d~veloped is apparently different 'from that which most organizations 
employ and may incorporate new concepts, or at least new techniques 
in its structure. Preliminary analysis indicates that it may have 
relevance to Dr. Likert's concept of multiple, oyerlapping groups, 
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especially as he has suggested that his concept would be of particular 
use in achieving coordination in large research and development organi-
8 
zations. If it should be proven that the MSC Apollo mission planning 
structure is representative of Dr. Likert's model it would constitute 
an important finding. For while Dr. Likert has indicated that "There 
are scattered examples indicating that the general approach . . . is 
9 
now being used at least partially • ," he has also stated that: 
Large governmental agencies as well as business 
enterprises are suffering from the failure of 
current efforts to solve the complex problems 
of coordination caused by extensive function-
alization. This failure is preventing govern-
ment, as -.;veIl as industry, fJ;om making full 
use of the new knowledge created by the extens-
sive research w'hich it is supporting. As a 
donsequence, large Federal agencies are not 
realizing a full return on their substantial 
r'esearch expenditures in the physical and . 
biological sciences and cannot do so until 10 
they can solve this organizational problem. 
A third factor, while possibly of secondary importance, is 
that the structure of MSC Apollo mission planning boards, panels and 
work groups also needs further study for reasons internal to MSC in 
order to claify its structure, interrelationships and'effectiveness. 
This aspect of the study may also have other, more important con-
siderations, as clarifications and improvements developed for internal 
MSC purpose may have broader implications in the overall study. 
In summary, each of the three factors discussed in this 
chapter demonstrate a need for a study of the !vISe Apollo mission 
planniugstructure. For here is a key organizational unit at, a focal 
point of one of the largest, most successful, technical endeavors of 
all time, an organizational unit that exhibits unusual lateral co-
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ordination patterns and which ShO\'7S characteristics of being 
representative of a conceptual model that a leading researcher 
proposes for organizations of the future, and an organizational 
unit whose structure and effectiveness has not as yet been 
adequately assessed. Taken together, these factors are compelling 
reasons for emphasizing that this area is a highly significant 
field for inquiry. The next chapter moves into the purpose, scope, 
and limitations of the study . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. For approximately its first two years (Oct., 1958 to Jan., 1961) 
Manned Spacecraft Center was designated as the Space Task Group. 
2. Manned Spacecraft Center hereafter, is referred to as ~1SC. 
3. President John F. Kennedy in an address at Rice University, 
Houston, Texas, September 12, 1962, as cited in The Apollo 
Spacecraft: A Chronology, Vol. I, by Ivan D. Ertel and Mary 
Louise Horse, The NASA Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 188 . 
~---
\ 
4. Tom Alexander, "The Unexpected Payoff of Project Apollo," Fortune, 
July, 1969, pp. 114-156 . 
5. Sir Charles P. Snow, "The Moon Landing," Look, August 26, 1969, 
p. 72. (Phrase underlined for emphasis by study author.) 
6. Address by James E. Webb, then Administrator, NASA, at the John 
Diebqld Lecture on Technological Change and Management, Harvard 
University School of Business Administration, Boston, Mass., 
September 30, 1968. 
7. At the request of the ApolLo Spacecraft Program Manager, MSC, a 
study of MSC mission planning was conducted. The result is NASA 
General Working Paper No. 10,080 entitled Mission Planning at 
the Manned Spacecraft Center, by Earle B. Young, William A. 
Larson and Wesley R. Westmeyerj (Houston: Manned Spacecraft 
Center, April 4, 1969). This stUdy has been a very useful source 
in providing data concerning the responsibilities and composition 
of the various mission planning boards, panels, and working groups. 
8. Ibid., p. 187. 
--,-
9. Ibid., p. 183. 
10. Ibid., p. 157. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE THESIS 
The basic purpose of this study is to describe, to analyze, 
and to evaluate the effectiveness of the HSC Apollo mission planning 
organizational structure. The chapter objectives are (1) to develop 
the principal ideas or hypotheses which, at least tentatively, pro- ' 
vide a conceptual basis for viewing and assessing the subject 
organizatiopal structure; (2) to establish definite boundaries of 
the study by both defining study exclusions, as well as by describing 
study content; and to (3) identify certain basic assumptions which 
have been made in conducting the study. 
Workin& Hypotheses 
, 
Preliminary data strongly suggest that the structure of 
boards, panels, and working groups which overlays the basic functional 
structure is a key element in the ove~all MSC Apollo mission planning 
structure. It is also this structure of boards, panels, and working 
groups, developed as a strong coordinating mechanism, which eVidences 
a! lateral organizational pattern not found, or at least not formally 
I 
identified in most organizations. Finally, it is this structure 
which in its relations with the functional organization that exhibits 
characteristics suggesting Dr. Likert's concept of multiple, over-
1 
lapping groups. Therefore, in view of these distinguishing traits 
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which the structure exhibits, the follow'ing ~'lOrking hypothes is is 
postulated. 
Working Hypothesis 1. The organizational structure developed 
to perform MSC Apollo mission planning is a highly representative 
example of the multiple, overlapping group structure proposed by 
Rensis Likert for large R&D organizations. 
As one views the overlay of N~C board, panel, and working 
group structure superimposed on the functional line organization, a 
number of questions are raised. First, what is the potential for 
conflict between elements of the line organ'ization and the board 
structure? Second, how is potential for conflict mi~? Third, 
what is the principal factor which ensures that~d structure 
activities are effectively integrated into the overall mission 
planning function? 
In r~gard to the first question, the potential for conflict 
is obviously very dependent both on the membership within thehoara 
structure as'compared with membership in the fUl1ctionalQrganization 
and is also dependent on the working relationships that have been 
established to coordinate the activities of these, organizational 
entities. Pertaining to the ~econd question, the potential for con-
fIict can bee££ectively minimized by having dual membership; that 
is, having all members of the board structure also be members of the 
related functional organization. As to the'third question, a very 
effective'method of integrat!ng board activities into the overall 
I 
mission ,pj,anning / function Vs 
/ to have the same personnel who perform 
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the integrating function in the functional organization also perform 
the same function in the board structure. In other words, the 
'integrating function should be performed by the line supervisors who 
also participate as members in the board-structure at levels com-
mensurate with their positions in the line hierarchy. This concept 
is consistent with statements of Dr. Likert who hf.\,s j--2;mphasized that 
supervisory particip~tion is essential in th~ multiple, overlapping 
group structure and that each multiple, overlapping group should 
have "a superior from the next higher level . . . included in each 
subordinate, cross-function work group."2 As a consequence, the 
following hypothesis is postulated. 
Hypothesis II. The major factor integrating the activities 
of cross-function groups into the overall organization is partici-
pation within these groups by line supervisors. 
Hypotheses I and II are concerned principally with the 
structure of the MSC Apollo mission planning structure. However, 
in addition to determining the organizational structure, it is 
, 
also essential for purposes ot this 's~lidy that the effectiveness 
of the mission planning board structure be determined. Hypothesis 
III is form1)lated with the objective o.fmaking that determination. 
Hypoth~s.is III.' The use of the mul tiple overlapping group 
structure is an extremely valuabl~ tool in achieving highly successful 
coordination in a complex organizational environment. 
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Boundari ~ of Study 
The boundaries of the study as described herewith involve 
3 
. two reference levels--organizational and conceptual. 
First, organizationally, the study treats only those six 
major organizations that are significantly involved in Apollo mission 
planning; it does not encompass the entire MSC organization. Second, 
this study basically treats these six organizations only in terms of 
their participation in the Apollo mission planning function. To the 
extent that these organizations perform other Apollo functions or 
similar mission planning activities in support of other programs, 
these aspects are not treated, except as they are directly relevant 
to this study. Third, the entire Apollo mission planning function 
is not included within the study; only those mission planning 
funCrtions which accomplished by the MSC organizational elements 
are included. However, as these MSC Apollo organizations;perform 
! 
the substantial portion. of the Apollo mission planning functions, 
it is not necessary to consider the mission plcmning functions per-
formed by other NASA organizations and contractors. In acldi,tion, 
the MSC Apo11o mission planning structure of boards, panels, and 
working groups was constantly evolving as it adjusted to program 
phase changes. Forpllrposes of this study, however, only the 
organizational structure as it exi.sted in the period (July, 1968 
I 
th1rough July, 1969) immediately preceding the first lunar landing 
mission is analyzed. 
The development of the board, panel, and working group 
structure into a strong lateral coordinating mechanism is evidently 
14 
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the most significant aspect of the MSC mission planning organization. 
Consequently, the primary thrust of the study is toward analytical 
concepts which can be utilized to explain and interpret the signifi-
cance of this lateral, organizational pattern. In that respect, 
concepts developed in such fields as classical and modern organiza-
tional theory, group theory, information theory, cybernetics, 
decision theory, motivational theory, etc., are utilized, as 
applicable, to analyze the subject structure. However, as the scope 
of the study is limited to concepts which are sufficiently broad to 
explain both organizational structure developments as well as 
theoretical concepts, many of the concepts in these fields of the 
literature will not be immediately applicable. 
Accordingly, although Dr. Likert has formulated a broad 
systems theory of organization, it is not within the scope of this 
study to analyze the MSC mission planning structure in terms of 
his overall theory. For example, while many of his concepts such 
. 4 
as the principle of supportive relationships, group methods of 
.' I ,5 
supervision, and even his basic concept of a consistent systems 
approach to orga~ization6 are probably relevant,7 they are treated 
only inci;dentally in the study. 
Furthennore, although the structure of boards, panels, and 
working groups naturaLly involves extensive use of meetings, the 
subject of effective methods and techniques of conducting committee' 
meet.iugs, etc., is not included as such within the mai'h thrust of 
the study. Rather, as indicated by Hypothesis II above, the concern 
is with broader organizational methods used for effectively inte-
15 
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grating con~ittee activities into the overall mission planning 
function. 
Assumptions 
Two fundamental assumptions are implicitly made in the 
fundamental approach to this study. The first assumption is that the 
style of management and operations within the MSC Apollo mission 
planning organization is basically in accord with characteristics of 
organizations at the borderline between Style 3 (consultative) and 
Style 4 (participative) in Dr. Likert' sco.ntinuum of management 
8 
systems. This assumption is based on two earlier studies conducted 
independently at MSC. The: first study was relatively limited and 
involved only the managers in one of the six organizations concerned 
·th .. 1 . 9 W1 m1SS10n p ann1ng. Measuring six factors which Dr. Likert 
uses to determine management style, the study showed that the 
managerial personnel at the various levels of the organization per-
I 
I 
ceived the organization style to be in the high consultative range 
for three factors (leadership, motivation and communication) and in 
the medium consultative range for the other three factors (decisions, 
goals, and control). The second, more recent study involveq. 'non-
managerial professionals in five of the six organizations involved 
10 
in mission planning. The results of this- study indicated the 
majority of the mission planning organizations were operating in 
the high consultative range,~ith the bne organization that had been 
surveyed earlier moving into the participative range. 
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The second assumption made concerning the MSC Apollo mission 
planning organization is that it is composed of highly successful and 
effective R&D organizations led by highly skilled technica~ managers 
and that therefore its methods of op~ration merit special study. This 
assumption is based on three factors. First, it performed a central 
role in what has been acknowledged worldwide as an outstanding 
technical and managerial accomplishment--the Apollo Program. Second, 
~he majority of organizations performing the mission planning function 
have received special recognition both by national professional 
organizations and top NASA management for their team per+ormance, 
not only for their work on Apollo but also previously, for work 
associated with Projects Mercury and Gemini. Third, leaders at the 
various levels of the mission planning organization have, during the 
years, received many special awards from national professional 
organizatiolls) other national groups, as well as recognition from 
the NASA organization for outstanding technical and leadership 
accomplishments. As an example, in considering only one type of 
award, mei:nbers. of the MSC Apollo mission planning structure have 
been selected in the last nine years on five different occasions 
for the Arthur Flemming A1;vard as one of ten outstanding men in govern-
mente 
In concluding this chapter , the following summa·ry statements· 
are made. First, basic assumptions are (a) that the organizational 
elements of the MSC Apo~Lo mission planning structure are highly 
I 
successful organizations led by personnel recognized nationally as 
outstanding technical managers and (b) that these organizations are 
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managed in a style that is characterized as a consultative-partici-
pative systems approach. Second, that although the study could be 
broadened both organizationally as well as conceptually, the main 
thrust of the study is limited to an analysis and evaluation of the 
lateral coordinating mechanism of the MSC Apollo mission planning 
structure. Third, and finally, the basic thesis is that the MSC 
Apollo mission planning structure, utilizing Rensis Likert's con-
cept of a mUltiple, o~erlappi~g group structure, has developed as 
an extremely valuable tool for achieving highly successful co-
ordination. The next chapter develops the research design by which 
the validity of the working hypotheses are tested. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Likert, The Human 9rganization, pp. 158-188. 
2. Ib~d., p. 176 . 
3. The entire subject of the MSC organizational environment is 
treated extensively in Chapter V, "MSC Environment," of this 
study. The subject of organizational concepts is treated 
further in Chapter IV, "Survey of the Literature," of this 
study. 
4. Likert, The Human Organization, p. 47. 
S. Ibid., pp. 49-51. 
6. Ibid., p. 123. 
7. See the next section, "Assumptions," in the current chapter for 
an expansion on this idea. 
8. Likert, The Human Organization, pp. 14-24. 
9. Frederik P. Williams, A Study of Organizational Behavibr and 
Management of the Flight Operatiions Directorate NASA - MSC 
(Unpu'blished study, Manned Space raft Center, dated July, 1968). 
10. Richard A. Hamilton, A Comparativ.e Analysis of .the Professional's 
Occupational Environment ~ the Manned §pacecraft Center (Houston: 
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, January, 1969) . 
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CHAPTER III 
- 1 
Tlm RESEARCH DESIGN 
The objectives of this chapter are (1) to specify the major 
criteria which are used to test the validity of the hypotheses, and 
(2) to set forth the research techniques used, as well as the se-
quence in which they are accomplished. 
Criteri~ for Validating Hypotheses 
. . 
In this section criteria are presented for validating each 
of the three hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. In 
addition, there is also shown the source of research data ,..,hich, in 
subsequent chapters, is compared with the criteria to substantiate 
or reject the respective hypothesis. That is, for each criteria it 
is specified q,s to whether the evaluation is conducted with secondary. 
research data (MSC organizational analysis dat,a) or primary research 
data (questionnaire results). If primary research data are llsed, 
the specific question(s) from which the data are obtained is so indi-
cated. A copy of the questionnaire with its associated cover letter 
is in Appendix A. The questionnaire itself is discussed in detail 
in the next section of this chapter . 
. ' . I Hypothesis I Validation Criteria 
Hypothesis I. The organizational structure developed to perform 
MSC Apollo mission planning is a highly representative example of 
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multiple, overlapping group structure proposed by Rensis Likert for 
large R&D organizations. 
Validation Criteria 
1. The organizational structure exhibits a lateral pattern of 
2. 
communication and interact:i.on at ". every hierarchical 
level • •• ,,2 as "a legitimate part of the formal system. 
(Figure 1 on the next page ShO\<78 three structural cross -function 
groups in a hierarchical structure.) 
Validation Data Sources: a) Analysis based on organizational 
data 
b) Questions 4, 14; 15 
Cross-function groups are "linked to the rest of the orgarri~ation 
4 by means of persons who are members of more than one group." 
These persons who hold overlapping group membership are termed 
linking pins. 
Validation Data Source: Analysis based on organizational data 
3. "Each cross-function group has as its superior a • • • person 
from the hierarchical level directly above that of the other 
5 
members'of the group." 
Validation Data Source: Analysis based on organizational data 
4. Group decisio~-making processes are heavily relied on within 
6 
the cross-function groups. 
Validation Data Source: Question 9 
5. Although participation in the cross-function group structure 
requires that direction be taken from more than one supervisor, 
such dual direction does not give rise to difficulties to the 
21 
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Figure 1. }1u1tiple, Ov.er1apping Group Structure 
From Rensis Likert: The Human Organization 
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employee involved. 
Validation Data Source: Questions 10, 11 
Hypothesis II Validation Criteria 
Hypothesis II. The major factor integrating the activities of 
cross-function groups into the overall organization is participation 
within these groups by line supervisors. 
Validation Criteria 
1. Analysis of org.anizational structure shows significant partici-
pation by line supervisors as linking pins between the cross-
function groups and the rest of the organization. 
Validation Data Source: Analysis based on organizational data 
2. An increase of line supervisory participation in cross-function 
groups increases performance capabilities of the groups. 
Validation Data Source: Question 13 
3. 
, 
Participants in cross-function groups recognize participation 
by line supervisors as a major factor in the integrating cross-
function activities with the rest of the organization. 
Validation Data Source: Question 16 
Hypothesis III Validation Criteria 
Hypothesis III. The use of the multiple overlapping group structure 
is an extremely valuable tool in achieving highly successful co-
ordination in a complex organization environment. 
Validation Criteria,. 
1. The cross-function group structure is v~ffective in ensuring 
that proper personnel.are involved in the deCision-making process. 
23 
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Validation Data Sources: a) Question 12 
b) Analysis based on organizational 
data 
2. The cross-function group structure significantly aids in the 
effective performance of the overall function. 
Validation Data Source: Questions 17, 18 
3. The cross-function group structure is very effective in providing 
lateral coordination. 
Validation Data Source: Question 5 
4. As the cross-function structure is an effective tool the partici-
pants recognize that their time and efforts are well utilized in 
the performance of this function. 
Validation Data Source: Questions 6, 7, 8 
Research Techniques 
The aim of this section is to describe the research techniques 
usedand the objectives they are designed to achieve in the study plan. 
A discussion of these techniques follows in order of the subsequent 
presentation in study. 
Survey of the Literature 
The goal of this survey is to provide an overall perspective 
of concepts in the literature which are useful for' analyzing the MSC 
Apollo mission planning structure. While the main thesis of the study 
is that Dr. Likert's the9ry provides a sound conceptual interpretation 
for the subject organizational pattern, the added .i,nsights from these' 
other concepts identified~ in the survey provide- an opportunity fo-r 
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more comprehensive productive analysis. 
. q .. 
The survey is divided into four major phases chronologically--
the Scientific Management Period (1885-1925), the Administrative 
Management Theory Period (1925-1938), th~ Multi-Disciplinary Period 
\ 
(1938-1960), and the Modern Organizational Theory Period (1960-present). 
The survey of the literature covering the first two periods is limited 
to the writings of acknowledged major contributors to the field of 
organizational theory from business and public administration. For 
the third and fourth period, the survey is broadened to include con-
cepts as may be relevant from the fields of communications theory, 
cybernetics, informatioTl theory, group theory, and decision-making 
theory. However, much of the work in these areas is not directly 
r~levant as many of the concepts and theories posite.d do not adequately 
consider the organizational structure except by implication, therefore 
only generalized trends will be indicated. The results of the survey 
of the literature are treated in Chapter IV. 
MSC Environment 
The purpose of this portion of the research study is to 
provide adequate background material concerning the environ~ent of 
the MSC Apollo mission planning structure in order to provide a 
proper perspective and thereby (~nhance the capability to analyze 
and interpre·t the study findings. The ba.sic data sources for this 
phase of the study a:~~ l~ASA historical reco'rds (secondary research 
data). 
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MSC Apollo Mission Planning Structure 
The purpose of this phase of the study is to comprehensively 
describe, analyze and interpret the ~ffiC Apollo mission planning 
structure. Consideration is given first to the normal, vertical 
hierarchical structure, then to the board, panel, and working group 
structure which forms the lateral organization pattern and finally 
to the inter-relationships between these two elements of formal system. 
Special studies conducted include analyses of board, panel, and 
working group membership (a) in order to compare board membership 
with membership in the rest of the organization, (b) to determine 
extent of line supervisor participation, (c) to determine if multi-
level hierarchical participation exists in each cross-function group, 
and (d) to determine extent members participate in more than one 
cross-function group. Primary data sources for this phase of the 
study are MSC secondary sources plus additional MSC primary source 
data needed to update information on board structure composition. 
Data obtained in analyses are used substantially to test Hypothesis 
I, and, in addition, to provide supporting data to test Hypotheses 
II and III. 
The Questionnaire 
th~ Questionnaire {see Appendix A) was formulated with the 
primary purpose ,to provide data noe otherwise available, but required 
for testing HYI'()theses II and III. In addition, it provides informa"" 
tion relative to the use of the board, panel, working group structure 
in other, prev,ious :HSC programs (Mercury and Gemini) as well, as to 
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determine the feasibility of using a similar organizational arrange-
ment in future programs. 
The mailed questionnaire is essentially in closed form style, 
\'lith twenty-one of the twenty-two questions providing for a multiple 
choice type of answer. The last question is in free form designed 
to enable the answeree to comment on any aspect of the }ffiC Apollo 
mission planning structure, relative to its make-up, effectiveness, 
or future application in other functions. 
Developed in accordance with the requirements for data 
outlined in the preceding paragraph, a preliminary version of the 
questionnaire was submitted to t'ivO members of the MSC technical staff 
for pre-te.sting. Based on their comments minor changes were made in 
three of the questions. Analysis of the board, panel, 'i'lorking group 
structure shows that total participation in the various board, panel, 
and working group meetings averaged about 128 members. Because of 
the relatively small size of the population it was d~termined to 
submit the questionnaire to all persons who substantially participated 
in any of the groups. This standard of "substantial participation" 
is! used as many of the questions require insight and familiarity with 
, , 
th~ cross-function activities that, can only be gained after such 
i 
participation. Thus, the term "substarttial" is defined to i-q.clude 
group members who participated in at least five meetings of their 
, " 
respective group during the year under study, or in those cases where, 
the group met less than five times during the year, all members of 
the group were included. Based on a revie'i'l of attendance records 
and the, abovie criteria, questionnaires were submitted on March 6, 
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1970 to ninety-one members of the cross-function groups with a request 
that they be completed and returned by March 13th. 
Appendix A of this study includes the cover letter (self-
explanatory) which was submitted with ea~h questionnaire. 
The questionnaire responses are presented and analyzed in 
Chapter VII. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter VIII, "Conclusions," correlates the evidence developed 
in Chapters IV through VII and arrives at an overall conclusion as to 
the proof or disproof of the 'vorking hypothesis. In addition, relevant 
concepts drawn from the survey are included to provide added scope of 
this study. 
The remaining chapters of the study implement this research 
design. The next chapter discusses the survey of the literature. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The research design approach and methodological terminology 
used in this paper is essentially that suggested in Jessamon 
Da~ve 's1'7riting"Business and Economics 'papers (Totowa, N.J.: 
2. 
3. 
4 •. 
5. 
6. 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1965). This book "ivas extremely 
useful in developing this research design. 
Other works consulted in this phase of the study, especially 
in regard to the questionnaire, include: 
Wilson Gee, Social pcience Research Hethods (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950), pp. 300-318. 
Paaline V. Young, Scientific Social Surveys and Research 
(Englew'ood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), pp. 
115-136, 176-203 .. 
Carter V. Good and Douglas E. Scates, Het.hogs of Research 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), pp. 277-
316, 604-634; 
J. Francis Rummel and Wesley C. Ballaire, Research Methodology 
in Business (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 
107-146. 
Likert, The Fum~ Organization, p. 173. 
Ibid.,)). 170. 
Il::>id. , p. 50. 
Ibid. , p. 165. 
Ibid. , pp. 49-51. 
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CHAPTER IV 
". 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an abstract of 
concepts advanced and techniques utilized in performing the· lateral 
coordination function in organizations. Certain concepts and tech-
niques in the abstract are identified and selected for later use in 
, 
the study to aid in the interpretation of findings involving the MSC 
Apollo'mission planning structure. The survey includes both a review 
of current concepts in the fields o~ organizational theory, communi-
cation,s theory, cybernetics, group theory, and decision-making theory, 
as well as a brief review of the writings of major contributions from 
earlier periods. 
The' survey as p~esented below is divided into, four major 
phases chronologically--the Scientific Management Period (1885-1925), 
the Administrative Management Theory Period (1925-1938), the Multi-
Disciplinary· Period (1938-1960), and the Hodern Organizational 
Theory Period (1960-Present). These periods are so titled to indi-
cate the main thrust of the organizational thought during the 
period. 
Scietl.tific Hanagement Period (1885-1925) 
This section c_onsiders the contributions of three authorities, 
Frederick W. Taylor, Henri Fayol and Mary Parker Follett, to the con-
cept of lateral coordination •. 
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Frederick W. Taylor 
Conventionally, the term "scientific management" is equated 
w'ith "Taylorism" and with time and motion studies. As a matter of 
fact, to a large extent, the major emphasis in the literature of 
this period is on techniques for improving production. l However, 
Frecerick W. Taylor stresses that he advocates " .•• a complete 
mental revolution •.• " on the part of workingmen and managers.2 
His concept of scientific management has four basic elements: 
"(1) science, not rule of thumb; (2) harmony, not discord; (3) 
cooperation, not individualism; (4) maximum output, not restricted 
3 
output." In addition, he elevates the status of management by 
assigning it new, specialized functions of planning and organizing. 4 
He also deve10pes the "functional" supervisor concept. That is, any 
number of staff specialists can directly cO,ntrol a worker with 
respect to his work in their field of specialization. 5 
Howev~r, although his new concept of management and his 
functional supervisor concept both reqtiire a significant increase in 
the number of staff specialists, Taylor advances no concept by which 
these staff specialist organizations coordinate their activities. 
Rather the emphasis in his works is placed almost exclusively on the 
idea of identifyit;lg, iso;lating, and assigni.ng to specialists the 
various tasks or fUl1ctions that must be performed in an organization. 
The concept of coordinatio~, which is a necessary coordinate element 
of specialization, is treated within his works only to the extent 
that " ••• supervisors would smooth out difficulties which arise 
3L . 
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between different • • 116 " I" t speC1a 1S s. Thus Taylor leaves the task 
()f handling the coordination function to others. 
Henri Fayol 
While Taylor developed his concepts with a perspective 
initiated from the shop floor, Henri Fayol's perspective is essentially 
7 
that of an executive director of a large coal and steel combine. 
F.ayol is recognized as having formulated one of the first general 
administrative management theories. He also is the fl ••• earliest 
known proponent of a theoretical analysis of managerial activities; 
an analysis which has withstood almost a half-century of critical 
discussion. fiB He identifies five universal management activities: 
. 9 planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and control11ng. 
He. also lists fourteen principles or rules of thumb which are to be 
generally utilized and are fl ••• flexible and capable of adaptation 
10 
to every need. fI For purposes of this stlldy, one of the management 
activities, coordination, and one of his principles, unity of com-
mand and the scalar chain are especially important. 
I 
Fot Fayol, coordination is: 
I 
• . • to harmonize all the activities of a 
concern so as to f~cilitate its working, 
a~d its success. It is to bear in mind in 
any activity whatsoever . • . , the, obli-
gations and consequences such action involves 
for all the functions of the business.1 l 
Fayol lists three signs that indicate lack of coordination 
in. an organization. First, departments which operate as if they 
\ 
were ends in themselves. Second, water-tight compartments exist 
within the departments. Third, the general interest is not con-
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sidered and initiative and loyalty are non-existent. 12 He proposes 
two methods for coordination, weekly conferences of department heads 
and liaison officers. Liaison officers are used to the extent that 
department meetings cannot be held. How~ver, the conference of 
department heads is essential to the success of an organization. 
It has for its aim: 
• • . to inform management about the running 
of the concern, to make clear co-operation 
to be expected as bet-';veen various departments, 
to utilize the presence of departmental mana-
gers for solving various problems of common 
interest. In such conferences it is not a 
case of drawing up the plan of action of the 
business) but of facilitating the carrying 
out of this plan in the light of current 
events. The scope of each conference extends 
over a short period only, normally a week, 
duri.ng which the harmonizing of activity 
and focusing of effort are to be ensured. 
• . • all departmental heads meet once a 
week, on a given day, under the chairman-
ship of the general manager. 
• eo • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
In a relatively short time--about an hour--
the general ma,llager is informed as to the 
general run of things, and can make deci-
sions touching various departments simul-
taneously, and can be explicit as to hmv 
different departments are to help one 
another. Each departmental head goes 
away knowing exactly what he has to do 
and in the knowledge that he is to return 
in a week's time to give an account of 
what he has done. Such cohesion could 
not be obtained without conference even 
if ten times more time and effort v7ere to 
be expended. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. observat'ion has convinced me that a 
weekly meeting is just as suitable for bus-
inesses of any kind having a labour force of 
similar magnitude .• • • I think that the 
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weekly meeting of departmental heads is in-
dispensable for purposes of coordination 
in the case of very large units, ministries, 
and the government proper, and I myself 
would make it a binding obligation for all 
concerns. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The co-ordinating conference is to co-ordination 
what the plan of action is to foresight, what 
summarized charts of personnel are to the 
human organization; it is a characteristic 
sign and essential instrument. If the sign 
is missing there is a good chance that the 
function is badly carried out but the presence 
of such a sign is no absolute guarantee of 
smooth working and in addition the manager 
must know how' to use the instrument properly, 
and the art of manipulating these various 
instruments is one of the qualities required 
of the manager. l3 
In addition to the above coordinating mechanism which 
accomplishes coordination for supervisors under one superior, Fayol 
also. proposes another method of coordination involving communication 
between employees in different organizational units~ He terms his 
method the gang plank approa·ch. l4 Normally, his principles of unity 
of command and the scalar chain indicate that communications should 
go up the scalar chain of supervisors to a common supervisor and 
then back down another chain of supervisors to appropriate organi-
zational units. He points out, however, that there are many 
activities that require speedy e~ecution for which the scalar chain 
cannot be used. Figure 2 (below) shows the gang plank (F to G) in 
an organization whose scalar chain is represented by G to A to Q. 
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Figure 2--The Gang Plank. (From Henri Fayol: general 
~ Industrial Management) 
Fayol comments on the merits and use of the gang. plank 
approach as follows:' 
So long as F and P remain in agreement, and so 
long as their actions are approved by their 
immediate superiors, direct contact: may be 
maintained, but from the instant that agreement 
ceases or there is no approval from the superiors 
direct contact comes to an end, and the scalar 
chain is straightway resumed. Such is the actual 
procedure to be observed in the great majority 
of businesses. It provides for the usual exercise 
of some measure of initiative at all levels of 
authority. 
The use of the "gang plank" is simple, swift, 
sure. It allows the two employeesF and P to 
deal at one sitting, and in a few hours, with 
some question or other which via the scalar 
c~:lain would pass through tw'enty transmissions, 
ihconvenience many people, involve masses of 
pkper, Jose weeks of months to get t~ a con-
clusion less satisfactory generally than the 
one which could have been obtained via direct 
contact as. between F and P. 
I 
• 1· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ! • • • • 
It is an error to depart needlessly from the 
line of authority, but it is an even greater 
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one to keep to it when detriment to the 
business ensues. lS 
Mary Parker Follett 
Mary Parker Follett became prominent in the early 1920's 
as a result of her work in adult education as well as for her 
political writings, including The New State (1920) and Creative 
\ 
Experience (1924). Subsequently because she c6nsidered that business 
leaders were generally more active than public administrators in 
trying to solve management problems, she shifted the emphasis of her 
16 
studies to business management. Thus many of her ideas later 
developed in the field of business management dra1;v upon her earlier 
work in political science. In placing a strong emphasis on the 
sociological character of organization she pioneered in what has 
17 become a major field of, emphasis in organizational theory. 
To Follett, coordination is the basis of sound organization 
d d .. . 18 an a m1n1strat10n and she, accordingly, treats the subject of 
coordination in an outstanding manner in her studies. A summarized 
evaluation of coordination in her own words follows: 
. 
The imperative need of: the moment isa search 
for the best methods of co-ordination, of 
adjustment. But the process of gdjusting is 
not:; one \vhich can be, imposed from outside--it 
is essentially, basically, by its very nature, 
a procesB of auto-c<:mtro11ed activity.19 
• . • the chief weaknesses of those businesses 
~hich I have studied was lack of co-ordination. ' 
Yet there is much talk of co-ordination. Why, 
the,n, do we not get it? : First, because its 
advantage, it~ necessity~ is not yet seen with 
sufficient clearness. Secondly, the system of 
organization in a plant is often so hierarchical, 
sp ascending and descending, that it is almost 
36 
l 
"-~-. -- ,-.. ~ . ., 
'~: .; 
"_.;. :.;' " 
, t. 
. " 
.... , 
; . 
."-.-",--"!".o." >~ ~.~ 
' . 
. , ... 
, .. \,\'. 
,. '."j." • 
",.':" 
. '"-"'. =." 
',; 
"" 
.. ~ 
"." 
"' . 
impossible to provide for cross-relations; the 
notion of horizontal authority has not yet taken 
the place of that of vertical authority. We 
cannot, however, succeed in modern business by 
always running up and down a ladder of authority. 
In·the third place, cross functioning seems 
often to be conceived of as us~ful only "tvhen 
difficulties arise, or when it is obvious that 
joint consultation on some specific problems 
would be desirable. But as such consultation 
is necessary all the tinle, some machinery which 
will operate continuously should be provided. 20 
Four fundamental principles of organization are: 
1. Co-ordination by direct contact of the 
responsible people concerned. 
2. Co-ordination in the early stages • 
3~ Co-ordination as the reciprocal relating 
of all the factors in a situation. 
4. Co-ordinatioll as a continuing process. 
In regard to the first priuciple, co-ordination 
by direct contact of the responsible people 
concerned, we find in some industries that 
cJntrol is coming more and more to be effected 
I 
tn-rough cross-relations" between heads of de-
partments instead of up and d£wn the line 
through the chief executive. 2 
*i second principle was co-ordination in the 
early stages. This means that the direct 
contact must be8in in the earliest stages 
of the process. L2 
I i~o not believe there will ever be any 
geuine, any effective, uniting except that 
b~gun in 'the very early stages. I In govern-
ment this will mean in the smallest units, 
whether these be geographical or vocational; 
in industry, in joint sub-conunitte'es. 
That expression, I the very early stages, r 
expresses the essence of my whole philosophy 
of organization, in business or in govern-
ment •••• it is not sufficiently recog-
nized that co-ordination is a process w'hich 
should have its beginnings very far ba.ck in 
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the organization of the plant. You cannot 
always bring together the results of depart-
mental activities and expect to co-ordinate 
them. You have to have an organization which 
will permit an interweaving all along the 
line. Strand should weave with strand, and 
then Tile shall not have the clumsy task of 
trying to patch together finished webs. 23 
The third principle, co-ordination as the 
rec]procal relating of all the factors in 
a situation, shows us just Tilhat this process 
of co-ordination actually is . . . . recip-
rocal relating, this interpenetration of 
every part of every other part, and again by 
every other part as it has been permeated 
by all, should be the goal of all attempts 
at co-ordination, a goal, of course, never 
wholly reached. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
If then the process of co-ordination is one 
of interpenetration, it is obvious that it 
cannot be enforced by an outside body. That 
is why I have very grave doubts whether 
'central' planning, as at present conceived 
by many, will bring us any appreciable degree 
of co-ordination. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . 
Co-ordination means change in the parts 
co-ordinated. Co-ordination in its stricter 
meaning does not imply change in theiparts, 
but co-ordination is now being used, some-
what inaccurately perhaps, as synonymous with 
correlation. Correlations is probably the 
better word because correlation implies inter-
penetration of the parts while co"-ordination 24 
implies only an harmonious ordering of parts~ 
We can never reconcile planning and individual-
ism until we understarid not as an apartness 
from the whole, but as a contribution to the 
whole. In some of the businesses I hav,e 
studied, I have
j 
been told that the head of a 
department should subordinate the good of his 
department to the good of the 'tvhole under-
taking. But of course he should do no such 
thing. His departmental point of view is 
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needed in the whole. It must indeed be 
reconciled with all the other points of 
view in the business, but it must not be 
abandoned. 25 
• • • the plan proceeds horizontally 
thro1.1ghout the lilftole organization involving 
ultimately all the related departments. 
Thus planning remains an integral part of 
the management of the self-governing units. 
. planning as a horizontal process 
between the units of a company and planning 
as a horizontal process between the depart-
ments of a single unit. This is what we 
should aim at .•.. 26 
My fourth principle was co-ordination as a 
continuing process. 
I am claiming that a Planning Board if 
rightly conceived can make for the great 
freedom of individual men or individual 
, ~ ~ 
industries '. One reason for this is that 
the machinery for co-ordination would be 
continuous, not set up for special occa-
sions. If a board is set up to consider 
a special problem the tendency is naturally 
to think only of the question under discus-. 
sion; the incentive to discuss the principles 
which can serve as guides for future similar 
cases is not so great. But if we had a 
permanent :Planning Board, and it should 
make some classification of problems, then 
when a fresh problem arose it would be 
able to see the points in which that re-
sembled a certain 'class of problems . • . 
i 
Now continuous machinery for ,.;rorking Glut 
the principlE~s of relation, whether it be 
in factory or nation or internationally, 
is of the very essence of freedom. For 
it tends towa,rd freedom when the rest of 
our world is following certain principles; 
we are bound when someone's action toward 
us may be of one kind to-day and another 
tomorrow . . . . Collectivelx to discover 
and follow certain principles of action 
makes' for individual freedom. Continuous 
machinery for this purpose is an essential 
factor . • . • 
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Another advantage of a permanent Planning 
Board is that then the circle, or spiral, 
is not broken tn the transition from plan-
ning to activity and from activity to 
further planning. A mistake we often tend 
to make is that the world stands still 
while we are going through the.process of 
a given adjustment. And it doesn't. Facts 
change, we must keep up with the facts; 
keeping up with the facts changes the facts. 
In other words, the process of adjustment 
changes the things to be adjusted. 27 
Sununary 
Although these authorities were writing in approximately 
the same time period it is apparent, and as brought out later in 
this chapter, that their various views on lateral coordination 
approximate the range of views current in the field of management 
today. Taylor, concerned with specialization and departmentali-
~ation, minimizes coordination and relegates it to problem areas 
to be solved by supervisors. Fayol, assigning it a major role, 
makes it onE! of his five management activities. He also recog-
nizes that lack of adequate coordination can be a major organiza-
tional problem. His concept of the weekly conference of depart-
ment heads is an instrument for positive coordination within a 
hierarchical group. In many respects, it anticipates aspects of 
Likert's group pattern of hierarchical organization. 28 He also 
I, 
recognizes that there are occas;ions when probl:ems require direct 
coordination and corrtrnunica~ion outside the immediate organization 
and in these instances his gang plank approach is to be used. 
Mary Parker Follett goes a step further than Fayol and 
assigns to coordination the principal role for achieving 
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organizational goals. She also charges that lack of coordination 
was the chief weakness of businesses which she studied. Her four 
principles of coordination provide an even more positive basis for 
coordination. Coordination may be early, direct, self-adjusting 
and continuous. In addition, she adds that coordination must not 
just involve a harmonious ordering of the parts, but that there 
must also be an internal reciprocal adjusting of the parts. 
In addition to the hypotheses criteria developed in 
Chapter III, five factors from this section are used in later 
chapters to aid in evaluating the MSC Apollo mission planning 
structure. Th~ five factors are Fayol's concept of weekly con-
ferences of department heads and Follett's concepts of early, direct, 
self-adjusting and continuous coordination. 
Administrative Management Theorx 
.0925-19381 
This section briefly considers the contributions of Leonard 
D. White, W. F. Willoughby, James D. Hooney and Alan C. Reiley, 
John M. Gaus, Luther Gulick, L. Urwick, Elton May and F. G. 
Roethlesberger. 
Leonard D. White and vI. F . Willoughby 
Leonard D. White's Introduction ~ the Study of Public 
Administration in 1926, followed clos~ly thereafter by W', F. 
Willoughby's Principles of ,Public Aqrainistration in 1927 were the 
first systematic treatments of American public administration from 
an administrative management point of view. Reflecting the environ-
41 
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ment of the time, major emphases of their work include civil service 
reform and the Federal personnel system, separation of administration 
from policy, economy and efficiency, a concern for the integ~ation 
and grouping of govern~ental activities, . and in Willoughby's work a 
29 
substantial coverage of budgetary and fiscal matters of government. 
In regard to the matter of coordination both White and 
Willoughby consider it only in the broadest terms, and only in an 
indirect way, based on a mechanistic organizing of functions. Their 
concern is with consolidating the position of the chief executive 
and ~ntegrating the activities of the administrative organizations 
into "a single integreted piece of administrative mechanism,,30 under 
the direction of the chief executive. Thus, Willoughby devotes an 
entire chapter, Chapter V, "Organization of the Administrative 
Branch as a Whole," to a discussion of the relative merits of 
independent versus integrated or departmental organizations. 31 Whitei, 
in a later work,32 in his discussion of the "new management, II c;.ontinues 
this main emphasis on the role of the chief executive, his staff; and 
the coordination of activities into departments under the chief 
executive~ It is only in the third edition (1949) of his work, 
I t d · h S d f P b 1 . Ad" . 33. nro uctl.on to ~ .. tu y 0 Ul.c. ml.nl.strat10ll,.u _ 1n a new part, 
"The Dynamics of Management," that White, in Chapter. XV, "Coordin-
ation and Communication," discusses coordination in terms of the on-
going organization. Even -here, while stressing the necessity of 
effective coordination, illustrations are limited to the inter-
departmental and chief executive levels. 
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James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley 
In 1931 Mooney and Reiley, in their classic work Onward 
3L~ Industry, developed a set of principles based on a structural 
approach to organization. While recognizing that people were in-
valved in the day-to-day coordination it is their thesis that 
" ••• sound co-ordination of these jobs, considered simply as jobs, 
must be the first and necessary condition in the effective co-
35 
ordination of the human factor." Their primary concern then is 
with the depersonalized organizing process rather than with the 
subsequent personalized administration of organization. 36 For them 
all the organizations are scalar (hierarchical) and it is scalar 
chain by which coordination, the first, or basic principle of 
• • 'I b ff· h h h .. ,,37 organ1zat10n '. ~.. ecomes e ect1ve t roug out t e organ1zat10n. 
A summary of their position on coordi.nation is as follows: 
Coordination . • • is the orderly arrangement 
of group effort, to provide unity of action 
in the pursuit of a common purpose. 38 
I 
True co-ordination in the formal sense can 
only be effectuated through functional de-
~inition, and such co-ordination must begin 
a~ the top. Without it there will be f~iction, even at the top, and in these 
circumstances it is futile to look for co-
ordinated harmony at any other point down 
the line. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Cp -ordinatiQn.,. as we have noted, is the 
determining principle of ,organization, the 
form which contains all tither pri~ciples, 
the beginning and the end of all organized 
effort. W~ must find the actual process, 
hO't<1ever, through which co-ordination be-
comes effective throughout an orgp. nization. 
Here I would distinguish between t't<10 forms 
43 
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of co-ordination, the perpendicular and the 
horizontal. 
The principle of perpendicular co-ordination 
is expressed in the single word authority.39 
It i~ through authority and the process of delegation that 
the coordination of functions is achieved. 40 
iir._ 
So much for perpendicular co-ordination, 
operating throttgh leadership and the 
delegation of authority, without which 
no organization can function. Another 
factor of equal importance is that of 
indoctrination in the common purpose, 
which is obviously essential to the true 
intelligence of concerted effort. Here 
enters the other great principle, that of 
horizontal co-ordination, which operates 
not through authority and the function of 
COnimand but through the universal service 
ofkno·wledge. This difference between 
the perpendicular and the horizontal forms 
of co-ordination brings us to the final 
distinction in functionalism, that between 
the line and the staff. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Authority, with its process of delegation, 
is of course essential in everj organization, 
~ut experience proves that the service of 
knowledge is an equal necessity, and, 
furthermore, that such service is impossible' 
through the contacts of command alone. Staff 
services, whether formally organized or not, 
are bound to grow up in every organization. 
'l]here formal organization, however, is 
demanded if we are to achieve the most 
efficient forms of conc:erted human effort. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I 
~n all forms of organization, what I have 
called horizontal co-ordination is the 
~rinciple that indoctrinates everymernber 
of the group in the common purpose, and 
thus insures the highest collective effi-
ciency and intelligence in the pursuit of 
the ·objective. 41 
44 
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John M. Gaus 
John M. Gaus, distinguished political scientist and 
authority in public administration, suggested in 1936 a theory of 
42 
organization which emphasized the human element. Concerned that 
the term organization was being used in such a way as to give it 
43 
" •• • a mechanical, non-human quality • .• " ,he states that 
organization is Ita relating of individuals so that their efforts 
may be more effective in the accomplishment of some purpose.,,44 
Th f d .. .. d . 45 d h 1 f 1 d e essence 0 a m~n~strat~on ~s e ucat~on, an t e ro e 0 ea er-
ship is to ensure that each individual in the organization It ••• 
knows his function . • . so that there will be no uncertainty and 
hesitation in the integration of his actions with those of the 
other members of the organization.,,46 In addition, the administrator 
47 
must endure that he "wins the active consent and support" of the 
members of the organization. It is through the realization of these 
two goals that the function of coordination is accomplished. For 
coordination is: 
.: •• the task of obtaining this active consent 
of these persons in their day-to-day activity 
through the careful allocation of functions, 
the co~operative evolving of working policy, the 
securing and making available of relevant know-
ledge, the detennination of priorities in 
processes and activities, the delimitation and, 
focusing of efforts and resources, and the 
recruiting and canalizing of the ideas and 
energies of the persons in the organization. 48 
Thus, Gaus sees the coordination functionias being accomplished by 
the line supervisor through a process of education. Recognizing 
difficulty in a large organization for an administrator to know 
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all that is required, Gaus sees an auxiliary technical staff which 
facilitate the work of these administrators through service and 
d . 49 a V1ce. 
Luther Gulick' 
As a member of President Roosevelt's Committee on Admin-
istrative Management, Luther Gulick, integrating and further ela-
borating on concepts of Fayol and Mooney and Reiley, developed a 
structural theory of organization which "became widely accepted in 
American textbooks dealing with public administration."50 Especially 
famous is his acronym, POSDCORB, which is designed to direct 
attention to the functions of a chief executive: planning, organ-
izing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting. 
51 His theory, as set forth in Papers 2£ the Science of 
Administration, states that the division of work fl. is 
inescapable," and therefore "co-ordination becomes mandatory.,,52 
Coordination must be a~hieved in two coordinate ways: (1) by 
organization, and (2) by the dominance of a central idea of purpose 
which is necessary for " .•• action and self-coordination in the 
d ·1 . f 11 f h . ,,53 a1 y operatl.Qn 0 a '. parts 0 t e enterpr1se. 
Coordination is achieved in organizations by a system of 
hierarchical authority from the top administrator to "the ultimate 
k bd ··· .>. ,,54 w9r su 1V1S10ns. There are four basic organizational patterns 
which can be utilized by purpose, by process,by persons or things, 
55 
and by place. The determination of which pattern of organization 
to use is dependent on which is the most effective way to coordinate" 
46 
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57 
the organizations activities, for instance, by process or by purpose. 
Organizationally, the basic means of coordination is hier-
archical, but there are other coordinating mechanisms which: 
• must be regarded as part.of the organi-
zation as such. Among these must be included 
planning boards and committees, interdepart-
mental committees, co-ordinators, and officially 
arranged regional meetings, etc. These are all 
organizational devices for bringing about the 
co-ordination of the work of government. Co-
ordination of this type is essential. It 
greatly lessens the military stiffness and red 
tape of the strictly hierarchical structure. 
It greatly increases the consultative process 
in administration. It must be recognized, how-
ever, that it is to be used only to deal with 
abnormal situations and where matters of policy 
are involved, as in planning. The organization 
itself should be set up so that it can dispose 
of the routine work without such devices, 
because these devices are too dilatory, ir-
responsible and time-co sumi.ng for normal 
administration. Wherever an organization needs 
continual resort to special co-ordinating devices 
in the discharge of its regular work, this is 
proof that the organiza.tion is bad. These special 
agencies of co-ordination draw their sanction 
from the ,hierarchical structure and should 
receive the particular attention of the executive 
authority. They should not be set up and for-
gotten, ignored, or permitted to assume an 
independent status. 58 
As indicated above, in addition to coordination by 
• I 
organization, there is a second essential method of coordination 
and that is by ideas~In this respect, Gulick's concept closely 
follows Mooney and Reiley and will not be discussed here. 
L. UnvicK 
Colonel Urwick "s theory of organization also involves con-
cepts similar to those of Fayol, Mooney and Reiley, and Gulick. 
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Therefore, for purposes of this study, a review of Unvick I s thinking 
is limited essentially to his concept of staff. 59 Basically, it is 
his position that in large organizations coordination can most 
effectively be achieved by utilization of the staff concept. 60 
Urwick's concept of staff does not involve authority to command6l 
nor specialized functions such as personnel or similar activities, 
but rather consists only of personnel who are generalists and whose 
function is coordination. The role of the staff generalist is to 
facilitate the work of their immediate superior by (a) collection 
and dissemination of information for him, (b) transmission of his 
orders and instructions and (c) anticipation and resolution of 
difficulties in carrying out his plans. These staff generalists 
are located at each of the various hierarchical lev~.ls as may be 
required by workload demands. 
There are two consequences which result because of inade-
quate staff support. First, there is an excessive use of commjttees 
and second, superiors, rather than performing their planning and 
leadership functions, are bogged down in paperwork and other similar 
details. 62 
Some relevant comments by Urtvick on comrni ttJes' are: 
Committees are a subject in therrrseives. A 
committee is a g.roupof persons l to whom 
certain Junctions have been assigned on 
condii:i~m that they discharg~ those 
functions conjointly and in a cprporate . 
cap~city. A unit of organizatirin in this 
form is. always an alternative to employing 
an individual tQ perform the same functions. 
Experience suggests that it is a form with 
distinct limitations. 
. . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . ~ . . 
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Committees have certain structural pecu-
liarities. They are discontinuous: they 
cease to exist as a unit each time that the 
committee rises. The chairman must either 
lead a committee or some other member \vill. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . 
Committees are also prone to a number of 
psychological weaknesses. Hr. E. C. 
Lindeman has listed fourteen of the most 
common, ranging from 'tendency to indulge 
in irrelevant discussion,' through 'members 
try to impress superior' alld 'Chairman 
obtrudes opinions' to 'tendency to jump to 
conclusions. ' 
. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . ~ . . . . . 
But even if the activities assigned to it: 
are correctly chosen and care and intelli-
gence are used in its composition, a unit 
in committee form will only work really 
successfully if certain basic conditions 
are fulfilled. Its members ~ust understand 
that the purpose of a committee is not to 
~in support for this or that individual 
Opinion, but to develop a collective judg-
I . 
ment which is something more than the sum of 
~he individual views represented--a 
resultant having an entity of its own and 
developing out of the conjoint thinking of 
the committee. 63 
Elton May and If. J. Ro~thlisb-erger 
As a result of certain of investigations conducted during 
the period from 1927 to 1932 at the Hawthorne plant of Western 
Electric, theCoi.cept of organization was significantly broadened. 
The works64,65,66, 67 of f h k' . El two 0 t e e~ 1nvest1gators, . ton M~y 
and F. J. Roethlisberger, have provided a comprehensive description, 
analysis and interpretation of the data obtained. Briefly stated, 
their findings were that, in addition to the formal organization, 
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there exists in organi.zations a much broader social organization. 
This social organization consists of the 11. • • actual patterns' 
of interactions existing within or between employee groups, super-
visory groups and management groups . . ,,68 Further, that like 
the: 
..• family, the social organization of any 
group is felt as a real thing, indeed as 
som('(;hing far more real than the technical 
organization of a factory; and spontaneously 
formed human relations are felt to have a 
meaning and a va.lue that are lacking in 
purely hierarchical relations or in those 
relations that are involved in merely 1;vorking 
together in time and place, according to an 
arbitrarily determined plan. 69 
In addition the findings sho-';ved that there was a wide 
difference in the effectiveness in which the two principal functions 
70 
of the organization were being performed. The economic function, 
the functioning of the firm from a profit and loss standpoint was 
well understood and was constantly being improved upon. However, 
the second function, the internal function which involves the 
maintenance of an effective social organization and ultimately the 
effectiveness of the total organization was not significantly being 
improved upon. As a result there 1;vas a failure to adequately 
develop: 
•••. skills and techniques for securing 
co-operation,that is, for getting individual~ 
. working together effectivelly and with satis-
faction to th-emselVes. The slight advances 
which have been made in this area have been 
overshadowed by the new and powerful techno-
logical developments of modern industry.7l 
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Other relevant findings are: 
• 
Some parts of the system can change more 
rapidly than others. The technical organ-
ization can change more rapidly than th~ 
social organization; the formal organiza,-
tion can change more rapidly tqan the 
informal; the systems of beliefs and ideas 
can change more rapidly than the patterns 
of interaction and associated sentiments, 
of which these beliefs and ideas are an 
expression. In the disparity in the rates 
of change possible there exists a precon-
dition for unbalance whi~h may ,manifest 
itself in many, forms. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . 
• . • the limits of human collaboratiolJ. 
are determined far more by the informal 
than by the formal organization of the 
plant. Collaboration is not wholly a I 
matter of logical organization." It pre-
supposes social codes, conventions, tr,adi-
tions, and routine or customary ways of 
responding to situations. Without such 
basic codes or conventions, effective ,('lOrk 
relations are not possible. 72 
If human collaboration is based on social 
codes which regulate the behavior and 
attitudes of individuals to eAch other, 
no logical contrivances by themselves can 
substitute for them. Technological ad-
vance must presuppose and make use of 
sJch codes. Any plan to promote collab-
oration amOng the workers, therefore, has 
t~ be thought of in relati06 to its effect 
on the actual social organization of the 
workers and not merely from a logical view-
point alone. Succ~ssi£ul management of any 
human enterprise depends largely on the . 
ability to introduce more efficient methods 
without disrupting in the process the 
social foundations on which collaboration 
isbased. 73 
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Summary 
The basic organizational concern of White and Willoughby was 
with increasing the capability of the chief executive to manage the 
activities of the administrative organiz~tion. Proposed methods for 
providing this capabilit~ are threefold: first, giving the chief 
executive control over all administrative organizations; second, 
providing him with adequate staff support; and third, integrating 
scattered organizational units into cohesive departments. However, 
organizations today are not generally faced with this basic type of 
coordination problem; in this study at least, the above methods are 
not immediately relevant and, therefore, will not be considered 
further. 
The approaches of Mooney and Reil~y, Gulick, and Urwick to 
the matter of coordination are basically the same, emphasizing its 
structural aspects. All four authorities consider coordination as 
basic internal goal of organization, with the hierarchical or scalar 
chain serving as the primary coordinating mechanism. Mooney and 
Reiley emphasize that coordination must be considered first from a 
structural viewpoint, that organization is the most important 
element in coordination. Urwick, with Mooney, Reiley and Gulick 
agreeing, stresses that in large organizations a line-staff structure 
is 'required to ensure effective coordination. When speaking here of 
staff, Urwick liwits it to generalists who serve as assi,stants to 
II 
line supervisors at apptopriate hierarchical levels and ~ho facilitate 
his work by serving as informati.on-gatherers and by relieving him of 
work detail. All four authorities indicate that the staff function 
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involves horizontal coordinatioIi whose purpose is knowledge and 
service. In addition, Gulick identifies four types of organizational 
patterns--by purpose, by process, by person or thing and by place--
and indicates that the basis for choice among the four types depends· 
on which pattern provides the most effective coordination for the 
particular situation under consideration. t-lhile Gulick and Urwick 
both see the necessity for committees, both consider that their use 
should be very limited. Gulick states that wherever there is continual 
use of committeel3 that is a sign that the organization is bad; Urwick I 
more specifically states that it indicates a lack of staff generalists, 
who could more effectively and efficiently perform the task. 
Gaus approaches coordination from the viewpoint of the 
individual; that it is the individual who must do the coordinating 
and be coordinated. It is the purpose of leadership througheduaation, 
to provide the basis for coordination. The leader must ensure, first, 
that each employee knows his function and its interrelationship with 
the remainder of the organization and, second, that the employee is 
willing to participate. 
Mayo and Roethlisberger approach the problem of coordirtation 
as a group phenomenon, pointing out the limitations placed on co-
ordination by social norms. They indicate that relatively little 
, ." ~ 
thought is given to social group co'nsiiderationswhen formal organi-
i 
zational changes are made. They also identify three factors that 
'., 
should be considered in making/changes in organization. First, 
i 
social group relations within organization which, in many instances, 
have more meaning and value to individuals than do strictly formal 
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relations. Second, it is easier to make changes in the formal 
organization than it is in the social organization. Third, social 
norms r~gulate or restrict cooperation. 
In addition to the hypothesis criteria developed in Chapter 
III, three factors drawn from this section are used in later chapters 
as an aid to evaluating the MSC Apollo mission planning structure. 
The three factors are (1) organizational structure, including con-
cepts of hierarchical coordination, staff generalists, and Gulick's 
four organizational patterns, (2) the individual aspect, including 
Gaus' educational hypothesis, and (3) the social group as a limiting 
factor in coordination. 
Multi-Disciplinary Period (1938-1960) 
The knowledge that one can gain about organizations from 
the literature up to this period can be compared with the knowledge 
that can be acquired about an elephant by examining only its 
skeleton. However, during the period under discussion, the field 
of study was broadened tremendo'.:,rs1y. As many social science 
disciplines began to focus their efforts on organizations, new 
perspectives ;were added. E~tehsive empirical investigations were 
cond~cted concerning the individual as well as concerning small 
group dynamics in organization; stvdies of the relationships' of 
various organizations to their environm'cnt were conducted. Theories 
of organizations as decision-making systems or as.connnunications. 
netw'orks were also developed. The management science/systems analysis 
approach was also introduced. 
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These many pokings and probings began to yield bits and 
pieces of information about the different aspects of this elephantine 
phenomenon called organization. Thus, during the latter part of the 
period it becrune increasingly apparent that a much broader concept 
of organization must be developed to effectively relate all of these 
diverse views and concepts of organization which these authorities 
were postulating as a result of their findings. It is to this goal 
then, to the development of a general integrated theory of organi-
zation, that modern organizational theory is striving. 
A consideration of all inVestigations and concepts developed 
or initiated in the many disciplines during this period is beyond 
the limited scope of this study. Only a few of the authorities such 
as Chester Barnard, Max Weber and Herbert Simon, whose works stand 
out as beacons early in this period, will be focused upon for 
relevant concepts. Further, pertinent findings from other authorities 
and disciplines will also be briefly described. However, consider-
ation of certain authorities such as Karl Deutsch, Douglas McGregor 
and Rensis Likert) will be deferred to cohsideration in the next 
settion. While they made a significant impact on the field during 
the 1950's, their major works, wherein they comprehensively describe 
their theories, were not published until the 1960's. 
Chester I. Barnard 
In 1938, Chester I. Barnard published his classic work, 
The. Functions £f the Executive. In it, he postulates a theory of 
organization which ,encompasses many of the concepts that are developed 
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further by others later in this period. It is Barnard's basic pre-
mise that human beings, " ••• do not function except in conjunction 
with other human organisms,"74 and that the reason for. these inter-
actions are to achieve some purpose or purposes that could not be 
achieved individually, without cooperation. That all such coopera-
tion by t'.;vo or more persons for a definite end involves a cooperative 
•• !" 
system which is " .•. a complex of physical, biological, personal, 
and social components which are in specific relationship II . . . 
The formal organization,or " ••. system of consciously coordinated 
personal activities or forces,"75 is but one of the components of a 
76 large system, called a cooperative system. "Moreover, most formal 
organizations are partial systems included within larger organiza-
ti0n systems. The most comprehensive formal organizations are in-
cluded in an informaJ.." nebulous, and undirected system usually named 
'society. ,,,77 
In cooperative systems there is also the informal organization, 
that is "the aggregate of personal contacts and interactions .•• ,,78 
which are" • l not al. part of or governed by any formal organiza-
t . II 79 ~on. Informal processes, which are unconscious 'tl7hen compared 
with the conscious formal proceSSes, have two types of effect: 
, 
"(a) they establish certain attitu.des, understandings, customs, 
habits, institutions; and (b) they create a condition under which 
formal organizations may arise.,,80 
Wi·th the foregoing perspectives in mind, a summary of 
Barnard's comments which have implications for this study follows: 
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Systems of cooperation are never stable, 
because of changes in the environment 
and the evaluation of new purposes .. 
adjustQent of cooperative systems to 
changing conditions or new purposes 81 
implies special management processes . • . • 
The techniques of corrnllunication are an 
important part of any organization and 
are the pre-eminent problems of many. 
In an exhaustive theory of organization, 
communication would occupy a central 
place, because the structure, extensive-
ness, and scope of organization are 
almost entirely determined by communica-
tion techniques. 82 
It may, therefore, be said that all large 
formal organizations are constituted of 
numbers of small organizations. It is 
impossible to create a large organization 
except by combining small organizations. 
The basic organization, if measured by 
the number of persons simultaneously 
contributing to it, is usually quite 
small--from tv70 to fifteen or twenty 
persons, and probably not having an aver-
age of more than ten .. 
Tne clue to the structural requirements 
of large complex organizations lies in 
the reason for the limitations of the size 
of simple organizations. The lim~tati6ns 
are inherent in the necessitie~ of inter-
col:nmunication. • . • we discussed com-! 
munication between persons as ~n essential 
element of cooperative systems; it is also 
the limiting factor in the size structure 
of complex organizations~ 
. . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The size of the unit, therefore, usually 
is determined by the limitations of 
effective leadership. These limitations 
depend upon (a) the complexity of purpose 
and technological con~itions; (b) the 
difficulty of the communication process; 
(c) the extent to which communication is 
necessary; (d) the complexity of the 
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personal relationships involved, that is, 
of the social conditions. 83 
The fact that these large organizations 
are built up of small unit organizations 
is neglected in the spectacular size that 
ensues, and ,V'e often pass from the whole 
or major divisions to 'men.' The result-
ing dismissal fromthe mind of the ines-
capable practice of unit organization 
often leads to utterly unrealistic atti-
tudes regarding organization prob1ems. 84 
The coordination of efforts essential to 
a system of cooperation requires, as we 
have seen, an organization system of com-
munication. Such a system of communica-
tion implies centers or points of inter-
connection and can only operate as these 
centers are occupied by persons who are 
called executives .. 85 
Accordingly, persons specializing in the 
executive functions in most cases are 
'members' of, or contributors to, two 
units of organization in one complex 
organization--first, the so-ca11ed'working 
unit, and second, the executive unit. 86 
Max Weber 
Although Max Weber, German sociologist, had completed his 
work by 1920, itwasu't until 1946)that H. H. Gerth's and C. W~ight 
Mitl's translation entitled ~ ~~,Heber: Essays in Sociology87 
and in 1947 that TalCQtt P·arsons' and A. M., Henderson's translation 
of The Theory of ~cial and Economic Organization88 made his theories 
of bureaucracy generalily known in the United States. For that.· 
, 
reason, hisi,work is discussed at this point. Weber's theory of 
organization is based on the manner in which the authority in 
organization is legitimized. The ideal-type for him is the 
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bureaucratic or rational-legal organization which he sees as 
" .•• the dominant institution of modern society.,,89 This rational-
legal authority consists of t,.,o basic parts: (1) a commitment to 
expertise and (2) acceptance of hierarchical authority.90 
As a result, his bureaucratic structure is a closed hier-
archical system, operating machine-like as a neutral instrument, 
not with individuals, but only roles being filled. Thus, from an 
entirely different base, Weber posits a normative theory of organi-
zation very similar to that advanced earlier by the administrative 
management school. However, as show'n by Petet' Blau in his studies 
of bureaucratic organizations, individual needs for security, power 
and status do influence the workings of the bureaucracy.91 Further, 
P ilip Selznick in his study of TVA. shows that bureaucrac-ies need 
not be a closed hierarchical system but can react intimately at all 
levels with their environment, both external. 92 internal and 
Herbert A. Simon 
The contributions of Herbert Simon, summarized in three of 
his works 93 , 94, 95 span almost the entire period under discussion. 
In 1947, in ~9ministrative F\~havio.:r., he advanced his basic thesis 
that: 
I 
.1 • • organization behavior is a complex 
nbtwork of decisional processes, all poine:ed 
t~ward their influence upon the. behaviors of 
the operatives--·those who do the actual 
'physical' work of the organj,.zation~ The 
anatomy of the organization is to be found in 
the distribut:ion and allocation of clecision-
making functions~ The physiology of the 
organization is to be found in the processes 
whereby the organization influences the 
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decisions of each of its members--su~E1Ying 
these decisions with their premises. 
In this study we shall be primarily con-
concerned with 'vertical' specialization--
the division of decision-making duties 
between'operative and supervisory perspnnel. 
There would rseem to be at least three 
reasons fdr vertical specialization in 
organization. First, if there is any 
horizontal specialization, vertical 
specialization is absolutely essential to 
achieve coordination among the operative 
employees. Second, just as horizontal 
specialization permits greater skill and 
expertise to! b~ developed by the operative 
group in the performance of their tasks, 
so vertical specialization permits greater 
expertise in the making of decisions. 
Third, vertical specialization permits the 
operative personnel to be held accountable 
for their decisions. 97 
'Who really makes the decisions?' Such a 
question is meaningless--a complex decision 
is like a great river, dratving from its 
many tributaries the innumerable component 
ptemises of which it is constituted. Many 
individuals and organization units con-
tribute to every large decision, and the 
problem of centralization and decentrali--
zation is a problem of arranging this 98. 
complex system into an effective scheme. I 
Communication may be formally defined as 
any process whereby decisional premises 
are transmitted from one member of any 
organization to another. 
Communication in organizations is a two-way 
process: it comprehends both the transmit~ 
tal !E. a decisi.onal center (Le., an individual 
vested with the responsibility for making 
particular decisions) of orders, information, 
and advice; and the transmittal .of the 
decisions reC!.ched from this center to othRr 
'-parts of the organization. Moreover, it is 
a process that takes place uptvard, downward, 
and laterally throug~out the organization. 
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The information and orders that flo\v down-
\ 
ward through the formal channels of authority 
and the information that flo'ivs upward through 
these same channels are only a small part of 
the total network of communications in any 
actual organization. 99 
From the fo~egoing we see that 'other than recognizing the 
need for some type of hierarchical decision-making structure, Simon 
does not propose any specific form of organizational structure. 
The ultimate form that should be developed is one that ensures that 
the "proper" premises or information is given to the "proper" 
decision-maker who then has "proper" mechanisms for distributing 
his decision to others as a premise for their decisions. 
In 1950, Simon, in conjunction with Donald Smithburg and 
Victor Thompson, presented the first systematic treatment of public 
administration from a behavioral viewpoint. As much of this work 
incorporates thinking ex-pressed by Barnard and by Simon in his 
earlier work it is not discussed here. However, excerpts from one 
section de~ling with the use of conferences and committees follow: 
i 
• 
Where decisions are complex, requiring the ~econciliation of a wide range of points of 
view, effective communication often requires 
that all the persons involved in the deci-
sion be brought together for face-to-face 
discussion in a conference or series of ' 
conferences. Where it is desired to formal-
izethe conference procedure, and where the 
same group of persons is involved in a 
series of conferences, a definite committee 
can be established. 
An important advantage of the cbnference 
and, the committee over step-by-step clear-
ance as a P1eans of reaching a joint decision 
is that each participant is exposed directly 
and simultaneously to the views of all the 
others. There is a maximum of opportunity 
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for the free interchange of information and 
ideas. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
There were a number" of reasons for the 
success of the committee proce~s in this 
case ..•. the committee served to for-
malize an informal communication system 
that was already largely in existence. 
Second; the problems involved .•. cut 
complete~y across departmental lines. 
Almost eVery major aspect of the plan 
was of considerable interest to at least, 
a half dozen departments. Where each 
problem confronting a committee is of 
interest to only a few of "the particip'ants, 
the committee is likely to be niuch less 
successful. 
Apart from their effectiveness in securing 
a free interchange of views, and hence in 
securing sounder decisions, conferences 
and committees serve other important com-
munication functions. First, they commu-
nicate a thorough understanding to the 
participants of the decisions reached. 
Moreover, by providing a feeling of par-
ticipation in thede.cision-making process 
and a feeling of responsibility for the 
decisions reached, they greatly improve 
the motivations of the participants in 
~ater carrying out the decisions. Th~r~ 
~s a considerable and growing body of 
~vidence that group participation in 
decisioh~making is an important means for 
securing acceptance for new programs and 
organization changes. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 
It should not be concluded that commit.tees 
are an unmitigated blessing. 
. committees can prove an extremely 
costly and time-wasting device if they are 
brought together without a real reason for 
their existence, if they suffer from in-
effective chairmanship or inadequate pre-
liminary spade work by a properly staffed 
, 
62 
.... .g .. 
-
\ 
"'''' 
: ;:J 
" ~ 
" .~ 
:.' ~ 
. '·i 
. " 
.. '1., 
1 
-';'1' 
.... I;' .... "'.,' ,I, 
i.:' -"1 
' . ····'1 
", ··;1 
.. .; ~ 
'. :1 
.~ 
, .. 
... -
'" 
-, " 
',' 
" , 
. :.~ .. ,," ...... " .. .... .... ~'. :' 
,. .-~ ~ - ,- ".- , . 
" ' .. 
. ".':", 
" . 
.. 
J,- .' 
"".' 
secretariat, or if they continue in existence 
(as they often do) after their work has been 
completed. Frequently they are used for in-
appropriate tasks. For example, a committee 
can review a document that has been drafted 
previously, but almost no group of more than 
two or three persons can efficiently do the 
work of drafting. Likewise, committees are 
often bogged down in debate about questions 
of fact that co~ld be more accurately and 
quickly decided by a little research outside 
the committee chambers. lOO 
In their work, Organizations, 1958, March and Simon make 
a number of pertinent points concerning coordination: 
One peculiar characteristic of the assign-
ment problem, and of all the formalizations 
of the departmentalization problem in classi-
cal organization theory, is that, if take~ 
l~terally, problems of cdordination are 
eliminated. Since the whole set of activities 
tp be performed is specified in advance, once 
these are allocated to organization units and 
individuals the organization problem posed by 
these formal theories is solved. 
Of course, writers on organization theory 
a~e aware that coordination is a highly 
significant problem. Our point is simply 
that this problem is absent from the formal. 
models, and hence that the formal models 
d~part widely from what is asserted in a 
common-sense way about organizations. As 
is often the case, comnon sense appears to 
be more relevant to the real-world phenomena 
than do the models ... 101 . 
Tqe ~ of coordinatioh used in the organi-
zcition is a function of the extent to which 
the situation is standardized. To the extent 
that contingencies arise, not anticipated in 
the schedule, coordination requires com-
munication to give notice of deviations from 
planned or predicted conditions, or to give 
instructions fdr change~ in activity to ad-
just to these deviations. We may lable 
coordination based on pre~established 
schedules coordination £y plan, and coordin-
63 
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ation that involves transmission of new 
information coordination £y feedback. The 
more stable and predictable the situation, 
the greater the reliance on coordination by 
plan; the more variable and unpredictable 
the situation, the greater the reliance on 
coordination by feedback. l02 
The capacity of an organization to maintain 
a complex, highly interdependent pattern of 
activity is limited in part by its capacity 
to handle the comnunication required for 
coordination. The greater the efficiency 
of communication within the organization, 
the greater the tolerance for interdepend-
ence. l03 
Other Contributors 
! 
·¥ 
A review of the literature involving the traditional or 
operational school of organization for the period indicates no 
significant change in the position adopted earlier by Fayol, Gulick, 
and Urwick. George Terry, in his work, has chapters both on co-
ordination and on cOnnTIunications, but these essentially elaborate 
on ideas expressed earlier. l04 Ralph C. Davis devotes over one 
hundred pages to staff organization, but once again, it is only a 
further elaboration and detailing of ideas expressed in earlier 
work. lOS Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnel, as with Terry and 
Davis, discuss the nature of, reasons for, misuse of,. and disad-
, 106 
vantages of comrnitt'ees. Koontz's eight reasons for use of 
committees are: (1) need for group deliberation and judgment, 
(2) fear of pla.cing authority in one person, (3) representation 
of interested groups, (4) coordination of plans and policies, 
(5) transmission of information, (6) consolidation of authority, 
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(7) motivation through participation, and (8) avoidance of action. 
The six reasons he lists as disadvantages of committees are: (1) 
high cost in time and energy, (2) tendency to compromise t.o least 
common denominator, (3) indecision and domination, (4) having yes-
men or warring camps, (5) splitting of responsibility, and (6) 
107 
minority tyranny. 
During the 1950's increased attention was devoted to the 
study of communication networks in small groups. The principal 
focus was on determination of the most efficient communication 
linkage patterns among members of small groups. 'A series of ex-
periments were conducted by Bavelas (1950), Leavitt (1951), Heise 
and Miller (1951) and Guetzkow and Dill (1957) utilizing different 
1 · k 108 1n age patterns. Basic patterns considered were a serial link-
age or chain, a radical linkage or wheel, and a circular or all 
channel linkage. While a review of the findings of these studies 
is beyond the scope of this paper, it is significant that. Robert 
Dubin has formulated a theory of organizational linkage as a result 
of these and other similar studies. l09 Dubin reaches the following 
conclusions: 
The big result of the Guetzkow-Dill experi-
ments for our purposes is this. Where a 
group of individuals is originally con-
strained to interact in interpersonal 
linkage-systems requiring more than the 
minimum numbers of links, they will, if 
given the opportunity, reduce the linkage 
system to the minimum. We would addi-
tionally infer fro!11 their d.::·~ta, that the 
greater the departure from the ~inimum . 
number, of links, the greater is the self-
generated pressure to reorganize the 
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closed group into a minimum linkage 
system. 110 
•• 
The argument may be summarized briefly. 
A unit is part of an organization if it has 
at least one link with a member unit of the 
organization. Links among units are the 
mainstreams of organization: channels of 
information, authority, work-flow, and per-
sonnel mobility. Systematic ways of con-
necting units vary in the number of linkages 
required. If stability of the organization is 
is a desirable goal, then choices may be made 
among unit linkage-systems according to the 
criterion of minimizing the number of links. 
There are theoretical reasons and empirical 
evidence to support this criterion. III 
Indeed, I would be presumptuous enough ~o 
suggest that the satirical Parkinson's Law 
--'Work expands so as to fill the time avail-
able for its completion'--(Parkinson, 1957) 
fs itself grounded in the Law of Linkage for 
Parkinsonian administrators, viz.: Maximize 
tpe number of linkages among organization 
units and work will hav~ to expand to main-
tain them!ll2 
However, Dubin's conclusion that minimum linkage patterns 
are best is subject to serious question. For example a study of 
communication nets with Air Force bomber crews by Robert Ziller in 
1958 found " ••. that the more flexible groups and the more COrt-
fident groups were -generally found to be ,those with the more opell 
communication systems • • 11113 
I 
Or,:as William G. Scott reports: 
I*deed, it has been found that the circular 
(committee or participation) pattern con-
tributes far more to human satisfaction on 
the job and it increases productivity • 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Some circumstances may require a committee-
participative form of decision or joint 
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consultation on problems. These conditions 
include highly involved technical problems 
or the co-ordination of complex organizations. 
Participation is also useful 'tvhen it can be 
shown to improve both morale and efficiency. 
However, group decision making or participation 
is not defensible as a pure 'mQrale booster. ,114 
'+ 
As suggested earlier, by the middle of the 1950's it became 
apparent that modern organizational theory would have to take on a 
broad " .•• conceptional-analytical base" and " ••• above all, a 
th .. . t t . t' ,,115 syn es~z~ng, ~n egra ~ng na ure. This conceptual basis was 
also proposed by Kenneth Boulding in 1956. 116 He suggests first 
that developing a hierarchical model of systems is a more systematic 
way of approaching general systems theory. He proposes a hierarchy 
of nine le:ve1s, in ascending order: (1) framework, (2) clockworks, 
(3) thermostat, (4) open system, or self-maintaining structure 
(cell), (5) genetic-societal level (a plant, for example), (6) 
animal, (7) human, (8) social organizations, and (9) transcendental. 
He furth~r indicates that this model suggests where there 
are gaps in our knowledge as we Can only construc;t adequate 
theoretical models up to about the fourth level, but not much 
117 beyond. As his subtitle "The Skeleton of Science" suggests, we 
have a long way to go to construct an adequate theory of human 
. . 118 organ~zat~on. 
Summary 
One of the most striking features evident in this section 
is the extent to which the organizational theory advanG~d in the 
earliest work, The Functions of the Executive meets the criteria 
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of a systems approach. Another striking fact is the similarity of 
Barnard's concept of organization '"-lith that of Rensis Likert "vhose 
theory is discussed in the next section. Both take the view that 
the basic building block of organization is what Barnard calls the 
unit organization. Barnard also points out that there is a failure 
to take into account these basic units which is utterly unrealistic 
and which leads to serious organizational problems. Another simi-
larity between Barnard's concept and Likert's lies in what Barnard 
terms the centers or points of interconnection between unit 
organizations. Barnard suggests that these interconnections must 
be performed by competent persons called executives, Likert uses 
the term linking pins. Both emphasize that this linking pin 
function is performed by a person who is in effect a member of both 
groups. 
Weber's theory" which is extremely mechanistic, impiicitly 
emphasizes that the coordination function is accomplished only by 
the proper organizing of parts. Nevertheless, its use as a sounding 
board by others, such as Selznick and Blau, has served to show that 
o~ganizations are social institutions that must be vie,.ved both in 
I 
terms of their various environments as well as the fact that 
organizations' internal workings and goals are markedly influenced 
by the feelings, sentiments and values of their members. 
Herbert Simon, with his view of organization as a,decision 
making process, stresses the basic need to organize effectively to 
ensure that premises or il"lformation· is most efficiently provided 
68 
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decision centers. He proposes no explicit organizational structure 
other than a hierarchical decision scheme. He does present some 
.~ 
" 
pertinent comments on committees. First, the corrmlittees are most 
useful lV'here problems are complex and sp~ed in decision-making is 
important. Second, in some instances, committees may be just a 
formal recognition of an informal communication system. An important 
concept which Simon advanced is the differentiation between co-
ordination by plan and coordination by feedback and their application 
in stable and predictable situations versus variable and unpredict-
able situations. Another idea he posits is the need for a highly 
efficient communi,cation system to achieve coordination in a complex, 
, '" I: ;';j' 
interdependent pattern of activity. 
Concepts ,associated with communication networks and the 
relative efficiency of various linkage patterns add another 
dimension to the study of lateral coordination. Robert Dubin sug-
gests that minimum linkage is best. Other studies indicate that in 
complex, unstable situations, patterns within increased linkage are 
more productive. In any event, while the findings to date may be 
inconclusive, they do indicate there is a tradeoff point between 
costs and benefits associated with the number of linkages established. 
However, 'using Kenneth Bould,ing' s hierarchical scheme as frame of 
reference,it is suggested that the linkage or coordination mechanism 
must be as sophisticated as the problem or situation in which it is. 
operating. 
In addition to the hypotheses criteria developed in Chapter 
III, four factors from this section are considered in subsequent 
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chapters in evaluating the MSC Apollo mission planning structure. 
First, the lateral coordinating structure is considered as to its 
effectiveness as a mechanism for transfer of premise information as 
suggested by Simon's decisi.on theory. Second, the MSC Apollo mission 
planning structure is considered in terms of Simon's concept of 
coordination by fp.edback. Third, it is considered in terms of 
communication network linkage theory. Finally, in terms of Kenneth 
Boulding's suggestion, it will be evaluated in terms of its sophis-
tication when compared with the problem with 'tvhich it must be con-
cerned. 
Modern 9rganizational Theory Period 
(1960-Present) 
There are a number of basic underlying themes which set 
apart the literature of this period from that preceding it. First, 
there is an acknmvledgment that the world in which we live ,consists, 
t d t 'd t t f 0 t· 0 119, 120 S d th o an unprece en e ex en ,0 organ1za 10ns. ' "econ,' e 
world in which we live is one of explosive change, and organizations 
L 
must have new capabilities with which to adapt to changes. 12l , 122 
Third, in considering their various aspects, organizations and 
associated management: systems cannot be viewed as being qf one 
type but rather as existing in different forms along continuum in 
d Off" f 123, 124, t25, 126 "h 1erent orms. Fourth, there are 0 •• tree 
broad streams ••. democra:cy, collaboration, and science 
127 
moving steadily to\vard a confluenee· in the twentieth century oJl 
Collaboration, or cooperation is the most recent of these ideas 
70 
e· • 
\ 
,j 
~ 
• .1 
i. < y 
I >~ t 
:",' . 
. '
, ~,'-' ,.,"'" --~.;..,;~ . ":""'~ . • 
• " 
" 
128, 129 
and is a twentieth century addition to our value system. 
While collaboration normally is thought of in terms of individuals 
or groups within an organization, Peter Drucker suggests that a new 
theory must be formulated, a theory: 
• . of the society of organizations is 
needed to explain organizational inter-
dependence. 
. . . . . . . . . . . • • 
But the new interdepencence among organi-
zations is not primarily physical. In-
creasingly, major organizations farm out 
to each other the very performance of their 
oWn functions. Increasingly each organi-
zation is using' the others as agents for 
the accomplishment of its own tasks. There 
is an intertwining of functions such as we 
have never known before. The roles are 
subject to rapid change; what one organiza-
tion is expected to do today, another one 
may take on tomorrow,.130 
Given these considerations, this section aims to briefly 
review the relevant aspects of the works of such authorities as 
Douglas McGregor, Rensis Likert, Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, Karl 
Deutch, Warren G. Bennis, and Donald C. Pe1z and Frank M. Andrews. 
Furthermore, as their study is focused directly on management of 
large research and development projects, concepts of David I. 
Cleland and William R. King as formulated in Systems Analysis and 
Project Management are examined. 
Douglas McGregor 
Douglas McGregor states~thatthe traditional conc~ption of 
organizational theory is based on certain assumptions about human 
behavior. First, man has an inherent dislike for work and he will 
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avoid it, if at all possible. Second, man has to be directed, 
coerced and threatened lvith punishment to ensure he performs ade-
quately on the job. Third, the average person avoids responsibility, 
wants direction, has little ambition and.desires security above all. 
131 
This concept of human motivation McGregor styles as Theory X . 
McGregor indicates there is fl ••• a growing body of research 
f · d ,,132 h' h . d' h "'h X . k d' d In ings . •• W lC In lcates t at ~ eory. IS wea an Ina e-
quate. He then proposes a new theory, Theory Y, based in part on 
Maslow's hierarchical scheme of human needs. Theory Y is based on 
the following assumptions: (1) work is as natural as play or rest; 
(2) man will exercise self-discipline in tryi~g to achieve objectives 
to which he is committed; (3) there are (rewards, other than economic 
which can be utilized to motivate man; (4) given the right environ-
ment man can learn to seel~responsibi1ity; (5) many more people 
than actually do can contribute effectively to creative solutions; 
-
\ 
\ 
133 
and (6) the capabilities of the average person is not fully utilized. 
The effect on coordination, especially lateral coordination, 
as stated by McGregor is as follows: 
'. 
The line manager who 'seeks to operate within 
the context of Theory Y will establish relation~, 
s~ips with his subordinates~his superiors, and 
his colleagues which are much like those of the 
professional vis-a-vis his clients. He will 
become more like a professional staff member 
(although in general rather than specialized 
ways) and less-like a traditiOnal line manager. 
All managers, whether line or staff, have 
responsibilities fOr collaborating with other 
members of the organization in achieving organi-
zational objectives. Each is concerned with 
(1) making his Olm resources of knol-lledge, skill, 
72 
'I' 
, 
j 
~ 
i 
1/ 
4 
/ I 
/ t 
, i 
I 
I 
I 
, fr 
" 
- " ~ 
\ .• f. 
' .. 
~. i 
' . 
. " .. ' 
.. [')" ..... 
, ,~' .. ~ , 
; ':1 '. ": 
I 
r". ' ! . 
I 
. , 
" ...... ~' 
--'~". --: 
.' ~ ~ . 
• 'r.' 
.' '~;.:", 
...... 
- .-
:~.:. ~.', .. : ".1' 
, .' '.' ~ :: . 'It 
. ~ ~ ~ , '. . 
.", 
.. ' 
., -
1< _: 
and experience available to others; (2) 
obtaining h~lp from others in fulfilling 
his o'\;vn responsibilities; and (3) con-
trolling his own job. Each has both line 
and staff responsibilities. 
One consequence of this approa~h is the 
greater significance which the managerial 
~ acquires at each level of organiza-
tion. Nuch of the manager's work--be he 
line or staff--requires his collaboration 
with other managers in a relationship 
where personal authority and power must be 
subordinated to the requirements of the 
task if the organizational objectives are 
to be achieved. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Many activities simply cannot be carried on 
and many problems cannot b~ solved on an 
individual basis or in two-person relation-
s~ips. In addition, there are severe nega-
ti've consequences when we ignore the neces-
sity for group action and attempt to solve 
certain problems in terms of pair relation-
ships. 
In general we are remarkably inept in 
accomplishing objectives thr,ough group 
effort. This is not inevitable. It is a 
result of inadequate understanding and 
skill with respect to the unique aspects of 
group operation. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . ~ 
If, however, the superior recognizes the 
existence of the intricate interdependence 
characteristic of modern industry, and if 
\i1e is less interested in personal power 
than in creating conditions such that the 
human resources available to him will be 
utilized to achieve organizational purposes, 
he will seek to build a strong group. He 
will recognize that the highest commitment 
to organizational objectives, and the most 
successful collaboration in achieving them, 
require unique kinds of interaction which 
~ only occur in !!. highly effective group 
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setting. He will in fact discourage dis-
cussion or decision making on many matters 
~1hich affect his organization except in the 
group setting. He will give the idea of 
'the team' full expression, vlith all the 
connotations it carries on the football 
field. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The modern industrial organization is a vast 
complex of interdependent relationships, up, 
clown, across, and even 'diagonally.' In 
~act, the interdependence is so great that 
only collaborative team efforts can make 
I 
t,he system work effectively. It is probable 
~hat one day we shali begin to dra.w organi-
zation charts as a series of linked groups 
rather than as a hierarchical structure of 
individual Ireporting' relationships.l34 
Rensis Likert 
'* 
Dr. Rensis Likert, Director, Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan, has been head of tl. • • one of the m,jor 
institutions conducting research into human behavior in organi-
. 135 
zat10ns." His work, New Patterns of Management, based upon the 
empirical findings of hi~ group over the previous twelve years, was 
published' in 1961. In it he proposes a new theory of management, 
based upon his conclusions as to the methods currentlj being used 
by managers who exhibited the best pe.rformance records in American 
business and government. In essence, he concludes that the tradi-
tional theories of management are inadequate because they (1) assume 
that people '\vork only or primarily for economic ireasons and (2) they 
I I 
19nore small group methods of supervision. He found that the high-
t 
producing supervisor generally uses broader motivational forces and 
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is more skillful in supervising his subordinates as a gro.up, in 
fact, " .•• the higher his skill in using group methods o.f super-
vision, the greater are the productivity and job satisfactio.n of 
136 his subo.rdinates." As a result o.f his findings, Dr. Likert: 
. • • presents an interesting new theory of 
organization which integrates the numerous 
findings of small gro.up and organizational 
efficiency studies. His theory is of par-
ticular interest since it is o.ne o.f the few 
modern organization theo.ries that deals 
with both o.rganizational behavior and o.r-
ganizational structure. 137 
In the bro.ad perspective, Dr. Likert suggests that his new 
management system lies at one end of a continuum of " .•• various 
systems o.f management and control that has evo.lved in the co.urse o.f 
time .•• ,,138 While indicating that organizations may exist any-
wh~re o.n the continuum, with many intermediate patterns, he 
identifies fo.ur basic type::; o.f management style. They are Ex-
plo.itive Autho.ritative, Benevo.lent Autho.ritative, Co.nsultative and 
Participative management styles. The three named first are 
management systems that he considers traditional; the fourt;h is 
his science-based system. He subsequently changed the nqmencla-
, 
ture to. Systems 1 through 4, respectively, to. avo.id possible pre-
judging by respondents when completing questionnaires. Figure 3 
depicts the various systems o.n the continuum, utilizing bo.th 
i 
nomenclathres. 
His concept is based o.n the fact that he fo.und " .•. a 
k bl ' f . 1'· h" ,,139 bId remar a. y co.nSl.stent set 0. l.nterre atl.o.ns l.pS etween eaer-
ship styles and nine orga.·rtizational characteristics: mo.tivation, 
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Figure 3. Likert's Management Continuum. 
communication, interaction, decision-making, goal-setting, control, 
. 4, 
and performance. A complete listing of the organizational and per-
formance characteristics of the four different systems. may be found 
on pages 14 through 24, The Human Organization. 
There are three concepts which form the foundation for 
Likert's System 4; they are (1) the principle of supportive 
relationships, (2) the setting of high performance goals, and (3) 
the use of group methods of supervising, including group decision-
making. 
The principle of supportive relationships states that: 
The leadership and other processes of the 
organization must be such as to ensure a 
maximum probability that in all interactions 
and in all relationships within the organi-
zation, each member, in the light of his 
background, values, desires, and expectations, 
will view the experience as supportive and 
one which builds and maintains his sense of 
personal worth and importance. 140 
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In other words, supervisors are to be employee-centered. They 
focus their attention on the human aspects of their subordinates' 
problems. They regard their jobs as dealing with human beings as 
well as with the work. They see their role as facilitating the 
work of their subordinates; they exercise general rather than 
detailed supervision. 
However, it is not enough that the supervisor be employee-
centered. He must also have high performance goals and every member 
of his group: 
• • • should have high performance aspira-
tions as well. Since these high performance 
goals should not be imposed on employees, 
there must be a mechanism through which 
~mployees can help set the high-level goals 
which the satisfaction of their own needs 
require. 1lj.1 
The third concept, and the one with which this study is 
principally concerned, is the use of group methods of supervision. 
I 
There are two aspects of group supervision. First, the relations 
or interactions within each group; second,therelations or inter-
actions between groups. Within the group the s~pervisor relies 
heavily on group proce.sses rather than on man-to-man interaction. 
WhilEL, naturally, man-to-man interaction occurs, there is also a 
positive effort to ensure that at: 
. . . each hierarchical level . . • all sub-
ordinates in a work group who are affected 
by the outcome of a decision are involved 
in it.. (A work group is defined as a 
superior and all subordinates vIho report to 
him. ) 
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When the group process of decision making 
and supervision is used properly, discussion 
is focused on the decisions to be made. 
There is a minimum of idle talk. Gommuni-
cation is clear and adequately understood. 
Important issues are recognized and dealt 
with. The atmosphere is one of 'no non'" 
sense' with emphasis on high productivity, 
high quality, and low costs. Decisions are 
reached promptly, clear-cut responsibilities 
are established, and tasks are performed 
rapidly and productively. Confidence and 
trust pervade all aspects of the relation-
ship. The groupls capacity for effective 
problem solving is maintained by examining 
and dealing with group process.es when 
necessary. It is essential that the group 
method of decision making :and supervision 
not be confused with committees which never 
reach decisions or with 'Wishy-washy,' 
I common-denominator , sort of committee about 
which the superior can say, 'Well, the group 
made this decision, and I couldn't do a thing 
about it. I Quite the contrary! The group 
method of supervision holds the superior 
fully responsible for building his subqrdinates 
into a group which makes the best decisions 
and carries them out well. The superior is 
accountable for all decisions, for their 
execution, ~ for the results.T4'Z 
The focus of this study is directed at the second aspect 
of group supervision, the interactions between groups. Building 
up this basic organizational building block Dr. Likert goes on to 
state that: 
. • • organizations will function best, when 
its personnel function not as individuals 
out as members of highly effective work groups 
• conseq1J.ently, management should deliberately 
endeavor to build these effectiVE( groups, linking 
them into an over-all organization by means of 143 
people who hold overlapping group membership • . .. 
Those in.dividua1s who hold overlapping group memberships 
are called "linking pins (Figure 4). In a standard hierarchical 
organization: 
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The superior in one group is a subordinate 
in. the next group, and so on through the 
organization. If the work groups at each 
hierarchical "-evel are well knit and 
effective, the linking process will be 
accomplished 'tvell. 144 
(The arrows indicate the linking-pin function.) 
Figure 4. The linking pin. (From Rensis JLikert. 
New Patterns of Management.) 
In this earlier work, ~ Patterns of Management, in 
addition to formulating this hierarchical system of overlapping 
i 
groups, he further suggests there should be lateral linkages across 
the organization, that these additional linkages should II ••• act 
\ 
as the sinews binding the organization together arid making it: stronger 
d f - .." 145 H .. l' 1 k h an, more e fe~t~ve. owever, ~t 1S on y ~n a ater'tolor, Te. 
Human Organization, that. he fully develops this concept of multiple, 
. 146 overlapp~ng groups. The overlapping groups and linking pins as 
shO'tvn in Figure 4 indicate only vertical or hierarchical re1ation-
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ships, not recognizing horizontal or lateral communication channels. 
In that respect, Likert's basic model is similar to the typical 
organizational chart. He subsequently substantially modified this 
basic model to show horizontal overlapping groups, whose function 
is to provide lateral coordination. Each cross-function group has 
as its leader a person from the hierarchical level directly above 
that from other members of the group. This provides for vertical 
integration as well as lateral coordination. Figure 1, page 22, 
shows three such overlapping groups performing cross-functional 
coordination. We thus see that a central concept in Dr. Likert's 
... 
theory is: 
. :. • organizations are not sets of rela-
tionships among people, as depicted in the 
typical organization chart, but rather are 
relationships among sets of interlocking 
and interdependent groups. It is the U.nk-
ing pins who occupy key roles in organiza-
tions in terms of serving as the chan~el of 
communication and influence from one group 
to another. 147 
• • . the network structure of an organi-
zation using a science-based theory like 
System 4 is appreciably more complex than 
is the usual vertical structur~ • . • and 
requires greater learning and skills to 
operate it well. It is not a line, nor a 
~ine-staff, form of organization but is a 
Complex grid system with an elaborate, 
interlaced, organizational structure. It 
provides powerful resources for horizontal 
as well as vertical coordination. This 
complex network, through its alternate 
linkages, provides, as we have seen, better 
communication, greater capacity to deal 
with differences by group decision making, 
and better coordination. . . • It yieilds 
a more flexible organization and motivates 
individuals throughout the company to 
exercise more initiative in bringing about 
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improvement and change, as \'ire11 as giving 
them the means for doing so.148 
" . 
In thus formally recognizing these horizontal overlapping groups, 
Dr. Likert has suggested a new conceptual tool for effecting co-
ordination in large, complex organizations. 
Dr. Likert considers that the problem of how to achieve 
coordination in a highly functionalized company one of the most 
serious facing the manager today. He states that the System 4 
theory of organization must be adopted if the increasingly complex 
organizational problems which face managers are to be satisfactorily 
solved. 
Pr" 
Virtually every large company faces, in 
more or less serious form, the problem 
of whether to organize: on a functional 
basis or on a product or geographical 
basis or to try SOIfi~ compromip~::: solution. 
The requirements of both specialization 
~nd low unit costs achieved by large-scale 
operations (economy of scale) press for a 
functional form of organization. But it 
is not easy for a large, highly function-
alized organization to achieve effective 
~oordination. New products emerging from 
research, for example, do not move from 
research to development to manufacturing 
to marketing with the speed and coordina-
tion required to capitalize on the large 
demand for a new and useful product. 
Unfortunately, major trends are aggravating 
this already serious problem of ho\v to 
achieve coordination in a highly function-
alized company. New knowledge and method-
ologies are being created at a rapidly 
accelerating rate as the n~tional expendi-
tures for research and deve:J.opment increase. 
Becau3e of the limits of human' capacity, I 
more, not leSs, functionalization~s re-
quired to take effective use of these new 
resources. Increases in functionalization, 
in turn, make effective coordination both 
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more necessary and even more difficult. 149 
In a recent issue paper he states that: 
System 4 'tvith its mUltiple overlapping group 
structure and group problem solving, in 
addition to its capacity to en~ble an individual 
to have t\VO or more bosses, provides unique 
resources for achieving effective lateral, 
as well as vertical, coordination. Since 
the successful use of R&D usually requires 
effective lateral coordination, a shift to 
System 4 can increase appreciably the bene-
fits an organization derives from its R&D 
expenditures. ISO 
Torn Burns and G. M. Stalker 
'''. 
During the 1950's, Torn Burns and G. M. Stalker conducted 
a series of studies involving the management of traditional Scottish 
firms which were trying to introduce electronics development work 
into their operations. A majority of these firms failed in the 
attempt.. Burns and Stalker were able to discover significant 
differences between those firms that were able to make the change-
over and those that failed. As a result of their findings, Burns 
and Stalker suggested there'is a continuum of management systems. 
The two polar cases they identify as the mechanistic and the 
lSI 
organic. 
The mechanistic system is adapted to relatively stable 
situations. There is a strict departmentalism of functions and 
tasks, w'hich are precisely defined. Ther.e is an emphasi~ on a 
vertical hiera!1chy of control, authority land cormnunications. Each 
person,and organizational unit tends to operate as a distinct 
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separate entity.152 This system compares with the Weberian rational-
legal bureaucracy. 
The organic system is flexible and can accomodate ch~nge. It 
has a facility for handling non-routine decisions and in fact, handles 
this type of decision as a normal function. Given the unstable nature 
of conditions with which this type of organization must deal, there is 
a continual readjustment of tasks and jobs. Individuals and organi-
zationa1 units perform their assignments in light of overall knowledge 
of the organization's goals, interacting closely with others parti-
cipating in the action. 
Interaction runs laterally as much as 
vertically. Communication betw'een people 
of different rGj,nks tends to resemble 
late,ral consultation rather than vertical 
command. Omniscience can no longer be 
imputed to the head of the concern. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . 
The shift from mechanistic to organic 
• i· • makes conside.rable demands on 
inHividual members of an organization. 
In general terms, they are required to 
• • • regard it as something kept in 
be~ng by the sustained creative activity 
of themselves and other members, to cease 
being 'nine-to-fivers' and turn 'pro-
fessionals. '153 
Karl Deutsch 
Karl Deutsch has approached the problem of organization, 
particularly political organization, as a matter of communication 
and control. He states that communi'cation theory, control theory 
and cybernetics can produce important insights for all organi-
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t . 154 za-10ns. He also notes that the words cybernetics and government 
come from the same fl ••• Greek root that refers to the art of the 
steersman.,,155 He suggests that government or organizations should 
be viewed less as a matter of power and more as a problem of steering 
and that steering is essentially a matter of communication, feedback 
and control. 
It is not intended here to go into any detail concerning 
his total theoretical construct, but only to briefly present two 
aspects which may have immediate bearing on this study. While 
Deutsch uses examples from the political science they are also 
applicable to all la~ge organizations: 
The first mistake consists in overesti-
m,ating the importance of impersonal media 
oif communication, such as radio broadcasts 
apd newspapers, and underestimating. the 
incomparably greater significance of face-
I 
tp-face contacts. These face-to-face con-
tacts determine to a large degree what in 
fact will be tran'smitted most effectively 
and who will be the 'insiders' in the 
organization, that is, those persons who 
receive both information and attention on 
highly preferred terms. 156 
T~e strategic 'middle level' can perhaps 
b~ defined somewhat more closely. It is 
t~at level of communication and command 
that is 'vertically' close enough to the 
1 1 f .. ~rge mass 0 consumers, c1t1zens, or 
common soldiers to forestall any con-
tinuing and effective direct communication 
b~tween them and the 'highest echelons'; 
a.qd it must be far enough above the level 
ot the large numbers of th~ rank and file 
to permit effective 'horizontal' communi-
cation and organization among a sufficient-
ly large portion of the men or units on 
its O'iVl1 level. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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It should be noted that the persons on 
tHis strategic 'upper-middle-Ievel' 
us;ually receive very little publicity. 
They are the 'men behind the scenes' 
in the sense that they are the 'men 
who do the work' of making, permitting, 
and executing the largest number of 
strategic decisions. lS7 
Warren G. Bennis 
It is Warren Bennis' position that the Weberian rational-
l.gal type of bureaucracy is not adequate to cope with the many 
, 
problems that beset organizations today. ISS Instead he, suggests 
that futur~ organizations will have special characteristics: 
1he key word will be 'temporary'; there 
Will be adaptive, rapidly changing temporary 
~ystems. These will be organized around 
problems-to-be-s9,lved. The problems will 
be solved by groups of relative strangers 
,*ho represent a set of diverse professional 
$kills. The groups will be conducted on 
~rganic rather than mechanical models; they 
yill evolve in response to the problem rather 
~han prograrmned role expectations. The func-
tion of the 'executive' thus becomes coordi-I ' 
nator, or 'linking pin' between various 
project groups. He must be a man who can 
~peak the diverse languages of research and 
lfho can relay information and mediate among 
1;:he groups. People will be differentiated ~ vertically according !£ ~ and role 
put flexibly according 12 skill and profes-
sional traini~59 
He asserts that organizations, in order to cope with the 
rate of change they are experiencing, will increasingly make use 
~' of! planned-change programs to move toward: 
'!':' I 
I 
" • less bureau-
cratic and ~ ~articipative 'open-system,' and adaptive struc-
160 
tures." He further states that the adequate performance of 
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the horizontal linking pin function is a key requisite to effect 
th ' h 161 1S C ange. 
Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andre'tvs 
During the period 1958-1960 Donald Pelz and Frank AndreW's 
conducted a series of investigations which examined the relation-
ship between " ••. a scientist's performance and the organization 
162 
of his laboratory." There were eleven organizations in the study, 
including five industrial laboratories, five government laboratories, 
and seven departments in one university. Since the Pelzand 
i 
Andrews investigations 'explored the affect of communication and 
: I , 
coordination on scientists and engineers in R&D organizations 
similar to the organization being examined in this study, certain 
results of their investigations are directly applicable. They can 
be summarized as follows. 
First, an increase in horizontal contacts (contacts with 
163 colleagues) correlates directly with higher performance • 
We did not design the research to test a 
systematic organizational theory. As it 
turned out, though, the foregoing results 
tied in well with some of Rensis Likert's 
ideas, formulated mainly from data on non-
scientific organizations. Likert'~ concept 
of management by overlappino groups is con-
sistent with our resul-ts. 164 
Second, Pelz and Andrews found that there are correlations 
between how tightly coordina.tedan organization is, the type of 
scientists (Ph.D or non-Ph.D engineer) and the amount of autonomy 
required for good performance. 
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In general, we found that (A) the looser 
the situation, the more strongly high 
levels of motivation (both internal and 
external in source) accompanied high 
performance. But (B) the individual's 
autonomy and influence were most effec-
tive in situations of only moderate 
looseness. Part (C) gives some clue as 
to why; there were numerous hints that 
maximum autonomy in a very loose setting 
may. isolg§e the individual from stimu-
lat1.on. 
One explanat.ion for these results may be 
that in loose or extremely loose settings 
the most autonomous scientists tended to 
withdraw from outer stimulation (or to 
reduce inner motivation), that is, to 
weaken stimuli which might have enhanced 
their performance. In very tightly co-
ordinated situations, at the other 
extreme, autonomous individuals were 
h9th motivated and stimulated; but the 
rigidities of the setting apparently 
prevented these factors from enhancing 
creativity. Thus only in the middle-
range situations were two essential con'· 
ditions present: (a) high autonomy was 
accompanied by a number of strong moti-
vcitions and stimulations, and (b) the 
setting was flexible enough to allow 
tltese factors to improve performance. 
i 
I 
I~ the loosest settings, full autonomy 
m~y encourage complacency rather than 
zest, narrow specialization rather than 
breadth. In the strongholds of research, 
the isolated rooms in the ivory tower may 
not be the best habitat for achievement. 
It suggests, we think, that you emphasize 
different techniques when dealing with 
different segments of your research organi-
zation. For the sake of discussion we'll 
stretch a point and assume that all five 
levels of coordination are represented in 
different parts of your organization. 
Consider first the research engineers in 
your development laboratories: moderately 
autonomous non-Ph.D's, developing new 
products or processes. Let's assume they 
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cDrrespond to level III. For these men, 
the kind of philosophy represented in 
Rensis Likert f s New Patterns, of Management 
shDuld be highly effective. These men 
should rise to the challenge of more parti-
cipation in decision-making. Stimulate 
them with a wide variety Df problems. Make 
sure each man has three or four specialized 
skills, and a fair degree of leeway to 
follow up his ot.m ideas. 166 
David I. Cleland and William R. King 
System~ Analysis and Project Management, by David Cleland 
and William King, is one of the best balanced and cDmprehensive 
treatments of proj ect management avail~ble in the 1 i terat'lre. It 
divides prDject management into twO' phases, planning and executiDn; 
the title of the wDrk reflects this divisiDn. System analysis, 
covered in th,e first part Df the bDOk, concerns itself with the 
planning phase of new programs and analysis of alternatives using 
the systems approach a la McNamara-Hitch. The secDnd part Df the 
bDOk discusses the execution phase Df the prDgram--prDject manage-
ment. Specific subject areas cDvered in the latter half of the 
work include: the project envirDnment, concepts Df prDject manage-
ment, charting lateral Drganizational relationships, and prDject 
cDntrDI techniques. l67 
In discussing the theoretical basis for prDject management 
the authors review the cDncepts of the traditiDnal school as well 
as the administrative man~gement SChODl. In summarizing these 
theories, they state that it must be remembered that " .•. these 
ideas were develDped fDr organizations that were smaller and envirDn-
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ments that were simpler than those of today. 11168 Ci ting the ~vorks 
of Ralph C. Davis, George R. Terry and Harold Koontz, it is implied 
that Cleland and King's basic theoretical orientation is of the 
operational school. They also indicate t;:hat " .•• the concepts of 
traditional and project management compliment each other; they are 
not two distinct approaches to the execution function."169 However, 
they indicate that to the extent the traditional school operates on 
a Theory X basis which " .•• limits human collaboration in the 
organization,"170 it is inadequate and they therefore suggest Theory 
Y as a method of operation and motivation. 
Proje1ct management is concerned with: 
• • . the task of integrating functional and ~xtraorganizationa1 efforts directed toward 
the development and acquisition of a specific project. The project manager (or systems 
manager) is confronted wlth a unique set of 
,circumstances and forces ~vith each project, 
and these circumstances and forces channel 
his thought and behavior into somewhat singu-lar patterns of reSponse. 
The project manager's position is based on 
th~ realization that modern organizations 
are so complex as to preclude effective 
management using traditional organizational 
structures and relationships. Traditional 
philosophy is based on a vertical flow of 
authority and responsibility relationships 
and emphasizes only parts and segments of 
the organization. It does n6t place suffi-
cient importance on the interrelationships 
and integration of , activities invQlved in the 
total array.171 
Cleland and King suggest four criteria to be used in deciding 
whether or not a project office should be established. They are: 
magnitude of effort, unfamiliarity, interrelatedness, and organi-
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zational reputation. 172 In other words, it is a relatively large 
undertaking, it is different from the normal routine, there is a 
high degree of interdependence among the tasks, and the organiza-
tion's stake in the undertaking may be crucial. 
There are two basic types of project organizations, the 
pure project organization and the matrix organization. 173 In the 
pure project organization the manager is given authority to run 
the project as if it were a one-product company. The matrix 
organization is composed of both a project and a functional 
structure. It can take a large variety of forms depending on the 
project-functional combinations. In a matrix organization: 
• • • a functional organization exists in 
which the project manager reports to the 
chief executive in a line capacity. The 
staff of the project manager's office may 
vary in number from only the manager him-
self to several hundred people, depending 
upon the degree to which the project activi-
ties are centralized. As the project man-
ager's responsibilities increase and more 
facets of the project are centralized under 
his control, the company may establish an 
organizational entity (a division) to man-
age the project independently. In this type 
of matrix organization, the project manager 
has authority over the functional managers 
r~garding the 'what' and 'when' of the activ-
ities; the functional manager determines how I ~
the support will be given. The functional 
managers are responsible to both their func-
tional supervisors and the project manager 
f~r support of the projectj This situation, 
in which a line functional manager (such as 
a production manager) is placed in a position 
of providing advice, counsel, and specialized 
support to a project manager, who, 1:13 concerned. 
w~th unifying project a~tivities across the 
company, represents a change in the authority 
relationships. This is a radical departure 
from th"e lin~-staff organizational dichotomy 
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that has been the mainstay of management 
theory for decades. Also it seems to be a 
violation of the scalar principle described 
by Henri Fayo!. 
Authority patterns in the organization • • • flow both vertically and horizontally through-
out the company. In addition,there is flow 
to outside participating organizations. Pro,-ject organization frequently disregards levels 
and functions and superimposes the project 
structure on the existing Qrganization. The 
structure depends, to a large degree, on the location of the project contributor, regard-less of where that contributor is located. 
Thus, at times it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to chart the relationships .•• 
Some form of matrix organization is established 
almost universally in companies engaged in developing, testing, and delivering large pro-jects. In this dual management ,process, delib-
erate or purposeful conflict is 'recognized as 
a mechanism for achieving good trade-offs. 
Even though the organization is aligned in 
such a way that the conflict is required, (and 
recognized), the chief executives expect the 
managers to work out their conflicts. In 
other words, the project manager and the func-
tional managers must resolve the recurring 
conflicts that arise during the course of the project's life. Only truly significant dis-
agreements should be brought up to a common 
superior for resolution; management by excep-
tion is the rule! Both project and functional 
managers have the right of appeal, but before 
any such right is exercised, t~vo criteria 
should be met: (1) the issue is clearly drawn, 
with alternatives and costs described, and (2) it is a salient project-functional issue. The 
resolution of salient conflicts may determine 
the organizational placement of a project. 
Creating a matrix organization results in 
major organiz-ational changes in a company. 
In general, these changes emphasize decen- 174 tralization of authority and responsibility. 
The matrix, or mixed, organization has many 
advantages: 
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1. The project is emphasized by designating 
one individual as the focal point for all 
matters pertaining to it. 
2. Utilization of manpo,,·/er can be flexible 
because a reservoir of specialists is 
maintained in functional organizations. 
3. Specialized kno ... vledge is avaiLable to all 
programs on an equal basis; knowledge and 
experience can be transferred from one 
project to another. 
4. Project people have a functional home 
when they are no longer needed on a 
given project. 
5. Responsiveness to project needs and 
customer desires is generally faster 
because lines of communication are 
established and decision points are 
~entralized • 
6. Management consist;ency between projects 
can be maintained through the deliberate 
conflict ope~ating in the project-functional 
environment. 
7. A better balance between time, cost, and 
performance can be obtained through the 
built-in checks and balances (the delib-
erate conflict) and the continuous nego-
tiations carried on between the project 
and the functional organizations. 
, 
There are some disadvantages to a mixed organi-
zation. The balance ·of power between the func-
tional and the project organizations must be 
watched so that neither one erodes the other. 
':\:'he balance between time, cost, and perform-
ance must also be continually monitored so 
that neither group favors cost or time over 
technical performance.175 
'4 
Although naturally Cleland and King recognize that horizontal 
relationships are the essence of project management, there is little 
discussion in their work of concepts or techniques for lateral co-. 
ordination. There is some discussion on communication networks,. but 
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little more than stating that there are formal and informal networks 
f . t· 176 o commun1ca 1on. In this respect, the work reflects the tradi-
tional management approach. 
There is in their work, however, a very extensive discussion 
of methods for analyzing and charting horizontal relationships.177 
Recognizing that the traditional organization chart has proven to be 
a useful tool for depicting hierarchical relationships of the 
traditional school, Cleland and King explore the possibility of 
developing a method for depicting horizontal relationships. The 
method which they suggest is use of the linear responsibility chart 
(LRC) or a modified version of it which they call systems charting. 
Figure 9, on page 190 shows a simplified linear responsibility chart. 
·ft" 
Typically, the LRC shows these character-
'istics: 
1. Core information from convent:ional 
charts and associated manuals dis-
played in a matrix format. 
2. A series of position titles listed 
along the top of the table (columns). 
3. A listing of responsibi.lities, 
authorities, activities, functions, 
and projects dmvn the side of the 
chart (lines). 
4. An array of symbols indicating degree 
or extent of authority and (explaining 
the relationship between th\~·columns 
and the lines. 
i 
Such an arrangement sho1;vs in one horizontal 
line all persons involved in a function and 
~he extent and nature of their involvement • 
!furthermore, the one vertical line sho'tvs all 
functions that a person is. responsible for 
and the nature of his responsibility. A 
vertical line represents an individual's 
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job description; a horizontal line sho~vs 
the brea~out of a function or task by job 
position. 
There are two primary advantages to this 
mode of presentation. First, position 
descriptions and position guides are better 
at laying down responsibilities and author-
ity patterns than at portraying relation-
ships. Second, this type of charting de-
pictsthe work of top management as an 
integrated ,system rather than as a series 
of individual positions. The chart makes 
it: easy to compare the responsibilities of 
r~lated executives; in the coordination of 
budgets, for example, six individuals share 
the responsibility, ranging from 'must be 
consulted' to 'may be consulted' and 'must. 
be notified.' The filled-in chart provides 
a quick picture of all the positions in-
volved in the performance of a particular 
function. 178 
Other Contributors 
• 
Although they cannot be examined here extensively, there 
are a number of other authorities who should be identified as having 
contributed ideas to the subject of lateral coordination. Victor A. 
Thompson, for example, has discussed extensively the basic conflict 
between hierarchical authority and professional authQrity.179 
Similarly, Rqbert Golembiewski has pointed out that the old concept 
of line-staff relations, or the Neutral and Inferior Instrument (NIl) 
, 
concept, is no longer applicable,and that the new concept must be 
a Colleague mode1. 180 Furthermore, Wesley L. Hjornevik, former 
,Associate Director, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, has identified 
six different organizational patterns which MSC utilizes to 
facilitate lateral coordination: 
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1. A multidisciplined effort achieved by 
assigning the required professionals 
to a project office for the duration 
2 . 
3 • 
of the project 
A multidisciplined effort achieved by 
creating a s~all, coordinating project 
office but leaving the professionals 
in their respective organizations. 
A multidisciplined effort achieved 
through informal working groups and 
panels without any organizational 
change 
4. Amultidisciplined effort achieved by 
physical colocation of personnel with-
out any formal or informal organization 
changes 
5. A multidisciplined effort achieved by 
assigning specific missions to an 
organiz9-tion or individual 
6. A multidi.sciplined effort. achieved 
t~rough a flexible personnel classifi-
cation system that permits a diversi-
fied staff within any given functional 
organization. 181 
Sunnnary 
........ 
Two basic patterns, emerge as one summarizes the ideas and 
concepts of the authorities disc~ssed in this section. First, they 
all recognize that modern organizations, in varying degrees, are 
faced with a very unstable environment. Second; that the individ-
uals with these organizations must take a more active and broader" 
role in ensuring accomplishment of organizations objectives. This 
broader role involves substantially more lateral coordination with 
colleagues in other organizational units. Likert, supported by 
McGregor, Bennis, Pelz and Andrew's, suggests thatinterlinkage by 
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linking pins is an essential element in this lateral coordination 
process. 
In addition to the hypotheses criteria developed in Chapter 
III, four factors from this section are used in later chapters as 
an aid in evaluating t} clSC Apollo mission planning structure. 
First, Deutsch's concept of the strategic "middle level" as a key 
lateral linking mechanism is considered. Second, in respect to Pelz 
and Andrews findings, the impact of lateral coordination on 
individual performance is considered. Third, the MSC Apollo mission 
planning structure is considered in terms of Pelz and Andrews' con-
cept of coordination and autonomy. Fourth, the MSC Apollo mission 
planning structure is evaluated in terms of Cleland and King's 
concept of matrix organizations. 
Evaluation Factors . 
Sixteen factors have been identified in this chapter as 
potential aids for evaluating the MSC Apollo mission planning 
structure. The basic purpose of identifying these factors is to 
ensure that a broad perspective is t~ken in analyzing,the subject 
structure. Sufficient data is not available to evaluate the 
structure in terms of each of these factors. However, to the 
extent-that this data is not available, limitations of the study 
are thereby ident:ified. The sixteen factors arie: 
• 
L Fayol 'sconcept of weekly conferences of department 
heads 
2-5. Follett's concepts of early, direct, self-adjusting 
and continuous coordination 
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6. Traditional concepts of hierarchical coordination, 
including Gulick's four organizational patterns 
7. Coordination from the aspect of the individual, 
including Gaus' educational concept 
8. The social group as a limiting factor in coordination 
9. Coordination as a mechanism for transmitting premise 
information a la Simon 
10. Coordination by feedback 
'Z ~:q . 
11. Coordination in terms of communication network linkage 
patterns 
12. Boulding's concept of tool sophistication verSQS 
problem difficulty 
13. Deutsch's concept of "strategic middle level" 
14. Pelz and Andrews' concept of the relation of coordination· 
and autonomy 
15. Pelz and Andrews' concept of increased horizontal con-
tacts and increased performance 
16. Cleland and King's matrix organization. 
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CHAPTER V 
MSC ENVIRON1'IENT 
""""""'" 
.... 
On May 25, 1961, only twenty days after Alan Shepard's first 
,Ai 
fifteen minute suborbital flight and nine months before John Glenn's 
first U. S. orbital space flight, President John F. Kennedy urged 
that the United States establish as a National goal a manned lunar 
1 
landing before the end of the decade. The Nation accepted the 
challenge and, assigning this goal top priority, during the next 
nine years provided resources in excess of twenty-three billion 
dollars and a peak work effort of over 400,000 personnel from gov 
government, industry and universities to achieve this obje(:tive. 2 
The purpose of this chapter iS,to proVide' a perspective of the 
organizational environment in which the MSC Apollo mission planning 
structure operated~ thereby to aid in analyzing and interpreting 
study findings. Briefly described are the complex of organizations, 
the roles performed, interrelationships, and the policies and pro-
cedures in which the MSC Apollo mission planning function performed. 
Overview 
At the time of! President Kennedy's decision, NASA was two 
I 
ancl one-half years' old and, in the area of manned s.paceflight, 
was engaged in only one program, Project Mercury. Project Mercury 
was under the direction of the Space Task Group (STG), the nucleus 
. 
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of the yet to be formed Nanned Spacecraft Center, which was located 
-at the NASA Langley Research Center, Virginia. Of the four NASA 
Centers that would become substantially involved in manned.space 
flight activities, tw'o had just been formed and two ~vere yet to be 
organized. The Marshall Space Flight Center had been formed from 
the nucleus of the Wernher von Braun team and personnel of the Red-
stone Army Arsenal, Huntsville, Alaba~na. The Goddard Space Flight 
Center, recently formed, was engaged in developing the worldwide 
tracking network for Project Mercury, as well as conducting un-
manned space projects. During the next six months the Manned 
Spacecraft Center was formed with a nucleus of personnel from the 
700 man Space Task Group. The Kennedy Space Center was fo~med 
later from a nucleus of Marshall Space Flight Center and Manned 
Spacecraft Center personnel located at Cape Kennedy. 
In the next five and one-half years, during ·the period of the 
design and development of the Apollo spacecraft, launch vehicle and 
associated launch and other ground support facilities, a total of 
fourteen U.S. manned space flights, including four Mercury and ten 
I Gemini missions, were flown. Gemini, approved after Apollo, was 
an interim program, designed to provide the U.S. with additional 
operational experience pri.or to flying Apollo. Subsequently, after 
a delay of one year because of the fatal fire at the launch pad, 
the manned Apollo missions were flown, culminating nine months later 
in the successful lunar landing mission of July 16, 1969. 
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Organizations 
There are eight elements or groups which comprise the basic 
organizational environment as pertains to the MSC Apo.llo mission 
planning structure. The keystone, naturally, is NASA Headquarters; 
the other seven elements are NASA-MSC, NASA Marshall Space Flight 
Center (MSFC), NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA Goddard Space 
Flight Center (GSFC), Department of Defense manned spaceflight 
3 
support group, the Apollo spacecraft prime contractors, and the MBC 
4 
support contractors. The NASA organizations are shown on the chart 
on the next page in Figure 5. 
5 Manned Spacecraft Center 
The Manned Spacecraft Center was established on November 1, 
1961, approximately seven months after President Kennedy proposed 
6 the Apollo Program. Its predecessor, the Space Task Group (BTG), 
had been formed three years earlier to 
Within the next four months, this small 
accomplish Project Mercury. 
7 group not only realized 
its initial primary goal of putting the first U.S. astronaut, John 
Gl~nn, into earth orbit, but had also determined the basic con-
figuration of the ApQllo spacecraf.tcommand and service module and 
8 had awarded the contract for its design and manufacture. Further-
. 9 
more,. Gemini was announced as an interim program" and relocation 
of.MSC personnel to' Houston, the selected location of MSC, was 
10 begun. 
D'uring the next "!$even years ,the following events occurred 
at MSC. It grew in size from 170 civil personnel to approximately 
4600 personnel, approximately 57 per cent of whom are technical, 
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scientific or technical professionals. From ranchlands just south 
of Houston, Texas, a Center was developed encompassing facilities 
12 
and associated equipment valued in excess of $600,000,000. Major 
facilities built include the Mission Control Center, Lunar Receiving 
Laboratory, Space Envirorunent Simulation Laboratory, Mission 
Sit;nu1ation and Training Facilities, Flight Acceleration Facility, 
Vibration and Acoustic Test Facility and Systems Evaluation Labora-
tory. 
Concurrent with these developments, MSC guided Projects 
Mercury and Gemini to successful conclusion, thereby making the 
United States pre-eminent in manned spaceflight. Top MSC manage-
ment personnel who are responsible for these signal successes have 
worked together for over eight years. For example, of the top 
eleven technical MSC managers, eight also performed similar key 
,"I 
,j 
roles in Gemini and Mercury programs. Further,,a large majority 
of the next level of supervisors (division chiefs)-also played 
important parts in the previous programs. As a result, their 
close teamwork is very evident in the performance of their 
·functions. 
The Manned Spacecraft Center has three basic] responsibilities. 
First, it is responsible for manned. spacecraft design and deve1op-
lllent, including performing studies for advancement of manned space-
I 
craft technology. Second, it is responsible for conducting manned 
space flight: missions,' includi'ng development of mission plans and 
i 
training of flight crews and flight controllers. Third, it is 
responsible for performihg lunar and earth science investigations 
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as well as earth resources survey and applications programs. The 
basic framework in which these functions are principally accomplished 
are through major spaceflight programs such as Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo. Other programs currently in developmental or planning 
phases are the Apollo Applications Program, designed to test con-
cepts, techniques, and technology for long duration space flights; 
the space shuttle; the space sta.tion; and spacecraft designed for 
1 t .. 13 pane ary m1SS10ns. 
The organizational structure of MSC (Figure 6, next page) 
through which the MSC Director manages his operations, reflects the 
functional and program aspects outlined in the preceeding para-
graph. There are three program offices--the Apollo Spacecraft 
Program Office, the Apollo Applications Program Office, and the 
Advanced Mission Program Office. Briefly, the responsibilities of 
the ,program offices can be summarized as follows: (1) they are 
responsible for integrating the activities of the line organiza-
tions conc~t'ning their respective program, (2) they coordinate and 
integrate associate~ activities in other centers and agenci~s, and 
.(3) they technically direct the spac~c:raft developmental and manu-
I 
facturing contractors. There are five major line organizations: 
the Engineering and Development Directorate, Science and Appli-
cations Directorate, Medical Research and Operations Directorate, 
Flight Crew Operations Directorate, and Flight Operations Director-
ate. Thes'e organizations ha.ve a, dual function; first ~ to support 
the ,program offices and, second, to advance manned spaceflight 
technology in their respective functional areas. The functions and 
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organization of these five line organizations and the Apollo Space-
craft Program Office will be treated more exteilsfvely in the next 
chapter as they comprise the MSC Apollo mission planning structure. 
Ther~ are also two staff organizations, technical in function, 
wh!ich aid the J:.'f..sC Director in ensuring that there is (1) a high level 
of safety in test programs as well as (2) high reliability and 
quality in flight vehicle components. The remainder of MSC organi-
zation consists of management and administrative support elements. 
A small field test organization is located at White Sands, New 
Mexico. 
MSC Contractors 
In accordance wi,th NASA pol icy, 14 contractors perform 
essentialiy all manufacturing and directly associated developmental 
work for the m':ljor manned spacecraft programs;, Further, contractors 
also provide substantial support in the form of services at the 
manned space flight centers. The first group are normally termed 
spacecraft or prime contractors; the latter are normally termed 
support contractors, whether they provide services, or equipment 
and associated operation and maintenance ·suP. ort at the respective 
For the Apollo space'craft program, there are a total of 
~hirty-six contt;actors l5 whohadcontracts of over $5,000,000; 
four of these contractors are prime contractors and the remaining 
thirty-two are subcontractors. The largest contract, which is 
with North American Rockwell Corpoxration, is, in excess of six 
I 
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billion dollars. The other three prime contractors are Grumman 
Aircraft Engineering Corporation for the lunar landing module, and 
A. C. Spark Plug of General Motors Corporation and Instrumen~ation 
Laboratory of Massachusetts Institute of Technology which, together, 
< had responsibility for design, development, and manufacture of space-
craft guidance and navigation systems. 
In the 1968-69 time period there also were approximately 
9,000 support contractor personneJ. located on-site or in the near 
vicinity of MSC who W.ere responsible for laboratory operations or 
mission support.
16 
The mission support contractors were primarily 
I 
responsible for maintenance, operation and reconfiguration of the 
Mission Control Center, while others performed certain mission 
planning activities. With a reduction in the Apollo workload the 
number of support contractors is currently being substantially 
reduced. 
I 
! 
Other Organizations 
Within NASA Headquarters, the Associate Administrator for 
Manned Space Flight is responsible for managing all NASA efforts 
directly associated with manned spaceflight. Throu~h the Office 
of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) he directs: 
i 
• , •• the development of the large launch 
v~hicles and spacecraft, and the launch, 
operational, logistic, life support, and 
r~lated systems required for man to per-
form missions in space. 17 
The Associate Administratsr (OMSF) also provides overall manage-
ment direction to three NASA field centers--MSFC, KSC, and MSC. 
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Day-to-day management of Apollo Program activities at the Headquarters 
level are under the direction of the Apollo Program Manager. 
The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) at Huntsville, Ala-
~ama, is responsible for designing, developing and test support of 
launch vehicles required for the Apollo Program. A family of three 
different launch vehicles--the Saturn I, the Saturn tB and the mam-
moth thirty-six story Saturn V--were developed in the phased-growth 
program. The Kennedy Space Center, Cape Kennedy, Florida, is 
responsible for the test, checkout, and integration of launch vehicle 
and spacecraft components as well as launch operations. Another NASA 
Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, performed a major role in 
~upport of the Apollo Program. Although because of its other res-
ponsibllU:ies, it did not report to the Associate Administrator 
I 
for Manned Space Flight, it was r,esponsible for implementation and 
~peration of the worldwide system of tracking stations, instrumen-
, 
tation ships, instrumentation aircraft, and connnunications satellites 
utilized for Apollo space flights. The Department of Defense (DOD) 
also provides a broad range of support to the Apollo Program. 
Through the DOD Representation'for Manned Space Flight Support who 
coordinates elements of Air Force, Navy and Army in the support 
they provide in such,varied activities as specialized spacecraft 
systems testing, medical r~search, and launch ,and recovery operations. 
Interrelationships 
The interrelationships of NASA Headquarters, NASA centers, 
other government agencies, and the Apollo contractors in accomplishing 
i 
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the A~ollo Program are exceedingly complex; the aim of this subsection 
.is to merely highlight certain basic aspects of those interrelation-
ships. 
First, the unifying element in forcing or necessitating the 
inten:olationships is the ultimate mission--the lunar landing. Each 
organizational element has certain responsibilities for developing 
either elements of the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, ground support 
facilities, the mission plans, and the ground and flight crews nec-
essary to perform the mission. But all of these must perform as one 
on launch day and this can only be accomplished by the closest of 
team work, integrating requirements and making trade-offs on 
capabilities and limitations of the various systems. 
Basically, all major components utilized in th~ mission go 
through the same technical developmental process. The steps are 
design start, requirements definition,design development, manu-
facturing, test and checkout, delivery, integration and combined 
test of mission components, arid, finally launch. 18 At the completion 
of each of these steps there is a major technical review to assess 
I progress, evaluate problem are'as and determine the feasibility of 
I 
I 
~roceeding on to the next phase. As there are a number of dif-
I 
ferent missions to be supported there are mission components pro-
gressing through various phases of the technical process at the 
same time. 
A basic mechanism for ensuring integration of requirements 
~nd the associated design and development of the mission components 
is the Apollo Program Configuration Management System. 19 By 
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restricting various types of configuration changes to certain organi-
zational levels it ensures that changes cannot be effected in one 
area without assessing the impact in related areas. The top configura-
tion control board is chaired by the Apollo Program Manager, NASA 
Headquarters and includes representatives from the three centers which 
are responsible for ensuring all mission components are integrated on 
launch day. 
In addition to this basic coordinating and control mechanism 
there is another coordinating mechanism for integrating the activities 
of NASA Headquarters and the three manned space flight centers. This 
is a hierarchical system of twenty-four subpanels, eight panels and 
a Panel Review Board which involves the activities of 340 personnel 
parttime at the p~ak of the Apollo Program activities. 20 The purposes 
of panels and subpanels, consisting primarily of technical personnel 
from the three centers, are to establish requirements, resolve inter-
face problems, identify action items and otherwise serve to ensure 
the integrated design and development of mission components. The 
Panel Review Board's purpose is to resolve technical :issues referred 
up to it from the panels. 
The highest ranking integrating mechanism is the OMSF 
Management Council which consists of the Associate Administrator for 
Manned Space Flight, the Center Directors from the three manned space 
flight field centers, as well as certain other OMSF representatives. 
This group meets for two to three days each month in this capacity 
; to completely assess all current management and technical areas. 
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The Apollo related activities of the Goddard Spac~ Flight 
Center and of DOD are integrated into the above-mentioned co-
ordinating system by ~ffiC who ha~ primary responsibility in the 
broad areas supported by these government organizations. 
Management Policies 
Presented here are some representative comments, exp'ressing 
NASA m_anagement views on organization and operat ing policy. 
• 
Comments of James E. Webb 
Former Administrator, NASA 
At the time I took . • • office on February 
l~, 1961, I stated ••• that my purpose 
would be to work toward creating an environ-
ment within which NASA could be as innovative 
in the management of its programs as it was 
in aeronautics and space science. 21 
If the organizational framework in wh~ch 
e*ecutives are fitted is rigid, the execu-
tives can hardly be flexible. Since the 
endeavor itself must be able to maneuver in I 
aiturbulent atmosphere ..• , the elements 
that make up the endeavor must in their 
turn be responsive to quite flexible con-
trols. 22 
I 
Yet as a system of management, the tradi-
1 
tional doctrine constructed by Taylor, I W~ber, Fayol, and otheJcs, is not suited 
tc) the very large, complex undertaking. 
The fundamental shortcoming is the as-s~mption of a highly rigid and inflexible 
s~ructure. These concepts apply quite 
w~ll to routine, repetitive, and stable o~erations. But they are self-defeating 
for the highly complex endeavor • • • , 
where rapid change~and adjustment are 
the essence. 23 
I 
wd decided as a matter of deliberate policy 
to place principal reliance on the Ameri-
can industrial establishIn~nt and the 
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American university system as a whole. 
We decided to focus our governmental 
efforts principally on developing the 
needed in-house competence to make re-
sponsible decisions and on organizing 
and managing. A measure of what we had 
in mind is the fact that ninety percent 
of every dollar that has come to NASA . 
has moved optside the Agency. Our purpose 
was to spread the difficult problems 
over the largest number of able minds 
in the belief that this would produce 
the best answers. We recognized that to 
be effective in this approach NASA had 
to have very strong scientific and tech-
nical in-house capabilities. 24 
Comments of Wesley L. Hjornevik 
Former Associate Director MSC 
The concept of the matrix organization--the 
overlay of programs across functions--is 
qne of the basic management principles of 
MSC. Program management is necessary so 
we can coordinate and manage the spacecraft 
~rograms. Functional management is neces-
~ary to provide the skilled functional 
~pecialists (professionals) who furnish 
~echnical inputs in managing the programs 
~nd to provide the reservoir of talent 
qecessary to conceive and design new pro-
~rams.25 
I 
T~e second basic principle of MSC's manage-
ment of its diverse staff is the concept of 
d.centralized responsibility. For all 
p~actical purposes~ once a key leader was 
s~lected in any given functional area, he 
w~s essentially given a free hand to re-c~uit and create the type of organiz~6ion h~ felt was necessary to do his job. 
i 
i 
The third significant management principle 
PFacticed at MSC is the concept of support-
ing the laboratory environment ••. : this i~ an extension of the early basic decisions 
in the formation of NASA that NASA would m~nage its contractors from a laboratory 
environment in which the staff .could, main-
tain its technical competence. 27 
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Summary 
We thus see that the environment of the MSC Apollo mission 
planning system is extremely complex and dynamic. Structurally, 
the environment consists of technical government and contractor 
organizations dedicated to a. common goal--the manned lunar landing 
mission. Because of complex interrelationships, hierarchies of 
boards, panels, and sub-panels have been developed to integrate 
the activities of these organizations at all working levels. 
Finally, management poliCies place a strong emphasis on innovative 
management prac~ices, on being flexible, and a strong concern for 
both the individual as well as program goals. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. u. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Documents 2ll International Aspects of the Explora-!i2n. and Use of Outer ,Space, 1954-1962, Staff Report, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pp. 202-203. 
2. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, ABol~~ Program Management, Staff Study for the Subcommittee 
on NASA Oversight, 9lst Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 1. 
3. T~e term prime contra~ is used here to designate those 
contractors who have responsibility to development and 
manufacture of major spacecraft hardware. Prime contrac t~s for the Apollo spacecraft include North America Rockwell 
,Cdrporation, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, Mass.achusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Instrumentation Labo.ratory and A. C. Spark Plug Division of General Motors Corporation. 
4. The term support contractor is used here to designate those 
contractors who provide technical or administrative support 
either on or immediately adjacent to the MSC facility. It does not include spacecraft contractor personnel. 
, 
5. As the researcher has been an employee of MSC for over 8 years much of the information presented herein is based on personal knowledge acquired over the period of these years. To the extent that certain i~formation is not documented herein it can be assumed that the informati.on is available at MSC but that the researcher is drawing on his own knowledge. 
6. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Apollo SBacecraft: J:. Chronology, Vol. 1, by Ivan D. Ertel and Mary Louise Morse, The NASA Historical Series (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 118, (Hereinafter 
referred to as Apollo Chronology). 
7. tn July, 1961, STG had approximately 770 civil service per-
sonnel; by July, 196.2, it had grown to 1620 personnel. 
8. ABollo Chronolog,l ,1 p. 128. ' 
I 
9. ~., p. 132. 
10. Ibid. , p. 143. 
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11. National Aeronautics and Space Administration MSC/Apol'10 
Program Management, prepared by Management Analysis Branch 
(Houston: Manned Spacecraft Center, November 26, 1967), 
p. 1-3. It was informally confirmed that the percentage 
for later years is approximately the same. 
12. Ibid., p. 1-3. 
13. U. S., Space Task Group Report to the President, The Post-
Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future, MSC 1839-
69 (Houston: Manned Spacecraft Center,-September, 1969), 
pp. 1-25, passim. 
14. James E. Webb, Reflections Qll Government Service (Houston: 
Manned Spacecraft Center, not dated), Part II, p. 18. This 
is a compilation of three lectures presented in the McKinsey 
Foundation Lecture Series, Graduate School of Business, 
Columbia University, on May 2, 9, and 16, 1968. 
15. NASA, MEC/Apollo Program Management, Figure 1-4, no page 
number. 
16. NASA, MSC/Apollo Program Management, p. 1-5. 
17. U:. S., General Services Administration, National Archives and 
Records Service, United States Government organization 
Manual 1969-70 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1969), p. 464. 
18. U. S., Congress, House, Apollo Program Managem~nt, p. 230. 
19. NASA, MEC/Apollo Program Management, pp. D-l, D-2. 
I 
20:. NASA, Msc/Apollo Program Management, p. 111-30 . 
21. U. S., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, An 
Administrative History of 'NASA, 1958-1963, by Robert L . 
Roshalt, NASA SP-4104 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1966), p. iv. 
I Webb, Reflections 16. 221. 2!l Government, Part III, p. 
·1 
I 
I 
23. Webb, Reflections .2!l Government, Part I, p. 29 . 
24. Webb, Reflections .QE. Government, Part I, p. 18 • 
25. W~sley L. Hjornevik, Chapter IV "Guiding Work Relationships 
Among Scientific, Engineering, and Administrative Profes-
sionals" in Issues in Public Science Policy and Administration: 
A Sympos ium, prepared under the atl,spices 0.£ the Pr.ogram for 
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CHAPTER VI 
MSC APOLLO ~ISSION PLANNING STRUCTURE 
Apollo XIII was fifty-six hours into the mission, 202,000 
nautical miles from earth, when the explosion occurred in the 
·Odyssey. Critical oxygen, power and water supplies in the service 
module were most; shortly, primary navigation equipment also became 
iqoperable. It was only by utilizing, Aquarius, the lunar module, 
and employing all types of contingency plans and backup procedures 
that the astronauts averted almost certain death. Yet, three and 
one-half days later, after another 421,000 nautical miles of space-
flight, the Odyssey command module made a perfect splashdown in 
the South Pacific, only four miles from the recovery carrier. 
After the mission, the astronauts attributed their safe return 
i 
tol the ". . • initiative and ingenuity • • .• " of the ground con-I 
I 1 
·trbllers ..i.n making extensive use of contingency mission plans. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe, analyze and, to a 
limited extent, evaluate the effectiveness of the MSG Apolto 
mmssion planning structure--the organizational mechanism through 
which Apollo nominal and contingency spaceflight planning is 
accompli~hed. 
As was indicated in Chapter I, where the mission planning 
function is described more extensively, a spaceflight mission must 
be designed in much the same·ma.nner as the spacecraft. In fact, 
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there is an iterative feedback between space vehicle and mission 
requirements and constraints throughout the design and development 
of both components. In addition to the mission planning which must 
be performed for each of the different missions in the program, 
extensive mis?ion analysis studies are made II. • • to anticipate 
all the possibilities that could affect the flight ••• ,,2 and to 
develop contingency procedures to circumvent problem situations 
h . hi t at m1g t ~~cur. 
There are a number of facts to which attention should be 
drawn prior to beginning the description of this MSC Apollo mission 
I 
planning structure. First, a similar board, panel, working group 
s~ructure was not utilized to any significant extent for mission 
planning on Mercury and Gemini , the 'two previous manned spaceflight 
programs. The complexity of the mission planning required for 
flights in these programs was less by orders of magnitude and con-
sequently the mission planning activities were substantially less) 
not requiring formal intra-center lateral coordinating mechanisms. 
Second, boards, panels, and working groups are also used i~ Apollo 
c~ordinating hardware design and development. Furthermore, such 
I 
pa;nels and working.groups were used in Mercury and Gemini to co-
I 
ordinate overall program activities among the different organiza-
tions. For example, Paul Purser lists a total of seven such 
interface working groups in the Mercury program. Their purpose, 
as he states it: 
• 
These groups do not necessarily make decisions 
or recommendations but they do assure the 
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rapid interchange of technical information 
and a correspondingly early uncovering of 
potential mutual problems. The presence of 
technical personnel from all the potentially 
interested areas greatly reduces the possij 
bility of problems remaining unrecognized. 
Overview 
-
The Director and Deputy Director are: responsible for the 
implementation of all functions and programs as~1igned MSC. For 
the Apollo Program, the Director has assigned responsibility for 
the planning and, execution of missions to each of his five func-
tional line organizations in accordance with their respective on-
going duties and responsibilities. He has also assigned respon-
sibility to an MSC Apollo Sp~cecraft Program manager to: (a) 
technically manage Apollo spacecraft contracts, (b) coordinate 
MSC Apollo matters with both the Headquarters Apollo Program 
Manager as well as overall Apollo interfaces with other NASA 
Centers, and (c) coordinate and integrate the activities of the 
fiveMSG functional organizations into the Apollo program. Thus, 
what has been established is a matrix organization . 
I The Program Manager and the five managers of the functional 
1 
I 
I 
o~ganizations have coordinal responsibility; their relation is that 
11 
01 colleagues. The Program Manager tends to operate in terms of 
the ''when and what" of activities, while the functional managers 
II 
are more concerned with how activities will be accomplished . 
1 
Problems which arise are not settled by formal authority, but 
rather by the law of the. situation. In fjluch instances the Diretor 
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,and Deputy Director are advised of the situation, not to seek author-
ity for resolution of a dispute, but rather for consultation as senior 
technical colleagues. 
This study focuses the organizational area immediately below 
the level of Director and his Deputy; it is concerned with inter-
relationships among the Program Manager and the five functional 
managers as well as among their subordinates. 
~ Organizations 
The six principal organizational elements (Figure 6) which 
c~mprise the MSC Apollo mission planning structure are: the Apollo 
S.pacecraft Program Office, the Flight Operations Directorate, the 
Flight Crew Operations Directorate"the Engineering and Development 
Directorate, the Medical Research and Operations Directorate, and 
the Science and Applications Directorate. The approximate number 
of professional man-years that each organization devoted to Apollo 
mission planning from July, 1968 to July 1970 (FY70), the p~riod 
ulider consideration, and the relative percentage of this manpower 
i 
to the total of their respective professional personnel is as 
follows: 4 
i 
Otgani~zational !:!!!.!! 
! 
APIOllo Spacecraft Program Office 
Fl,ight Operations Directorate 
Fljight Crew Operations Directo:rate 
Engineering & Development 
Directorate 
Medical Research & Operations 
Directorate 
Science & Applications Directorate 
• 
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I 
FY70 Man-years. 
Apollo Mission 
Plannirw 
I 65 
60p 
24;0 
23'0 
20 
45 
1200 
Percent of 
Unit,' s Total 
WorkForce 
20% 
75% 
75% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
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The total of 1200 man-years represents approximately fifty percent 
of the total MSC technical professional man-years. It should be 
noted that in addition to performing Apollo mission planning 
function, a significant number of these personnel also support. 
mission operations during actual space flights. 
The MSC Apollo mission planning functions, described in 
skeletal form, for each of these six organizations are listed 
below. 
5 
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
The Program Office, focal point for MSC Apollo Program 
activities, consists of approximately 320 personnel, of which 
, 
100 are located at contractor facilities. Its primary mission 
planning activities inclu'de: (a) developing overall program plan, 
in~luding integration of hardw'are development plans and mission 
'program plans; (b) coordinating and developing the test program, 
the mission directive documents, the determination of instru-
mentation and measurement lists and requirements, the determin-
ation of engineering data acquisition and reduction requirements, 
and the establishment of detailed mission schedules; and (c) 
reporting detailed test results of each mission. 
Flight Operations Directorate 
The Director of Flight Operations, with a staff of 800' 
personnel, is the senior MSC representative for mission operations. 
He is responsible for mission planning, determining requirements 
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for flight control operations and facilities, and for operation of 
the Mission Control Center. Furthermore, the directorate develops 
recovery planning and coordinates implementation with DOD. Its 
primary mission planning activities include: (a) developing mission 
, . ~ 
trajectories, both for nominal and contingency situations; (b) 
. ' 
developing flight mission rules which specify systems performance 
evaluation criteria as well as action to be taken in the event of 
specific systems or equipment failure; (c) integrating all MSC 
fli~ht support requirements and coordinating with other responsible 
.,,':~ NASA organizations or ~vith DOD; and (d) providing flight controllers 
:i 
1 for mission operations. 
Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
The Flight Crew Operations Directorate, consisting of approxi-
mately 380 personnel, is responsible for training the astronauts. 
Its primary mission planning activities include: (a) preparing the 
mission flight 'plan used for onboard spacecraft activities; (b) 
providing flight crew inputs to development of mission operations 
procedures; and (c) instructing flight crew on conduct of experi-
mente 
Engineerjcng and Development Directorate 
~he Engineering Directorate, with a staff of 1090 personnel, 
is responsible for technical direction of assigned system and 'sub-
system work of program contractors, as well as for extensive in-
house test and evaluation programs. Its mission planning activities 
--
include: (a) analyzing spacecraft-to"'ground connnunications and 
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tracking systems capability and performance; (b) analyzing guidance, 
navigation and control systems; and (c) developing, testing, and 
evaluating life support systems, both spacecraft and spacesuit. 
Medical Research and Operations Directorate 
The Medical Research and Operations Directorate, with ninety-
eight personnel, is responsible for: (a) ensuring that medical 
instrumentation requirements for evaluation of astronaut physical 
status are incorporated into mission planning; and (b) .ensuring that 
mission plg.ns incorporate limitations imposed by physical and medical 
considerations. 
Science and Applications Directorate 
The Science and Applications Directorate, with 248 personnel, 
is responsible for mission experiments related to· space and earth 
sdience. Its mission planning responsibilities include: (a) pro-
vi!!ding space environmental data required to support spacecraft and 
miss,ion design; (b) developing flight experiment test objectives 
and requirements; and (c) planning for and providing operational 
support during mission. 
Board, Panel, Working GrouE. Structure . 
There are a total of twelve boards, panels, and working 
groups which have been organized to coordinate laterally the Apollo 
mission plqnning activities of these six major MSC organizational 
6 
elements. All but the first named, have as their primary function 
mission-related activities. The Apollo Spacecraft Configuration 
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Control Board, the senior board in the Apollo spacecraft structure, 
however, is also the principal spacecraft hard~-1are control board and, 
thus, serves to integrate overall spacecraft hardware development 
and mission design and operations activities. 
The twelve lateral coordination mechanisms are: 
1. Apollo Spacecraft Configuration Control Board 
2. Apollo Spacecraft Software Configuration Control Board 
3~ Crew Procedures Control Board 
4. Data Priority Coordination Working Group (Mission 
techniques Document Coordination) 
5. Data and Requirements Control Panel 
6. Flight Operations Plan Meetings 
7. Radiation Constraints Panel 
8. Lunar Surface Operations Panel 
19. Extravehicular Activity Task Force 
to. Apollo Abort Working Group 
11. Consumables Subsystem Working Group 
12. Mission Change Review Group 
The principal focus of this study and analysis is on the 
interrelationships of these boards, panels, and working group~ 
both among thernsel vesand with the six line organizations. 
Apollo Spacecraft Configuration Control Boa~d 
The Apollo Spacecraft Configuration Control Board is the 
senior MSC Apollo board. i It or the other MSC Apollo boards, panels, 
and working groups, all of which are supordinateto it, can act 
on all MSC Apollo matters except in those instances where proposed 
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changes affect the launch vehicle or other Genter/agency responsi-
bi1ities. In such cases, changes are referred to the NASA Head-
quarters Apollo ConfigurCltion Control Board. 
While the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Configuration Control 
Board has both hardware-oriented boards, panels, and working groups, 
for purposes of this study the hardware-oriented groups are not 
concerned. 
This board normally meets on a weekly basis from one to six 
~ours to consider major hardware or mission changes as well as 
program status. The composition of the board is: 
l~Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office--CHAIRMAN 
2. Director, Engineering and Development Directorate 
3. Director, Flight Operations 
4. Director, Flight Crew Operations 
5. Director, Medical Research and Operations 
6. Director, Science and Applications 
7. Assistant ASPO Manager for Flight Safety 
8.i Command and Service Module Program Manager 
9. Lunar Module Program Manager 
Apollo Spacecraft Software Configuration 
Control Board 
The function of this board is to ensure the o,rderly and 
timely development of the command module and lunar module computer 
I 
programs. These computer programs reflect mission planning decis.ions, 
especially in the areas of guidance, navigation and control. The 
134 
• 
. AI. -- -- 1 
\ 
I: 
I ! .. ' 
I 
, , 
, ~! 
':'!l 
'" '.~'.~: 
, .~ 
, 
, .. 
. , ",,1 
t' , 
i ", 
I. 
t,,: .. , 
" '~ 
"{ 
',. 
" 
i 
'-, -~, " -,~' ~- ;.r.:v.,..~ ~~ • ~. :.. ~ .,~',,:~ '-."" ." ", • ~_t . :to " ..• • 
' ... 
• • • '. ;',.:" _~ 4, -J . •..•• "- ,': :.~ " , 
. ~ ;. '... " • .'. . ... ,~. * ."' .. 
~ .. ~ .... " 
'j, , 
. " ~ 
"', : 
board meets on a weekly to biweekly basis for approximately five 
hours. The board's composition is: 
1. Director, Flight Operations--CHAIRMAN 
Representatives of: 
2. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
3. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
4. Engineering and Development Directorate 
Crew Procedures Control Board 
The primary function of the Cre't'1 Procedures Control Board is 
to maintain control over decisions concerning flight crew procedures. 
The board meets appl;'oximately every two weeks for thr(~e to four 
hours. The composi.tion of the board is: 
1. Director, Flight Crew Operations--CHAIRMAN 
Representatives of: 
2. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
3. Flight Operations Directorate 
4. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
5. Engineering and Development Directorat..e 
Data Priority Coordination Working Group 
(Mission Techniques Document Coordination) 
The purpose of this group is to descr.ibe e~actly, how the 
various mission techniques, especially from a guidance, navigation 
I ~nd control aspects, are to be accomplished. It actually functions 
i 
as eleven pan~ls associated with specifi(! mission phases such ,as 
lunar descent, midcour$'e correction phase~ etc." developing documen-
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tation of both ground and onboard techniques. The various groups 
meet weekly to biweekly depending on. the particular mission phase 
emphasis. The composition of the working group is as follows: 
I 
1. Chief, Data Priorities Coordination, Apollo Space-
craft Office--CHAIRMAN 
Representatives of: 
2~ Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
3. Flight Operations Directorate 
4. Engineering and Development Directorate 
Data and Requirements Control Panel 
The function of this group was to serve as a configuration 
control panel for the modification 'of the Mission Requirements 
Document from which requi~ements the mission plan is developed. 
It has been disbanded, ~Yith the Flight Operations Plan Meeting 
now accomplishing these responsibilities. The panel met monthly 
for three or four hours. The board's composition was: 
1. Chief, Systems Engineering Division, Apollo space-
craft Program Office--CHAIRMAN. 
Representatives of: 
2. Flight Operations Directorate 
3. Medical Research and Opurations Directorate 
4. Engineering and Development Directorate 
5. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
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Flight Operations Plan Meetings 
The Flight Operations Plan Meetings are the basic mechanis(t1 
for coordinating mission design and planning at MSC. All elements 
of the Center involved in Apollo mission planning participate in 
these meetings. The meetings serve as the primary control panel 
for proposed changes to mission constraints, mission rules and 
various trajectory modifications. Approximately six mot,1,ths before 
a mission, the Flight Director for the respective mission assumes 
responsibility for these activities and conducts Flight Director 
meetings. The Flight Operations Plan Meetings are conducted 
approximately every three to four weeks, being approximately seven 
to eight hours in duration. The composition of the board is: 
1. Technical Assistant for Apollo$ Flight Operations 
Directorate--CHAIRMAN 
Representatives of: 
2. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
3.J ,Engineering and Development Directorate 
4 Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
5. Medical Research and Operat"ions Direct~ra1:e 
6. Science and Applications Directorate 
Radiation Constraints Panel 
The purpose of this pam.'! I , which is a subgt"oup of the Flight 
oberations Plan Meetings, is to coordinate the activities of MSC 
i p~rsonnel working on variQus aspects of the radiation hazards of 
Apollo flights. The panel meets approximately every month, with the 
meetings lasting from three t;o four hours. The panel composition 
is as follows: 
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1. Technical Assistant for Apollo, Flight Operations 
Directorate--CHAIRMAN 
Representatives of: 
2. Flight Operations Directorate 
3. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
4. Medical Research and Operations Directorate 
5. Science and Applications Directorate 
6. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
Lunar Surface Operations Panel 
-
The purpose of this panel, which is a subgroup of the Flight 
Qperations Plan Meetings, is to develop flight crew procedures during 
lunar surface exploration. This panel meets at least once a month, 
with each meeting lasting from four to eight hours. The compos,ition 
of the board is: 
1. Head, Lunar Surface Operations Office, Flight Crew 
Operations Directorate--CHAIRMAN 
Rep~esentatives of: 
Flight Operations Directorate 
Engineering and Development Directorate 
4.j Medical Research and Operations Directorate 
I 
5. Science and Applications Directorate' 
6. Apollo SpacecraftP:t;'ogram Office 
Extravehicular Activity Task Force 
I This group was established to provide a medium for co-
I 
ordination of Apollo extravehicular activity (except lunar surface 
operations). The Extravehicular Activity Task Force, while still 
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chartered, no longer meets, as the last scheduled extravehicular 
activity took place on Apollo IX. The composition of the task 
force is: 
1. Systems Engineer, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office--
CHAIRMAN 
Reptesentatives of: 
2~ ,Flight Operations Directorate 
3. Engineering and Development Directorate 
4. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
Apollo Abort Working Group 
The purpose of this group was to identify abort situations, 
capabilities and procedures for all mission phases. It met approxi-
mately six times in FY1969 prior to being incorporated into the Data 
Priority panel system. The composition of the working group prior 
to' its cessation was: 
1. Assistant Chief, Mission planning and Analysis 
Division, Flight Operations Directorate--CHAIRMAN 
Representatives of: 
2. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
3. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
4. Flight Operations Directorate 
Consumables Subsystem Working Group 
" The purpose of this group is to coordinate and maintain 
cO,nsumable budgets for propellants, oxygen, water, hydrogen, electri-
cal systems, portable life support systems~ helium, and reaction 
control system propellants. The group meets approximately once a 
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month, for three, to four hours. The composition of the group is : 
1. Head, C.onsumables Analysis Section, Flight Opera-
tions Directorate--CHAIR}~ 
Representatives of: 
2., Engineering and Development Directorate 
3. Flight Crew Operations Direct~rate 
4. Flight Operations Directorate 
Mission Change Review Group 
This group was set up to ensure f'lll coordination and 
implementation of any changes in mission design related to tra-
jectory planning. Only three meetings oi.this group were held; 
the function is now performed by a trajectory change sheet sign-
off procedure. The composition of the group was: 
1. Assistant Chief for Mission Design, Flight Operations 
Directorate--CHAIRMAN 
Representatives of: 
2. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
3. .Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
4. Engineering and Development Directorate 
Analysis of Interrelationships 
In this section,' infornH:t.~ion .is presented showing there-
lationship of membership in the board, panel, working g·roup structure 
i~ comparison with membership in the six line organizations. In 
" 
addition an analysis is made of the results and comparisons are made 
to determine the extent to which they prove or disprove certai.n of 
the hypotheses criteria. 
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Figure 7 on the next page shows the MSC Apollo mission plan-
. 
ning matrix. Listed dow'n the left-haml column are the twelve board, 
panel, working groups; across the top of the page are the six line 
organizations. Figures within each block, from left to right, sho1;-1: 
first, the total number of personnel from the respective line 
organizations who normally participate in the meetings; second, the 
number of these participants who are line supervisors; and third, 
the chairman of the respective board, panel, or working group. 
A summary of the results are as follows. The total member 
participation for the twelve groups average at 128 personnel, of 
w~om sixty-four persons or fifty-three percent are supervisors. 
T~e variance in supervisor participation in the groups ranges from 
t~e Apollo Spacecraft Configuration board which is composed ninety 
percent of supervisors (100 percent, if the secretary of the board 
is excluded) to the Extravehicular Activity Task Force which has. 'no 
supervisors on it. The chairmen of the twelve groups come from 
only three line organizations; six are from the Flight Operations 
Directorate, three (one of whom is on temporary assignment from 
Flight Operations) are from the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, 
and one is from the Flight Crew Operations Directorate. Except for 
the Extravehicular Activity Task Force,'which .isn't actively func-
I 
t~oning, chairmanship of the respective groups .is assigned to the 
I 
otjganization that has principal line responsibility; thus the group 
s~rves as added resource for the respective line manager to accomplish 
his duties and responsibilities. It also is a£ormal mechanism for 
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_ ....... .,..--, 
--- -
1 
.. 
_ .. Apollo Flight IFlight Cret-tEngireer:in€'Iv1edical Science & Apollo Boards, Spacecraft Operation~~perations & Deve1op- Research & Application Panels, Program Directo- Directo- ment Direc rOperation~ pirecto- I Total i Working Groups Of'fice rate rate torate DirectoratE rate Spacecraft Configu- I 
i ~~tion Control (b) 5 (4,) (I)' 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 10( 9) (1); -~~ ~~-:::.-~~ .. ' -, Spacecraft Software 
I Configuration Contr'Ol 2 5 (5) (1) 2 (I} 1 (1) ;1.0(7)(~) --Crew Procedures 
Control 1 ',1 (1) 6 (5) (1) 2 (1) ;1.0(7)(1)' 
-Data & Requirements 
Control 6 (4) (1) 3 (2) 2 (1) 2 (1) 1 (1) ~q.( 9)( 1) Flight Operations 
2 (1) 15 (8) (I) 3 1 1 ~5(9)(1) r'~n an 3 -£.:;~ " ~ 
-
Radiation 
\ Constr'alnts 1 3 (1) (1) 1 2 (2) 1 (1) 8Uf-) (1) Lunar Surface 
[: (0) (1) 
Operations 1 1 (1) (1) 1 (1) 1 2 7(2)(1), 'E;;"tra vehi cuI ar .. 1\ c"t ~;.. - - •... --.- ..... - ~-' . 
tvi ty Tasj~ Force 1 2 2 6(0)(1) r-. .....~ Consmmnab1e s 
8(1)(1) Subsystem 4 (1) (1) 1 3 ..-.---~ 
, Hi 8'sion <.;hange 
8(5)(1) , Review 1 (1) 4 (2) (1) 2 (1) (1) ! Data Priority --I (Mission Techniques) 1 (1) (1) 3 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1) __ 7(6)(1) Abort Horking t;0up . 1 (1) S ( LJ.l ( 1) 2 8(5} (1) 
- Tot:-;:- . 22(12)( 4) 46( ~'8)( 6) ?S; 11)( 2) ,17 (7) (0) 6(4)(0) 15(2)(0) 121 (64)0-· L ( a.) Based on ana1ysi s' of information in NASA General \vorking Paper No .10, ORO, Mi ssion Planning at l):he NAS~ Ivlanne d Spa~ecraft Center (April, 1969) , as modif'ied based on updated information developed ~n Marc h, 1970. 
. (b) 
. _. . 
. 
J First number is t.ota1 membership, first parenthesis indicates members vlho are supervisors in formal organiz ation, second parenthesis indicates Head or Respective Board,' Panel, or Working Group. 
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the other line organizations to provide their inputs into the plan-
ning. 
In the figure on the following page, Figure 8, the composi-
tion of the various boards, panels, and working groups is shown 
according to the relative hierarchical position of the participants 
in their line organizations. The category title "Non-Supervisory" 
ma.y be somewhat misleading as it includes not only those personnel 
from within the lO"t'1est organizational units, but also includes 
another' twenty-five percent who serve on staffs at higher levels of 
the line hi~rarchy. 
As is quickly brought out in the future, the chairmen of 
ten of the twelve groups are at a higher level in the line hierarchy 
than the majority of the remaining members of the group. Also in 
the case of one exception, the chairman of the Apollo Spacecraft 
Configuration Control Board is the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager, 
who previously had moved to this critical position from his former 
position as Deputy Director of MSC; it can be assumed that he still 
exerts much of the senior colleague influence of his former position. 
Furthermore, Figur~8 ab~o shows the percentage partici-
pation of supervisors in board, panel, and working groups compared 
to the total number of supervisors in: the MSC Apollo mission planning 
: 
structure. The estimated total numbe,r of superiors in the overall 
j 
misJion planning structure was arrived at by totaling only those 
superiors in the six line organization$ who are in subunits that 
significantly participate in mission planning activities. At the 
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, Apollo Boards, .11' Div. Branch Sectior:; Non-r·.ana-Pane18, gers Chief's Chiefs Heads Supv. ; Horking Groups 
Spacecraf't Configu- ( f1) 
ration Control 8 (1 ) 1 0 0 1 
ppacecraft SoftHare 
- - I, (1) u Configuration Control 2 0 ,3 
CreH Procedures 
Control 1 (1) L~ 2 0 , 3 Data &, Requirements , ! Control 5 ( 1) " 4 0 5 I, 
Flight Operations I I 
( 1) I Plan 3 3 3 16 
. " Radiation 
Constraints 1 (1) 2 1 4- ' i 
Lunar Surface i 
Operations 2 (1) 5 
Extravehicular Acti-
yity Task Force 6 (1) 
C onS1l.l11a b 1 e s 
Subsystem 1 (1 ) '"I Mission Change 
RevieH 2 (1 ) 2 1 3 
Data Priority 
Techniques) ~:r''Iission 1 (1) 3 2 1 I Abort Horking 
. Group 2 (1) 2 1 3 I 
Total in Gr'0ups 10 (3) 23 (6) 20 11 (2;) , 57 (1 ) 
.. Estimated total in 
Mission Planning' 8 25 50 po ~JV 1030 Structure(b) , 
, 
" 
.. % of GrOUD to ( c) . ,,I; 
Estimated Total 125~6 ~, L 0'" 1jd 67; , , 92ib ~ ;'0 ;'U 
I 
(a) Number in parenthesis indicates chairman supervisors 
( b ) and (c ),.." 1· .,. t t ~xp al.nea l.n ex, 
Figure 8 
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lOl;.;rer and intermediate hierarchical levels, the est:imate of total 
. 
superiors involved may be in error up to .seven to ten percent; 
such an error is not significant in the overall study findings. 
Because some superiors participate in more than one board, panel, or 
working group, the percentage participation shown is some~vhat higher 
than the actual number of individual supervisors who participate in 
~he groups. At the top level, two managers serve on two boards. 
They each serve on one board as a member, and as a chairman on ·other 
~eparate boards--consequently the 125 percentage participation shown 
for managers. At the division of chief level there is one super-
visor who serves on three groups and five more who serve on two 
groups. There are four at the branch chief level, one at the section 
chief level and eight at the non-supervisory level who serve on more 
than one committee. Thus a total of twen.ty-one personnel have dual 
group membership beside their line organization membership. As a 
result, the integration of board, panel, working group activities 
should be enhanced. An evaluation of the above facts in light of 
~elevant hypotheses criteria elicits the foU.owing preliminary 
findings: 
1. In relation to Criteria l, ~ypothes·is I, analysis of Figures 7 
and 8 show's that the MSC Apollo board, panel, working group 
structure does exhibit characteristics of a lateral pattern of 
coordination at every hierarchical level and that this lateral 
. pattern is legitimate part of the formal system. 
2. In relation to Criteria 2, Hypothesis I, analysis of Figure 7 
shows that' these cross function groups are linked to the line 
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organization by means of persons who are members of more than 
one group. 
3. In relation to Criteria 3, Hypothesis I, analysis of Figure 8 
sho~vs that the cross-function groups have in at least ninety 
percent of the cases, a superior from the hierarchical level 
directly above that of the other members of the group. 
4. In relation to Criteria 1, Hypothesis II, analysis of Figures 
7 and 8 shows that supervisors participate to a significant 
extent (fifty-eight percent of membership) in cross-function 
groups. 
5. In relation to Criteria 1, Hypothesis III, analysis of the 
functional responsibilities of the line organization in com-
parison with membership on boat'ds, panels, and working groups 
show a high correlation, thus ind1.cating proper personnel are 
involved in the decision making processes. 
Other Significan~ Factors 
At this point, having in the briefest way reviewed the 
functions 'and structure of the,MSC Apollo mission planning structure 
and having determined that it does exhibit certain characteristics 
common to Likert's concept of multiple overlapping groups,. a better 
hnderstanding of the structure might be obtained if it is also briefly ! 
1 
I • 
examl.ned as a functioning system, in terms of inputs, processing and 
outputs • 
.ll'lrst, what are the outputs? Prior to launch and the success-
ful conclusion of a mission all that can be seen is much actlvity and 
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a steady output of documents. Generally these documents have one of 
. 
two words in their title, either "requirements" or "plans"; also, 
depending on the time period involved, these two words are qualified 
by such adjectives as "preliminary," "general," "interim," "revision 
II," "specific," "final," "updated," etc. These documents represent 
certain milestones accomplished in the mission planning process. 
The essence, then~ of the mission planning process is to 
develop plans to conduct spaceflight missions. However, as the 
majority of the personnel engaged in mission planning also support 
mission ~perations (either as flight crew or flight controllers) a 
910sely interrelated objective is to develop know-ledge within these 
individuals so that they may most effectively perform their operational 
responsibilitl.es. Another output, to a lesser extent, of the mission 
planning process is in the form of specifications for, and analysis of, 
space vehicle hardware development. 
The basic inputs to the process are twofold. First, a set of 
requirements stating what the basic objectives of the program, are 
ahd, second, as the program develops, complex sets of changing con-
i 
! 
i 
straints and performance capabilities for all of the various flight 
and ground support systems. 
It is thus the function of each of the six organizations 
within their area of responsibility to take the basic objective, for 
instance '''to go to the moon," and. through an iterative process of 
ever more detailed and comprehensive analyses to develop the mission 
plans'. But there is one compelling factor which dictates the manner 
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in 107hich this must be accomplished. That is, each of the organizations 
must depend on a constant stream of information being produced by the 
other five organizations in Qrder to proceed stepwise with its own 
planning responsibilities. 
This knowledge then, is the basic output of the mission planning 
process and to be used effectively it must be disseminated early, 
directly, and continuQusly--words used earlier by Mary Parker Follett 
to describe the planning process. In fact, her concepts of an fl." •• 
7 interpenetration ofeve:r'y part by every other part • • • fI and a 
constant interweaving of strand upon strand, are essential ingredients 
of successful spaceflight planning. 
In trying to compare the MSC Apollo mission planning structure 
~o organizational concepts of the traditional school or to adminis-
trative management ideas, their concepts of organizations, after 
acknowledging that there is a basic hierarchical arrangement in the 
MSC Apollo mission planning structure, fail to describe the system. 
Gulick's four concepts of organization by process, product, place 
or clientele certainly don't apply to the MSC Apollo mission plan-
ning structure. The matrix organization as described by Cleland and 
King is a more effective concept overall; however, it too is inade-
qU8;te in that it fails to describe the interworkings among the 
various subunits of matrix organizations. 
Herbert Simon's concept of thel:!i.teral coordination as e~ 
I 
meachanism for transmitti,ng premise information is certainly 
relevant in this case, but it ot;lly explain~ the necessity for 
extensive later~l contacts without ai.ding in explaining the co-
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ordinating mechanism itself. This is also true of his concept of 
coordination by feedback. He explains that situations lvhich are 
unpredictable and unstable require coordination by plan, but this 
concept also does not explain the mechanism. What is lacking in 
his concept, is a description of a mechanism for planned lateral 
feedback. 
Summary 
The MSC Apollo mission planning structure 'has been described 
and analyzed. It is found to consist of six major line organizations, 
c60rdinated laterally by a system of twelve boards, panels, and 
working groups. An analysis of member participation of the lateral 
groups shows that the average total membership is about 121, approxi-
mately fifty-eight percent of 'tvhom are supervisors from all levels 
of the line organizations. It is these supervisors who also pro-
vide the leadership to these groups:: eleven of the twelve groups 
are chaired by supervisors. In comparing the foregoing facts with 
certain of the hypotheses criteria, preliminary findings indicate 
that the MSC Apollo mission planning structure exhibits character-
istics cormnon to Likert's concept of multiple, overlapping groups. 
Also, in evaluating the MSC Apollo mission planning 
st~ucture,features brought out in this chapter are compared with 
I 
c;+tain of the ,:oncepts or factors enumerated in the survey of 
I 
literature and the following determinations made: (a) the tradi-
tional or administrative management concepts of organization do not 
provide an adequate conceptual basis for explaining the structure; 
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(b) that the Cleland-King matrix, while adequate to explain the 
overall organization, is not adequate to describe the lateral co-
ordinating mechanism; (c) that Simon's concepts adequately describe 
the necessity for the extensive lateral coordination but do not 
explain the lateral mechanism; and (d) that Mary Parker Follett's 
concepts of early, direct', self-adjusting and continuous co-
ordination are immediately applicable to describing the concepts 
underlying the MSC Apollo board, panel, working group structure. 
The focus of this chapter has been limited essentially to 
the basic skeleton of the lateral coordinating mechanism. In the 
next chapter, results of a questionnaire are presented, thereby 
developing a much more rounded picture of the structure. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Remarks by Astronauts James E. Lovell, Fred W. Haise and John 
L. Swigert in a nationally televised ne'l;-1S confer~~nce conduct,ed 
~t Houston, Texas, April 21, 1970. 
2. John P. Hayer, "Mission Analysis" in Manned Spacecraft: 
Engineering Design and Operation, edited by Paul E. Purser, 
Maxime A. Faget, and Norman F. Smith (New York: Fairfield. 
Publications, Inc., 1964), p. 23. 
3. Paul E. Purser, "Surmnary of Management and Operational Philoso·-
phy" in M!glned Spacecraft: Engineering Design and Operation., 
pp. 492-493. 
4. The number of Apollo mission planning man-years given for each 
organization is a rough estimate prqvided only as an insight 
into the extent of each organization's involvement in Apollo 
mission planning activities. It is probably accurate within 
ten percent. 
5. The brief functional statements for the six MSC Apollo 
mission planning organizations are adaptations of larger 
functional statements listed in Mission Operations PIal!, 
(Houston: NASA Manned Spacecraft Center,January, 1968), pp. 
21-27. 
6. 1:his listing of board,S, panels, and working groups is based on 
RASA General Working Paper No. 10,080, Mission Planning at the, 
~ Manned Spacecraft Center. One board, the Apollo Navi-
gation Working Group, listed in Working Paper 10,080 has been 
omitted. This group is an inter-center rather than an intra-
center working group. 
7. ' Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker 
Follett, edited by Henry C. Met,calf and L. Urwick (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. l5~. 
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CHAPTER VII 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
., 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe, analyze and 
interpret the results of the questionnaire submitted to the members 
of the MSC Apollo boards, panels, and working groups. A copy of 
the questionnaire and the associated cover letter are in Appendix A. 
In accordance with the research design criteria developed 
in the subsection "The Questionnaire," Chapter III of this study, 
the questionnaire was submitted to 97 individuals of whom 71 
furnished responses. An analysis of the returns shows that there 
its a representative number of responses in terms of: (1) the boards, 
panels, and working groups, (2) the six line organizations, and 
(3) supervisors and non-supervisors. The analysis also shows there 
is no significant difference in the responses based on these same 
I 
considerations. 
Except for 9uestion 4, there is no evidence that difficulty 
was experienced-in answering the questions. The problems' experienced 
with analyzing the responses to Question 4 are. discussed later. 
Twenty-three of the 71 respondents, besides complet.ing the 21 multiple 
choice questions, also provided comments in response to Question 22, 
which calls for free-form response. 
For each of the questions, the question itself,the response 
by the participants and the analysis are presented below. For 
- 1 
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facilitating the interpretation of data, the responses of the 
participants are shown in percentages. The sequence in ~vhich the 
questions are listed is not the :same sequence in which they are 
listed on the questionnaire, rather the questions are rearranged 
in accord nce with the hypotheses criteria to which they apply as 
developed in Chapter III, "The Research Design." 
Introductory Data 
1. In what capacity did you serve on the board, panel, or working 
group? 
89% Member 4% Both 
This question was included to provide a basis for determining 
whether in later questions there were differences in responses from 
these three g:roups. As indicated above, however, there were no 
significant difference. 
2. What percentage of your time was devoted to the Apollo mission 
planning function? 
41% 75-100% 17% 50-75% 23% 25-50% 19% 0-25% 
3. What percentage of your time spent in Apollo mission planning 
was! directly tied to work on board, panel, or working group 
(e.g., preparing for, attendance at, follow up)? 
7% 75-100% 10% 50-75% 20% 25-50% 63% 0-25% 
Questions 2 and 3 were included to provide background in-i 
1 
i 
formation as well as to determine whether there is a relation to the ! 
amount of time devoted to Apollo mission planning and the time 
I 
devoted to board work. An analysis of the individual respons.es shows 
that, as total mission planning activities increase so does the time 
on board activities increase, at least to a slight extent. Responses 
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to Question 2 support statements made eaFlier in the study that the 
Apollo mission planning function is accomplished by personnel who 
have other responsibilities; 42 percent indicate that less than 50 
percent of their time is spent on this function. Question 3 brings 
out the fact that 63 percent of the respondents spend less than 25 
percent of their time engaged in activ~ties directly related to the 
board. The significance of this answer is brought out later. 
19. Was there a similar group, formally organized, performing 
the same functions for Mercury or for Gemini? 
20. To what extent did a similar hierarchy of semi-formal 
boards, panels, working groups exist under previous 
programs 
It was assumed that the structure of boards, panels, and 
working groups which had developed for Apollo mission planning was 
significantly different than that developed for Mercury and Gemini. 
,*-' ,x 
\ 
, " 
This difference was pOSited by the increased complexity of the Apollo 
mission planning function and the consequent necessity for a much 
larger and more formal coordinating mechanism. 
In regard to the Mercury Program, 70 percent of the respond-
ents, in answering Question 19, confirmed this assumption. Another 
I' 
29 percent indicated they didn't know as they were not associated 
with the Mercury Program. One person did state there was a similar 
i 
formalized bosrd in his area. In respect to Question 20, no 
I 
! 
tespondents indi.cate that there was a similar semi-formal structure 
1 
~or Mercury; 7 percent indicate there was one to a slightly lesser 
i 
extent; and 70 percent indicate there was one to a much lesser 
extent. Twenty-five percent indicate that they didn't know. 
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In regard to the Gemini Program, 9 percent indicate that 
I 
there was a similar group organized to perform the same function 
as their group; 60 percent indicate there was not a similar group;· 
and 29 percent indicate they didn't know. In response to Question 
20, no respondents s tate that there ~V'as a similar semi -formal 
structure for Gemini; 37 percent indicate that there was one to a 
slightly less degree; 47 p~rcent indicate there was one to a much 
less extent; and 16 percent indicate they didn't know. 
It thus appears that for ~1erc'ury'the very limited mission 
plan~ing effort did not elicite a similar structure. However, to 
a limited extent, a similar structure of less scope and formality 
was utilized for the Gemini Program. The MBC Apollo mission 
planning structure, therefore, representa a mature development of 
a concept rather than a completely new idea. Other factors to be 
discussed later also indicate that the MSG Apollo mission planning 
structure was not developed as the result of a single management 
planning effort, but developed piecemeal. 
1lypothesis I Data 
4. To what extent were the following, principal functionsQf 
the board, panel, or working group? 
This is the question with which the respond.ents encountered 
problems in answering. It is now obvious that the multiple choice 
response (shown in Appendix A) was F.oorly designed. However, an 
analysis of the data, provides a basis for determining the relative 
importance of the five functions li1?ted. The percentage of 
respondents and the function they indicate as a top board function 
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are: 35 percent, horizontal coordination; 25 percent, making deci-
sions; 19 percent, providing solutions; 12 percent, identifying 
problems; and 9 percent, vertical coordination. The problem with 
the design of the multiple choice response, of course, is that 
these functio,ns are not mutually exclusive. Further, the respondents 
recognize that horizontal (or lateral) coordination is the principle 
function of the group and, to that extent, their answers provide 
limited evidence in support of validation criteria 1, Hypothesis I; 
that is, the groups a~e structured primarily for lateral communi-
cation and coordination. 
Moreover, independent of the above problems, the respnndents 
(in same groups) also showed a great divergence in the relative 
in\portance in which they place the three functions of identifying 
problems, making decisions, providing solutions. It appears that 
board members should be more aware of the purposes of their 
r~spective groups. 
14. To what extent does the "system" of boards, panels, 
and working groups that finally evolved constitute a 
hierarchical arr-angement similar to the formal organi-
zation? 
19% very much 47% moderately 27% slightly 
15. To what extent do you consider the complex of boards, 
'panels, working groups to be an integrated system? 
7% not at all 
43% moderately -11 %51 igh tty 
Re\"I~ ,.,LBes' to these questions also tend to corroborate 
validation. teria 1, Hypothesis I, that there exists a lateral 
, 
coordinating mechanism that is a legitima.te part of the formal 
system. In Question 15, 89 percent of the respondents indicate 
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they consider these boards, panels, and working groups to be an 
in.tegrated system, either moderately or very much. Moreover, in 
Question 14, 66 percent of the respondents indicate that they 
consider these boards, panels, and working groups to be similar 
to a formal organization, either moderately or very much. 
9. I:o what extent were decisions arrived at by group 
participation rather than by one individual making 
the decision at the board, panel, or working group 
meetings? 
53% very much 44% moderately 3% not very much 
Evaluation criteria 4, Hypothesis I, states that group 
decision processes are heavily relied on in cross-function groups. 
Ninety-seven percent of the respondents indicate that group 
decision making processes are used very much-to-moderately, thus 
furnishing strong evid'cnce that this criteria has been met. 
10. To what extent did the board, panel, working group 
structure result in the members working, in effect, 
for two or more supervisors? 
10% very much 44% moderately 36% little 10% not at all 
11. ·To the extent that the board, panel, working group 
structure did involve a person working for two super-
visors, what difficulties were encountered? 
__ ....;many 6% -moderate 63% little 31% none 
Evaluation criteris 5, Hypothesis I, states that although 
I' 
participat.ion in cross-function groups requires direction be taken 
from more than one supervisor, such dual direction should not give 
I 
rise to difficulties for the employees involved. In answering 
I Question 10., 54 percent of the respondents indicate that board 
membership involves working very much-to moderately for two super-
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iors. However, in Question 11, 94 percent indicate that this causes 
little or no difficulties. Thus these responses furnish strong 
evidence that this criterion is met. 
Hypothesis 11 Data 
13. It is assumed that in the period from November, 1960' 
through March, 1967 (e.g., emphasis having shifted from 
G~mini to Apollo, etc.) there was a significant in-
ctease in the number of line supervisors who became 
m¢mbers of various Apollo boards, panels, and working 
gtoups. Does such an increase in membership increase 
the capabilities of the boards, panels, and working 
groups? 
44% very much 37% moderately 19% slightly 
Validation criteria 2, Hypothesis II, states that an increase 
in line supervisory participation in cross-function groups increases 
performance capabilities of the group. As' 87 percent of the 
respondents indicate a very much-to-moderate increase. in capability 
in the above case, this criteria is considered to have been effectively 
met. 
16. To! the extent that the complex of boards, panels, "tvorking 
groups was a system,what was the principal integrating 
factor? Check appropriate b10ckfor each item. 
Fonnal'procedures 
Very much 
31% 
Moderate 
42% 
Slight 
27% 
Members who were non-
supervisors in their 
respective organizations 
i 
M~mbers who were super-
vtsors in their re~~ective 
organization 
.14% 
55% 
Hlads who were non-supervisors 
iitheir respective organization 8% 
H~ads who were non-supervisors 
in their respectiveorganiza-
tions 
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61% 
35% 51% 
15% 
40% 52% 
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Validation criteria 3, Hypothesis II, states that parti-
cipants in cross-function groups recognize that participation by 
line supervisors in these groups is a major factor integrating 
these cross-function activities with line organization activities. 
The above ranking of factors shows that chairmen who ;are also 
supervisors in line organizations are the highest ranked factor at 
61 percent; members of boards, etc., who are supervisors in line 
organization is the second highest ranked factor at 55 percent. 
The remaining factors'are ranked substantially lower, consequently 
it is considered that validation criteria 3, Hypothesis II, is met. 
Hypothesi~ III Data 
, 
12. To what extent did the board, panel, working group 
structure ensure that the proper personnel were in-
volved in making mission planning decisions? 
80% very much 19% moderately 1% slightly 
Validation criteria 1, Hypothesis III, states that the 
cross-function group is very effective in ensuring that proper 
personnel are involved in the decision-making process. Eighty per-
cent of the respondents indicate that this is very true of the 
i 
triission planning structure, thus this is considered as strong 
i .. 
evidence that this criteria has been met. 
17. What was the significance of the board, panel, working 
. group structure in the Apollo mission planning process? 
, Elftremely important, mission: planning could not 
64% have been accomplished without it 
Important, but functions it performed could have 
been accomplished by informal groups or other 
36% methods. 
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Not too important, functions it perfonned were 
-0- peripheral to mainstream mission planning effort 
18. To what extent did the board, panel, working group 
structure increase the overall quality of mission 
planning? 
39% 75-100% 35% 50-75% __ 23% 25-50% , 370 
, . 
0-25% 
Validation criteria 2, Hypothesis III, states that cross-
function group structure significantly aids in the effective perfonnance 
of the overall function. In Question 17, 64 percent of the respondents 
s,tate that the mission planning function could not have been accom-
p1ished without it. In Question 18, 74 percent of the respondents 
said that cross-function group structure increased the overall quality 
ot mission by over 50 percent. This is considered to be conclusive 
evidence that criteria 2 is met. 
It is significant that 74 percent of the participants said 
that the quality of mission planning improved by over 50 percent 
although in a previous question 63 percent indicated that they spent 
less than 25 percent of their time in board activities. 
5. How effective was the board ~ panel, working group in performing 
the following functions? 
Exce ~ .1_€!nt Good ill!. Poor 
-
H9rizontal coordination 60% 34% 4% 2% 
i 
f 
V1rtical coordination 27% 51% 12% 10% 
f I I Ident ;~,fying problems 3~% 35% 2li% 7% 
I i 
f 
I I 
Providing solutions 36'% 36% i ,18% 10% 
Making decisions 43% 
I 
3;8% 11% 8% 
Validation criteria 3, Hypothesis III, states that the cross-
function group is very effective in providing lateral coordination. 
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Sixty percent of the respondents indicate that effectiveness of the 
board was excellent; 94 percent indicate that its effectiveness ~n 
lateral coordination was excellent to good. This is considered 
ample evidence that validation criteria 3 is met. 
6. IIow effective was utilization of time in board, panel, 
working group meetings compared to utiliz~tion of time 
within your functional organization? 
7. 
-19% much better 35% better 45% about the same 
8% not quite as good 2% poor 
W~at was the caliber of the individuals on the board, 
panel, working group compared to the caliber of the 
rest of the mission planning organization personnel of 
comparable grade level? 
7% much better 48% better 44% about the same 
_____ not quite as good 1% poor 
8. To what extent did .the board, panel, working group 
structure contribute to creative results? 
30<>' ;;/(0 very much 43% moderately 18% not very much 
Validation criteria 4, Hypothesis III, states that as the 
cross-function structure is an effective tool, participants will 
r~cognize that their time is well utilized in the performance of 
I 
I 
t~is funct.ion. 'l'he responses to these questions in addition to 
i 
ptoviding more than sufficient evidence to meet the validation 4 
requirements, presents other significant data. 
It is quite customary to see derogative' comments in the. 
I 
I 
literature about committees. The respondents here disagree that 
I 
committee action is necessarily ineffective. In fact, in an 
i 
! 
organization that uses cormnittees extensively, 45.percent indicate 
that their time is better spent in committee activities than in 
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line activities. Fifty-five percent consider that the caliber of 
the individuals is better on the co~~ittees than in the normal 
line organizations. Eighty-two percent indicate that the boards', 
etc., contribution to creative results is in the moderate to very 
much range. 
The probable reasons for these answers are threefold. First, 
line supervisors from the next hierarchical level generally serve as 
chairmen of the boards, panels, and working groups. These chairmen 
exercise the same skills in leading these groupS as they do in their 
own organizations. Second, because of the interrelated aspects of 
the mission planning function, each participant requires information 
from the other participants to effectively perform his O't\TIl function. 
Third, as the Pe1z and Andrews studies indicate there is a strong 
correlation between an increase in horizontal contacts and an in-
crease in higher performance. As a result, under the guidance of 
! 
line supervisors, the other two factors provide a dynamic and 
stimulating work environment. 
21. ~o what extent should a mechanism similar to the board, 
panel, working group structure be ,used in the future for 
other large, complex operations? 
79% probably in most instances 
21% moderately, depends on the circumstances 
-0- . little, this is probablyaniSQlated instance 
where it could be effective 
It is signifit:ant that no respondent considers the effective 
use of a cross -fUllction structure in this case :as an isolated 
instance. As is brought out in t~leir cormnents in the next section, 
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the respondents have identified some important advantages to utilizing 
this type of structure. 
Respondents' Comments 
22. Comments (Concerning MSC Apollo mission planning "system" 
pf boards, panels and working groups or concerning its use 
as a management technique in the future; e.g., in looking 
back now would you improve the Apollo system of boards, 
panels, and working groups?) 
As indicated earlier, 21 of the 71 respondents submitted 
comments in addition to c~pLeting the multiple choice answers. 
Their comments fall into two classes--problem areas, and advantages 
" 
and recommendations; they are summarized below. 
Problem Areas 
The type of problems which the respondents identify are all 
a~sociated with improving the effectiveness of the board, p~nel, 
II 
w,?rking group structure;, none indicate there was anything wrong 
I 
i 
i w~th the structure per see There are six types of prob1e,ms identi-
i 
i . 
, fied; they are: 
1. Failure to acknowledge existence of a "system" of boards, panels, 
and working groups, with consequent inadequate knowledge by 
organization members on how the mission planning function was 
accompltshed, 
2. L~~t~ and piecemeal development of board structure; 
3. Duplication and overlap in functions and responsibilities of 
certain boards, etc. 
4. Lack of coordination between boards , pane1s,a.nd working groups 
5. Failure to adequately delegate ;authori'ty to bo.a.rds and failure 
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in clarifying types of decisions which boards can make; 
6. Making decisions first and then only using system to advise of 
decision made; othe~qise going around system. 
Some typical comments are: 
• 
The Apollo 'system' of mission planning did 
not grow out of a centrally conceived plan 
understood and sanctioned by management. 
Jt represented a piece meal response to 
problems of coordination at the point in 
time when the problems had grown to a point 
where they could not be ignored. The Apollo 
job could have been done with fewer panels/ 
Qoards/groups a,nd with less wasted effort 
if care had bee~ taken early in the program 
to layout an integrated plan of such groups. 
More advertisement; i.e., make the system 
known to all management levels and to in-
dividual engineers and analysts. Since 
~he Apollo mission planning system was 
~ontinuing to develop as we went, the big 
~icture of this system wasn't always clear 
cit lO1;qer management and worker levels. 
This was not intentional; it just didn't 
always filter at an appropriate rate. 
In general, the "system" is an extremely 
useful management technique that we should 
use in future programs. However, the 
major problems associated with the Apollo 
system was the lack of an overall, clearly 
~dentified integration of these efforts. 
9n too many occasions the functions being 
p,erforrned by various panels and working 
~roups were duplicated by o.ther panels and 
,orking groups which tended to reduce the 
o;verall effectiveness. 
I l1ake system more rigorous • • • there are 
things being done that should have board 
approval, i.e., working troops are under 
the table getting thin*s into missions 
without knowledge or approval by manage-
ment. l 
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Advantages and Recommendations 
The respondents provided some very useful information con-
cerning significant advantages of this system as well as mak~ng 
recommendations for improving utilization in other programs. Listed 
below, in order, is a summary of the advantages respondents listed, 
a summary of recommendations made and, last, some typical comments. 
A. Summary of advantages: 
1. It forced needed coordination, both laterally as well as 
vertically. 
2. It was an excellent mechanism for systematic early and 
thorough communication. 
3. It helped solve somer organization problems • 
B. Summary of recommendations: 
1. Design overall system at an early date in program 
2. Issue instruction which define boards, etc. 
a) scope and authority 
b) objectives 
3. Make system usage more d~sciplined 
4. Review charters regularly 
5. Key to use is firm management control 
6. Provide good support by line organizations 
7. Provide participants group-discussion training 
c. Some typical comments are: 
1. The system of bo~!rds ensured primarily that 
the appropriate p:,eople and therefore,. their 
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organizations, communicated before the fact 
of mission planning decisions. In pre-
vious programs we got in trouble where such 
communications were not effected. On Apollo 
the mechanism and therefore the results 
avoided much of this. Do not be misled~ 
You have to do more than ~rmit communication. 
Any system must force it, if the system is to 
work. 
2. You should recognize. that many of these 
panels had very different interests--i.e., 
some strictly technical, some strictly 
fuanagement oriented and some in between. 
Those such as data priority--FOP's were 
extremely useful and Apollo could not have 
survived without at least a similar mechanism. 
The CCB was useful because it forced upper 
management to participate. All of course 
provided a terrific means of commm;lication 
and coordination. The board and partel 
technique is good . • • 
3. Panels, in my opinion, will be needed ·.for 
future programs but should be held to a 
workable number, organize.d in some fashion 
and the charter reviewed regularly. 
4. Success of the board depends on 
a) Initiative, energy and leadership of 
board chairman 
b) Board having clear-cut objectives 
c) Good support of board by cognizant 
organizations. Decisions aren't made 
by board and presented to management 
as fait accompli; board function is 
essentially staff function. But it's 
great to be sure data and understanding 
of problem are complete, and to help 
define who's responsible for what. 
5. it was a disciplined way to bring the 
iright' people together and to make 
4ecisions and to maintain a record of these 
decisions. Information flo~y both vertically 
and horizontally was a major benefit from 
such activities. 
6. The keys are to have firm management 
control, and the ~ coordination· 
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possible ~pecially laterally in 
addition to the usual vertical). 
7. The Apollo mission" planning system worked. 
It forced needed 
organizations and between the line organi-
zations and management. 2 
Summary 
-
The questionnaire, which, w.as answered by 71 percent of the 
population provides important substantiating data in support of the 
three w'orking hypotheses. Further, significant information regarding 
the effectiveness of committee action is presented which both contra-
diets. much in the literature concerning the effectiveness of 
committee action and which also suggests how committee action might 
be made more effective. 
In support of Hypothesis I, evidence is presented which 
shows that the majority of respondents consider the board, panel, 
working group developed in support of Apollo mission planning to be 
an integrated, hierarchical system similar to a formal line organi-
zation. Further, although some difficulty w.as experienced with the 
question, evidence is advanced which indicates that the principal 
fUIl,ction of the boards, etc., is lateral coordination. Other evL-
denc~ is advanced which shows substantial group decision-making 
usage. At the same time it is shown that while participation in 
theise groups involves members working to a moderate amount for two 
supervisors, little or no difficulty is experienced in supervisor-
employee relations. 
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In support of Hypothesis III, evidence is presented which 
shows that an increase in line supervisory participation increases 
the capability of the cross-function group. Further, a substantial 
number of respondents indicate that supervisory participation in 
these groups is the principal factor integrating the committee 
activities with line organization activities. 
In support of Hypothesis III, evidence is presented which 
shows that the boards, panels, and working groups are very effective 
in ensuring that the proper personnel are involved in decision-
making functions. Moreover, 74 percent of the respondents indicate 
that the overall quality of mission planning improved over 50 percent 
by use of the committee structure. In addition, 64 percent of the 
respondents indicate that the Apollo mission planning function could 
not be accomplished without this committee structure. Evidence is 
also presented which shows that 80 percent of respondents consider 
that the boards, panels, and work groups, in accomplishing their 
principal functions, are in the excellent-to-good range; 91 percent 
indicate that the structure is in the excellent-to-good range in 
accomplishing lateral coordinat"ion. 
Additional data shows that 45 percent of respondents con-
sider their time spent in committee to be more effectively utilized 
than work in line organization activities; only. 10 percent considered 
th~ir time to be less ef£ectively utilized. Moreover, 55 percent 
consider the caliber of individuals (of same grade level) is better 
in committee work compared 'tlith comparable individuals in line 
organizations; only 1 percent considered their caliber lower. 
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Finally, 39 percent consider that the board, panel, working group 
structure contributes very much to creative results, only 18 percent 
thought the contributions of the groups as not important. 
A significant fact highlighted by questionnaire responses 
is the high regard that the respondents had for the effectiveness of 
committee action. This factor is considered in more detail in later 
chapters. 
The comments of 21 of the 71 respondents who answered the 
free-form Question 22 were especially useful. These comments are 
useful both in explaining the structure's relative deficiencies as 
well as in providing very meaningful information as to the advantages 
of such organizational arrangements. 
It is interesting to note that all of the problems identified 
are directed at deficiencies in the broad structure operation rather 
than toward the structure concept itself. Principal advantages of 
~he board structure are: (a) it forces needed coordination, rather 
i ' 
than just allowing coordination and (b) provides a systematic method 
for early, full and continuous coordination. Reconunendations are: 
(1) that similar cross-function structures should be used in the 
future and (2) to be most effective, the cross-function structure 
should be deliberately designed early in the program's life. 
In th~ next chapter the findings developed in the last four 
chapters will be summarized and conclusions reached. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Comments are taken from 4 different responses to Question 22 of 
the subject questionnaire. Questionnaire responses are in 
possession of this researcher. 
2. Comments are taken from 7 different responses to Question 22 of 
subject questionnaire. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Manned Spacecraft Center has developed a highly effective 
lateral organizational pattern in accomplishing its Apollo manned 
spaceflight mission planning activities. A key element in this 
organizational structure is the cross-function group, with its 
s:trong emphasis on supervisory participation. To a large extent, 
Rensis Likert's concept of multiple, overlapping groups which, 
, 1 
as he states, has "unique resources" for R&D organizations, 
furnishes a definite conceptual basis for describing this lateral 
coordinating and control structure. Furthermore, a survey of the 
literature indicates a striking deficiency in concepts of, and 
especially organizational techniques for lateral coordination, 
which might otherwise provide insights for explaining this 
organizational pattern. 
These conclusions emerge from a research investigation 
designed to: (1) study and analyze the MSC Apollo mission planning 
I 
'. 
o~ganizational structure and (2) interpret the results of this study 
ill terms of relevant concepts in the field of organizational theory. 
This subject area is chosen for investigation for two bas'ic, over-
lapping reasons. First, it is a key organizational unit in the 
successful Apollo lunar landing program, the world's most complex 
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R&D undertaking. Therefore, for possible future application, the 
management and .organizational techniques utilized in the undertaking 
deserve study to determine which .of these techniques contributed 
most to the success lof the. program. Second, the MSC Apollo mission 
planning structure exhibits apparently singular lateral .organi-
zational patterns which bear characteristics common to Likert's 
multiple, overlapping groups. If it develops that the mission 
planning structure is, in fact, utilizing an .organizati.onal pattern 
similar t.o that proposed by Likert, the significance of this finding 
is c.ompounded. 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, three working 
hyp.otheses are formulated. First, the .organizational structure 
developed to perform MSC Apollo mission planning is a highly repre-
s,entative example of the multiple, .overlapping gr.oup ~tructure pro-
posed by Likert f.or large R&D .organizations. Second, the maj.or 
factor integrating the activities of these cross-functi.on groups 
into the overall mission planning organization is participation in 
these groups by line supervisors. Third; the MSC Apo1l.o missi.on 
planning b.oard, panel, working '~roup structure is an extremely 
valuable t.ool in achieving successful c.oordinati.on in a,c.omplex 
organizational environment. 
The research design formulated to these working hypotheses 
inv.o1ves three approaches. First, a survey of the literature to 
identify relevant concepts which might provide an interpretive in-
sight into the organizational structure under analysis. Second, an 
examinati.on of the missi.on planning structure utilizing agency 
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secondary sources to describe and analyze the functions, duties, 
membership and interrelationships of the component parts. The third 
approach is a questionnaire surveying participants of the bo~rd, panel, 
working group structure to determine their evaluation of certain 
board, panel, working group factors: principal functions, effective-
ness in performance of functions, effectiveness of time utilized, 
contribution to creative results, participative decision-making, 
effectiveness of supervisory participation, overall contribution 
quality of mission planning function, and other similar factors. The 
next section briefly reviews the MSC environment; the following 
sections present the results of the implemented research design. 
A Connnon Goal 
-
The environment of the MSC Apollo mission planning structure 
is extremely complex and dynamic'. The first overriding consideration 
has been the goal of a manned lun~r landing prior to 1970; it is the 
unifying objective. The second consideration is the interrelated-
ness of all work effort; decisions reached at one end of the country 
cQncerning hardware can seriously impact mission planning consider-
a~ions across the country, and vice versa. Recognition of the need 
for close coordination is wide spread and, consequently, the needed 
i~tegrating mechanisms were established. This, is particularly true 
! 
in the mission planning area where it is much more difficult to . 
develop adequate tests and where much of the capability is reflected 
in a man's knowledge rather than in a developed piece of hardware. 
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As a r~sult of the foregoing there is a constant need for 
coordination and flexibility. This need is also reflected in the 
management practices which stress flexible organizations to meet 
changing the situations as the program moves from the design phase 
through the development and test phases and finally into the flight 
phase. 
Each of these elements have their impact on the MSC Apollo 
mission planning organization and serve as a unifying force. 
Likert's Concept 
Based on an analysis of its organizational structure and 
responses from the questionnaire, it is determined that the MSC 
Apollo mission planning system is, to a significant degree, a 
r.epresentative example of Likert's concept of overlapping groups. 
W:hether or not it is "highly representative" is debatable; the 
i 
question aris~s because the lateral organizational pattern, rather I. 
than being implemented as a specific management tool, evolved as 
the situation demanded and, as some of the respondents to the 
questionnaire indicate, there are, or were, certain overlapping 
areas which could be improved. It is significant, however, that 
modifications which the respondents, from their viewpoint, suggest 
for improvement would make it a "highly representative" example. 
The remainder of this section is a description and analysis of 
this strucrture. 
The Apollo mission planning structure consists of six line 
organizations, five functional and one, project office. All six 
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organizations perform other functions in addition to their Apollo 
mission planning activities during the period under consideration. 
The mission planning efforts of these personnel are integrated, 
along with other methods, by a system of twelve boards, panels, and 
w6rking groups. It is this lateral overlapping of these boards, 
panels, and working groups across the vertical line organizations 
that results in the singular matrix organization. 
" 
I ~ Analysis of secondary data shows the average total of 
board, panel, working group membership is approximately 121 persons, 
j 
., 
of whom 58 percent are supervisors from all four levels of the line 
organization. Supervisors also serve as chairmen of eleven of the 
twelve cross-functional groups. Eighty-nine percent of the respon-
d~nts to the questionnaire consider these boards, panels, and working 
g~oups to be an integrated structure; 66 percent consider them to 
be: in a hierarchical arrangement similar to a formal line organization. 
Ninety-seven percent indicate that group decision-making is used. 
i 
Further, while 54 percent indicate that participation in the cross-
t 
functional groups results in working 'at least moderately for two 
supervisors, 94 percent indicate little or no difficulty in super-
visory relations as a result. 
The above described data are evaluated against previously 
established evaluation criteria in the research design and, con-
sequently, based on this data and other data presented in the next 
: ' 
'section, it is determined that the MSC Apollo mission planning 
structure is representative of Likert's concept of multiple, over-
lapping groups. 
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As indicated above, however, there is some limitation as to 
extent of the representation as the cros's-function group concept has 
not been established and maintained, at least originally, on a 
systema.tic basis. This fact is brought out to a limited extent in 
reviewing the secondary sources where some overlapping in respon-
;". 
sibilities became evident. It is brought out more succinctly by a 
number of the respondents who indicate such problems as: failure to 
acknowledge existence of board structure earlier, late and piecemeal 
development of the board structure, duplication and overlap in cer-
tain areas and lack of coordination in certain instances. However, 
the use and recognition of the board structure is constantly 
developing and maturing and as a result, efforts may already have 
taken place to use this concept more systematically. For example, 
the respondents in making comments for improving the structure sug-
gest both early design of the system, as well as clear definition 
of: scope and authorities, objectives and inte.rrelationships. 
Effective Supervisory Participation, 
Of paramount importance in both Likert's concept as well 
as in the MSC Apollo mission planning structure is the critical role 
of the supervisor. For it is the supervisor who ensures that 
throughout the structure there is both an effectiv~_decision-making 
approach as well as a vertical information flow. This concept of 
supervisory participation in the cross-functional group cannot be 
.. ; ov~rstated, for without such participation the cross-function 
i 
groups. will become ineffective in the fa.ce of line hierarchy pressures. 2 • 1 ~ I 
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Two answers in the questionnaire corroborate this thesis 
that the supe~visor's role is critical. First, of five factors 
listed, 61 percent of the respondents indicate that a chairman who 
is also a supervisor in the line organization is the principal 
factor integrating line and cross-functional activities. The next 
highest factor involves the person who is a cross-function member 
and who is also a supervisor in the line organization. The third 
through fifth factors, involving formal procedures and cross-function 
members who are non-supervisors, are ranked substantially lower. 
The second question involved an increase in line supervisory 
participation in cross-functi~n groups. Eighty-one percent of 
respondents indicate that the capabilities of the cross-function 
groups increased very much-to-moderately as the result of an in-
crease in supervisor particiipation. 
Productive Lateral Coordination 
One of the basic assumptions of the study is that the 
organizational elements that compose the study are highly successful 
organizations. This assumption is based on three considerations . 
. : 
!: 
i .... ' , ,:.l Fir~t, members of the MEC Apollo mission planning structure performed 
, ,d 
. t\ 
{ a,key role in the successes of the Apollo spaceflight missions as 
',t,' ':1' 
.' . " 
well as in previous programs. Second, many leaders of these organi-
zations have been recognized nationally by their peers in professional 
',. 
organizations as outstanding technical managers. Third, these 
" 
organizations have been recognized numerous times as outstanding 
i 
'teams; most recently several key members were awarded the Medal of 
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Freedom, the United States' highest civilian a'tvard, by President 
Nixon, for the team's overall performance in real-time mission 
planning in support of Apollo XIII. 
Given the preceding assumption, one objective of the question-
naire was to dete.rmine to what extent the board, panel, working group 
structure contributes to the quality and effectiveness of the overall 
Apollo mission planning function. The determination. made is that 
not only was the overall quality ,of the total mission planning effort· 
substantially enhanced but that the mission planning function could 
not have been accomplished without these boards, panels, and working 
groups. Moreover, respondents' replies pertaining to the high 
effectiveness of these cross-function groups differ substantially 
from that which might have been expected from the literature cQnsider-
ing the wide range of the derogatory comments about committee 
activities~ In this regard, the key role played by supervisors in 
committee activities could prove to be a decisive one. 
Eighty percent of the respondents indicate that the board, 
panel, working group structure is very effective in ensuring that 
the proper personnel are involved in making decisions. Sixty-four 
,percent' of the respondents said that mission planning could not be 
accomplished without the broad structure. Ninety-four percent said 
. '. 
that the boards, panels, and working groups are in the excellent-to-
good range in performing the lateral coordination function. Most 
amazing of all, 39 percent indicate that the board, panel, working 
group s.tructure improves overall mission planning quality in excess 
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] of 75 percent; another 35 indicate the improvement to be in excess 
, 
.. ~ 
,.\ 
of 50 percent. 
In regard to the effectiveness of committee action their 
answers are as follows. Eighty-two percent indicate that the 
boards, panels, working groups contribution to creative results to 
be moderate or very much. Fifty-five percent indicate that the 
board members are of a better caliber than comparable level line 
,,' 
personnel. Forty-five percent indicate that their time was better 
utilized in committee action than in line activities; only 10 per-
cent indicate their time was not as well spent in cross-function 
groups. 
i' 
Verti'cal/Lateral Organization 
As ~le have seen from the foregoing discussions, the superior 
in the MSC Apollo mission planning structure occupies a position(s) 
that is strategic not only in normal vertical relationships but also 
in lateral relationships. His position in these lateral relationships, 
either as chairman or member of a connnittee, enables him to coordi-
nate. his activities with the o~her six line organizations. And, 
although he normally spends less than one-fourth of his time in 
11 
these activities, he considers them indispensable; he also considers 
I , 
that they increase the quality of mission planning by one-half. 
What does the literature say about such lateral relationships? 
In reviewing the works of major authorities of the last 
seventy years in the field of organization theory, one is struck 
by the relative absence of discussion of lateral coordination: 
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there is especially a lack of concepts for developing lateral or-
ganizational structures. For the first fifty years of this century, 
the major authorities--Taylor, Fayol, Mooney and Re.iley, White, 
Willoughby, Gulick, Urwick, and Weber, were concerned primarily with 
hierarchical relationships. To them, the matter of lateral co-
ordination is primarily an organizing function. If the organizing 
is accomplished properly, that is, if the same types of functions 
are assigned to one organization under one supervisor, the lateral 
coordination problem is resolved. Thus, in theory, if there are 
lateral coordination problems, they are problems of poor organi-
zation. While these authorities recognize that some lateral co-
ordination was necessary, in the main they consider it as a 
necessary, evil to solve " ..• abnormal situations These 
authorities generally also recognize the necessity for lateral 
coordination in their concepts of line-staff. Staff has respon-
sibility for horizontal or lateral coordination; yet to them, 
4 
staff is also a hierarchical function. 
However, the manner in which these authorities deal with 
lateral coordination may only reflect the organizational situation 
at their time. For at that time much of the work was process work 
in which each group dealt with the product it had in serial fashion, 
with contact minimized between units in the process. Today weare 
being faced, more and more, with large problems or projects which 
~equire a multi-disciplinary, overlapping, joint approach. It is 
" 
i· 
this new element in the organization's environment which requires 
'that lateral coordination be treated as an ongoing responsibility 
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rather than as an abnormal situation. 
On the other hand, there were three major authorities who, 
during these first fifty years of the century, developed concepts 
which are relevant to today's problems. Mary Parker Follett's 
concepts are most relevant to this study. While her treatment of 
the coordination is too extensive to discuss here"her four basic 
concepts of coordination can still be used as guidelines. In fact, 
in view of our envirorunent today, they are more important than 
ever. To Follett, the principal elements of coordination are: 
early, direct, reciprocal (that is, not just a relating of parts, 
5 
but a mutual adjusting within) and continuous. 
The other two authorities are Chester I. Barnard and Herbert 
A. Simon. Barnard suggests concepts which are very similar to those 
later advanced by Likert. He discusses the need to: (a) consider 
~he small unit organization, (b) recognize that executives serve as 
lIlembers of two or more units or systems of communication, and (c) 
recognize that the supervisory role is a coordinating role. 6 
~e does not discuss lateral coordination specifically, it is 
implied. In like manner, while Herbert A. Simon, in his classic 
work, Administrative Behavior, doesn't discuss lateral coordination 
per se, he does imply in his treatment of decision-making, that 
organizations must be structured to ensure that premise information 
flows directly to decision-making centers. 7 In a later work, he 
adds a dimension to coordination when he suggests that in instances 
of variable and unpredictable situations, coordination by feedback 
should be uti1ized. 8 
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In the 19s0;s there began a general broadening of the field 
of organization theory. Concepts from the fields of communication 
theory, cybernetics, group dynamics, decision-making, and systems 
analysis provided new insights for looking at organizations. The 
majority of the work in these areas has resulted in a tendency to 
look at organizations laterally as well as horizontally. However, 
the emphasis has been more with theoretical explanations of isolated 
phenomena rather than with developing theories of organizational 
structure. 
In the early 1960's the major works of Douglas McGregor, 
Rensis Likert, Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, and Warren C. Bennis 
were published. By then it was recognized that modern organizations 
must have new capabilities to deal with rapidly changing environ-
: 9 10 , 
ments. The key to the, new organizational capability involves a 
new insight into the nature of the individual in the organization--
. 11 
basically McGregor's Theory Y man. . Concurrently it was recognized 
12 13 that there is a continuum of organizational management patterns. ' 
The flexible, more adaptive organization pattern is termed "organic" 
by Burns and Stalker,14 "participative" by Likert. ls Likert also 
introduced the concept of the linking pin, the idea that organi-
zations consist of small units which are linked together by certain 
i 
16 persons who are members of two or more of each of these groups. 
T~is linking pin concept has been adopted by 
o~ganization theorists including MCGregor,17 
many of the leading 
18 ' Bennis, and Pelz 
d ,. d 19 an An rews. Pelz and Andrews have recently suggested that 
lateral coordination serves a dual purpos~. In addition to the 
182 
t-
., 
I 
\ 
I . r ... 
'. 
. " 
:.1 
" 
b' 
< .' 
. _ ... ~' . 
. "" '~.','" ' 
, " 
... 
..... . 
'" . . :,::. -' .~. "'. 
".' . 
,," . 
• : ,,, ~ . '" ~ ,o.' • ''': < 1-, . 
,c. 
• ~. - •••••• •• ¥ 
.. , i; ,:/::. OJ. (X~~:·~:b::.::~/ .. ; .. 
" 
Ii • ' 
normal organizational function of ensuring that activities are co-
ordinated, Pelz and Andre~vs' studies show' that in R&D organizations, 
increased lateral contacts among peers is directly correlated with 
20 increased performance. 
In a recent work, Systems Analysis and Project Management, 
David Cleland and William King deal extensively with p~ojectmanage-
ment in all its aspects. They fail, however, to discuss the lateral 
coordination within the project management organization. On the 
• 
other hand, they do suggest a tool for analyzing lateral coordination 
--the Linear Responsibility Chart (LRC). An application of the LRC 
is discussed in the next chapter. 
Conclusions 
In summary, it is concluded that the three hypotheses have 
been proven. The MSC Apollo mission planning structure is repre-
sentative of Likert's concept of multiple, overlapping groups. 
I S!upervisors do perform an essential, even critical role in ensuring 
the effective integration of cross-function activities and line 
organization activities. The use of the multiple, overlapping group 
structure is an extremely valuable, and in this instance, indis-
pensable tool in achieving highly successful coordination in a 
complex organizational environment. 
It is considered that these findings are highly significant. 
Today, as many of our problems grow, both in size and complexity, 
, 
i 
the necessity for lateral coordination increases by orders of 
magnitude. Here is a tool which has proven itself. While this is 
but one case and the environmental conditions were favorable to its 
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development, a designed systematic application to other problems and 
projects may prove to be equally profitable under different conditions. 
Another finding considered significant, is the highly 
effective nature of committe:; action within this system. The role 
performed by supervisors in the lateral group structure was of para-
mount importance. Independent of the overall use of the multiple 
group concept, the structure of committee action based on this con-
cept may prove to be very profitable. 
Yet another finding which is considered significant, although 
negative in nature, is the relative deficiency in the literature con-
cerning lateral coordination concepts and associated organizational 
techniques. This is obviously an organizational area to which 
considerable attention must be devoted if the problems which managers 
must face today are to be solved effectively. For modern organi-
iations must no longer be thought of as hierarchical patterns of 
~uthority and control, but rather as vertical/lateral patterns of 
i 
coordination--in Mary Parker Follett's terms, coordination that is 
early, direct, interpenetrating and continuous. 
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CHAPTER IX 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The complexity of modern organizations requires that in-
creasingly sophisticated tools be developed to adequately analyze 
and manage the intricate operations which are necessary to provide 
the flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing environmental factors • 
As indicated in the previous chapter, many authorities in the field 
now indicate that developing these necessary capabilities involves 
an increasing lateral communication and coordination .. Yet, con-
cepts and associated techniques for developing necessary lateral 
coordination patterns are meager. The purpose of this chapter is: 
(~) to suggest to the practicing manager certain methods which can 
be utilized until more adequate conceptual tools become available, 
and (b) to sugge$t to researchers certain areas where further in- I· 
vestigation is indicated. 
ill the Manager 
The practicing manager, in organizing his operations, has 
normally followed the lead of the traditional or administrative 
management theories. That is, his purpose in the past has been to 
neatly segregate related functi~ns into organizational units and 
then to integrate their activities by means of a hierarchical 
structure. He recognized, of course, that there would be many 
• ~l 
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problems of lateral coordination but this was an inherent function 
of the superior and therefore was left mainly in the realm of day-
to-day operations. What has happened in actual practice is that the 
superior in many instances has failed in accomplishing this co-
ordination responsibility; the reasons are many, e.g., too busy, 
didn't realize coordination was necessary, or was afraid of losing 
some of his author~ty. This is a rather polar case but it does 
emphasize the general t'raditional approach. 
The first reconnnendation is that an additional step be taken 
in the organizing process, and, subsequently, later periodic organi-
zational reviews. The additional step involves a systematic analysis 
of lateral patterns of organization; that is, identifying inter-
relationships, defining requirements for lateral communication and 
coordination, defining as,50ciatedduties and responsibilities, and 
also establishing coordinating mechanisms~ These must be docu-
mented, promulgated, and updated in a similar manner as other 
management documents. In fact, the manager will do well to go one 
step further in this process of analyzing lateral .patterns within 
his organization; he will also analyze the lateral relations of his 
organization with those of other organizations with which it inter-
I 
I 
ac:ts. For thes1e outside lateral relations, in many instances, 
have as much impact on his operations as do his internal lateral 
patterns. 
A sec.ond recommendation made is that in this process of 
organizational'analysis, a schematic chart or matrix be utilized 
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which portrays lateral or horizontal relationships. A typical 
arrangement for such a chart, which has corne to be called a Linear 
Responsibility Chart (LRC)l is to have positions or organizational 
units arranged aC'.ross the top of the chart and functions, responsi-
bilities, or activities down the left hand side. The inter-
relationship between these positions and functions is then shown 
by a set of symbols or numbers which indicate degrees of tyP€!S of 
responsibility for each related position and function. Figure 9, 
on the next page, is a simplified version of a linear responsi-
bility chart. 
There are a nu.mber of advantages to using this type of 
chart. First, it aids the user in changing his concept of organi-
zation. As the old, traditional organization chart served or serves 
as a useful tool in showing vertical, or authority relationships, 
the linear chart can show both vertical as well as horizontal 
relationships. Second, it enables the manager to see his operations 
as an integrated system;2 on ,a single chart, all of the major inter-
relationships can be shown. 
Now, it 'might be questioned that in view of the rapidly 
changing nature of lateral coordinating patterns whether it is 
practicable or feasible to try to stay cognizant of lateral 
relations. The answer is yes. One might not be able to keep 
current concerning all lateral relationships; the same, moreover, 
is true of vertical changes. But it is neither necessary, nor can 
a manager keep track of all such changes. There is a middle ground, 
however, within which the manager can operate. The depth of horizon-
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LINEAR RESPO}:SlBILrI'Y CHAR'll 
Organizational Units 
Project (Functionally Organized) 
Systems Unit Unit It I # II 
Project OVervieH 1,5,2 2,3,4 
System A 3 1,2,5 
System B 3 2,3, J-!-
System C 1,5 2,3,4 
System D 
.1,5 
--
. 
System E • 3 1,2,,5 
System F 3 -1 ? 5 , -, 
Assigned Responsibilities 
1. Provides direction 
2. Does 't'!ork 
3. Co~rdination required 
h. RevleHs and recommends 5. Approves 
Figure 9 
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Unit Unit 
#III ./.j. IV rT 
2,3,4 2,3,L~ 
2,3,4 2,3,4 
1,2,5 2,3,4 
2,3,4 
--
4 2,3~4 
2,3,4 
--
-- --
. ao 
unit 
If V 
2,3,4 
--
--
3,4 
2,3,4 
2,3,4 
--
. 
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tal analysis and associated LRC charting depends on the manager. 
In any event the organizational world is' becoming increasingly com-
plex, consequently, the manager must adapt his tools to these new 
complexities. 
A hird recommendation pertains to the use of committees. 
Too often, it appears, that committees fail because they are treated 
as somet.hing apart from the normal organization; too often they are 
treated or become as autonomous bodies. This concept is incorrect. 
A's this study sho'tvs, successful committees are as much an integral 
part of the ongoing organization as any line unit. Toge.ther with 
line units they require: (a) competent members, (b) an able super-
visor or chairman, and (c) an integration of their activities with 
the organization's overall activities. 
For the Researcher 
----
Four areas. of study are recommended for further research. 
The first involves' a broad criticism of the general lack of concepts 
w~ich can be used by the practicing manager. The next two recom-
mendations involve study of organizational areas whiGh are broader, 
b~t related to the current study. The fourth, and last recommendation, 
is a study of the possible application ~f the concepts utilized in 
the MSC Apollo mission planning structure to social areas. 
First, as iiIdicated in the introduction of this chapter, 
there is a deficiency of concepts and associated techniques for 
developing lateral coordination patterns. WJi.ile there have been a' 
large number of experiments accomplished and broad theoretical 
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generalizatians developed in the fields of group dynamics, communi-
cations theory, decision-making and systems analysis, there is little 
or nothing available as a practicable, unifying concept by which a 
manager can systematically use this information. The best he can do 
is use the salt and pepper approach--a dash of group dynamics, a 
sprinkle of communications theory, a sprig of decision-making, and 
stir it together using the systems analysis approach. While recog-
nizing that there is no magic formula available, there must be some 
better way to organize the currently available knowledge in order 
that it is better available for use. 
The second area recommended for possible study is the entire 
MSC organization as a lateral coordinating mechanism. The MSC 
Apollo mission planning structure is but one of six types of 
different lateral coordination patterns (see Chapter IV) that Wesley 
L. Hjornevik, former Associate Director, MSC, identifies as being 
used in that organization. 3 
The third area recommended for possible study as a lateral 
coordination is the entire Apollo Program structure, including NASA 
Headquarters, the NASA field centers, Apollo contractors and, to a 
limited extent, other goverrunent agencies. There are a series of 
boards, panels, and working groups which unite these organizations 
in performing their Apollo functions. It should prove worthwhile 
to determine the effectivene~s of a board, panel, working group 
structure across inter-organizational lines. 
The fourth area recommended for study is the possible appli-
cation of MSC Apollo mission planning lateral coordination patterns 
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to social areas. Many of the concepts utilized in the MSC Apollo 
mission planning st.ructure are the same as those which Mary Parker 
Follett suggested for use in solving the Nation's social problems 
almost forty years ago. The time may now be ripe for her ideas. 
, .' ~ 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. David I. Cleland and William R. King, ~stems Analysis and 
Project Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1968), p. 196. 
2. Ibid., p. 198. 
3. W~sley L. Hjornevik, "Chapter IV, Guiding Working Relationships 
Among Scientific Engineering and Administrative Professionals," 
an issue paper prepared for the Program for Advanced Study in 
Public Administration, University of New Mexico, 1969, p. 25. 
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APPENDIX 
Dear Mr. 
• 
'-
As you may be aware, for the past eight years I have been 
. , .. ' 
a member of Chris Kraft's staff. I am currently participating in a science adrninistration fellowship program at the University of New Mexico. A~ part of that program, I am engage6'in a project to document one of the management techniques which MSC has used in accomplishing the Apollo program objectives. The technique under study is the complex "system" of. boards, panels ~nd working groups that MSC used tp achieve Apollo objectives ~ssociated with mission planning. As a key member of the Apollo mission'planning team your assistance is solicited to arrive at certain determinations. Essentially what is requested is that you complete 'and return the attached questionnaire. 
. Why document this management technique? There are an'umber of reasons. First, the board-pane I-working group structure developed somewhat informally at MSC. If it has proven to be a useful tool, we should take a closer look to see how it operates in order that it might be used even more effectively i~ the future. Second, a number of individuals have suggested that the management techniques used by NASA in managing the Apollo Program might be TTstate-of~the art" and should be applied to other problem areas. James Webb espouses this view and has said that he considers the how and way NASA managed Apollo: "may constitute as important a contribution to our Nation.· .. to its ability to move~ .. forward into the future ... as the space capabilities themselves." It appears that MSC's development of this "system" of board-pane I-working group,structure to effect later~l coordination might constitute such an improved management technique. It therefore should be documented for possibly broader use in other organizations and other 'fields. Third, a leading management authority, Dr. Rensis Likert, University of Michigan, has developed a theoretical concept which 'embodies elements which appear very similar to the poard-panel-work group structure. He suggests that this ,should be the way large, complex organizations develop in the futy~ in brder to coordinate complex R&D operations. If MSC's board-panel-working group structure is representative of his theoretical concept it could prove to be an important factor in the empirical verification of this concept. 
With these considerations in mind I request your support to this project. As soon as the results of the questionnaire and 
. ~ther'analyses related to this project are correlated, I will send you the results of the preliminary findings. Late.r, when the-study is formally completed, a copy of that report will also be forwarded to you. 
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. I would appreciate if you would return this questionnaire 
to me by Friday, March 13, 1970. If you have any questions or 
if there is some way that I may be of assistance to you, you 
may contact me at the address listed below or at the telephone 
number (Area Code 505: . 265-1153). . 
My thanks for your assistance. 
Attachment 
, 
197, 
Yours sincerely, 
~1{e\:~~~~-' -
320 welles~~~ace, N. E. 
Albuquer'que, N. M. 87106 
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Please return to: Addressee Leslie J. Sullivan 
320'We1lesley Pl. N.E. 
Albuquerque, N~·M. 87106 
Phone: 505-265-1153 
The MSC Apollo Mission 
Planning Board-Panel-Working Group 
Structure (Internal only) 
\ 
On the follm<Jing pages is a series of questions about aspects of the Apollo mission planning process. You are asked to select tne ·answer which, in your opinion, is most appropriate. Indicate answer by a check C). If you feel more than one answer is a~propriate ~ndicate priority by marking by number with one' Cl) , etc. indicating the highes~ priority. If you desire to comment about the issue posed by the question just jot it down in the question· area or at the comment area at t~e end of the question-naire. 
Listed below are the boards, panels and working groups con-sidered to constitute an essential part of MSC mission planning process. If you have additions, please indicate. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
9. 
6. 
it. 
8;. 
9:. 
10'. 
11. 
12. 
Apollo Spaceccaft Configuration Cuntrol Board Apollo Spacecraft Software Configuration Control Board Crew Procedures Configuration Control Board Data Priority Coordination (Mission Techniques Document Coordination) Working Group(s) 
Data and Requirements Control Panel 
Flight Operations Plan Meetings 
Radiation Constraints Panel 
Lunar Surface Operations Panel 
Extravehicular Activity Task Force 
Apollo Abort Working Group 
Consumables Subsystem Working Group 
Mission Change Review Group 
Additions 
It is recognized that some of the above groups met infrequently; .~owever, information is needed on all of,the panels, etg. to d~velop a complete picture. Also, if you served on more than one panel, etc. it would be desirable if<you would complete the,question-naire iof each panel on which you participated. 
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,Fc)r purposes of this study the time period under 
~onsideration is from July 1, 1968 to. ~une 30, 1969. It 
is recognized that the anSl-Jers in many instances may be 
subjective, but in any case, your best estimate Hill 
contribute to the tGtal picture. 
1. In what capacity did you se,rve on the boa:r-d, panel, 
or working group? 
Head 
--
Member 
--
Both 
--
2. ~fuat percentage of your time was devoted to the Apollo 
missio~ planning function? 
75-100% 
--
__ 50-75% 25-50% 
. ..,.. . --
__ 0-25% 
3. \\fhat p'ercentage of your time spent in Apollo mission 
planning was directly tied to work on board, panel, 
or working group (e.g. preparing for, attendance at, follow up)? . 
"75-100% 
--
4. To what extent were the follotvin:::. principal functions 
of the board, p~nel, or working grqup? 
75-100% 50-75% 25-50% 0~25% 
' Horizontal coordination 
Vertical coordination ---
Identifying problems 
Providing solutions 
Making decisions 
Other (identify) 
5. Hbw effective waR the board, panel, working group in 
!,erfol"ming the follo'V.Jiilg functio:J.s? 
Excellent Good Fair Poor Horizontal coordinatiori-
'Vertical coordination ----
Identifying problems 
Providing solutions 
l4aking deCisions 
Other (identify) 
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'How effective was utilization of time in board, panel, 
working group meetings compared to utilization of time 
withlnyour functional organization? 
much better better about tlt,e same 
--
____ not quite as good poor 
What was the caliber of the individuals on the board, 
. panel, . working group compared to the caliber of the 
~est of the mission planning org9niz~tion per~onnel 
of comparable grade level? ' 
much better better about the same 
---
____ not quite as good poor 
To \Olhat extent did the board, panel, working group 
structure contribute to creative results? 
__ very much 
__ moderately not very much 
--
To what extent were decisions arrived at by group 
participation rather than one individual making the 
decision at the board,' panel, wOl"king group meetings? 
very much 
---
__ moderately not very much 
--
To what extent did the board, panel, working group 
structure result in the members working,. in effect, 
for two or more 'bosses? 
. very much 
--
_--..moderately little 
--
not at all 
--
To the extent that the board, panel, working group 
structure did involve a person working for two hosses 
what difficulties Here encountered? ' 
__ many moderate 
---
little 
--
none 
--I 
To what extent did the board, pal~el, ~'lOrking group 
structure ensure that the proper p·er.:.onnel ~-1ere ir..volved 
in making mission pla.nning decisions? 
__ very much 
__ Moderately 
__ sliehtly 
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It is a8sQ~ed that in the period from November, 1966 
through March, 1967 (e.g. emphasis having shifted ~rom 
Gemini to Apollo, etc.) th~re was a significant increase 
in the number of line supervisors w-Tho became. members of 
various Apollo boards, "panels, and" working groups. Does. 
such an increase in membership increa.se the capabilitl~s 
of the b9ards, panels, and wbrking groups? 
. very much 
--
moderately 
--
__ slightly 
To loIhat extent does the "system" of boards, panels 
sJ;ld working groups that finally evolved constitute 
S hierarchical arra.ngement similar to the formal organi-
zation? ' 
very much 
--
__ moderately 
__ slightly not at all 
--15. To what extent do you consider the complex of boards, 
panels, "tvorking groups to be ari integrated system? 
--
very'much 
__ modera~ely 
__ slightly 
16. To the extent that the' complex of boards, panels, \-10rk-
ing groups was a system, t·rhat Has the principal inte-
"----------- -grating factor? Check appropriate block for each item. 
Formal procedures 
Members who \-Tere non-
superVisors in their 
respective organizations 
Members Hho were super- " 
visors in their respective 
organization -
"Heads who Here non-super-
visors in their respective 
organization 
H~ads who Here supervisors 
in their resnective organ-ization . 
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17. 1-}hat was the significance of the boa.rd, panel, working group structure in the Apollo mission planning process? 
__ ~Extremely important, mission planning could not have been accomplished without' it Important, but function~ it performed could have . 
\ 
-~ been accomplished by informal groups or other methods 
__ Not too important, functions it performed to/ere periph- I eral to mainstream mission planning effort 
18. To what extent did the board, panel, Horking group structure increase the overall quality of ~ission 
" planning? 
__ ,75-100% 50-757~ 
......... -. 25-50% 
--
0.-25% 
--19. Was there a similar group, formally organized, perform-ing the same functions for 
20. 
A. l.fercury? Yes If yes, its name was 
No, coordina tion~~performed informally 
--
Other 
---- ----------------------------------
B. Gemini? Yes If yes, its name was 
--
No, cOOr'dination perf'ormed infol"mally 
Other 
---- -----------------------------~--~ 
To what extent did a similar hierarchy of semi-formal ~oards, panels, working groups exist under nrevious programs? (See list of Apollo gro.up~ at beginning o'f 
. Que st :i.onnaire ) 
A.' r-f.ercury 
much more about the ~ame 
::==slightly less-- much less 
B. Gemini 
much more about the sa~e 
·-.,-.. -sllghtly 1es8-- much less ~~~\.'-
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21. To what extent should a mechanism similar to the board, 
panel, working group structure be used in the future for 
other large, complex operations? 
---
probably in most instances 
moderatelYj depends on th~ circumstances 
---
____ little, this is probably an isolated instance where 
it could be effective 
'22. Comments (Concerning MSC Apollo miss ion planning "system" 
of boards, panels and working" groups or concerning its use 
as,a management technique in the future; e.g. in looking 
back now would you improve the Apollo system of boards, 
panels and working groups?) 
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